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1  Introduction: Genre in the Climate Debate
The fundamental idea of the present volume is that an engagement with the genres 
involved in the climate debate can be a key to understanding, developing, and 
perhaps even changing the debate. 
The book’s starting point is twofold. On the one hand, a well-known problem, the 
gap between the near-unanimous agreement in science about the basics of human 
made, or anthropogenic, climate change (ACC), and the widespread lack of accep-
tance of this agreement in the public sphere. On the other, a field of study, genre 
research, which has been through an explosive development during the last three 
decades, but is still a long way from having made its full impact on research and is 
largely unknown beyond the academy. 
Briefly stated, the connection between the two is that genres play vital roles in 
human interaction. We express ourselves in genres, learn in genres, and act in genres. 
Therefore, the question about how knowledge of ACC spreads – or, as the case may 
be, does not spread – from the scientific sphere to a broader public will to a very 
large extent be influenced by the genres in play, and by the use of those genres by 
individual actors. 
More than this, however, is the role played by genres – and by genre users – in the 
climate debate. Genres are strong carriers of tacit cultural knowledge (Devitt, 2004; 
Auken, 2015a), and their role in social interchanges and institutional communication 
have been analyzed many times over (for instance, Andersen, 2015; Artemeva, 2008; 
Bazerman, 1994; Berkenkotter, 2011; Bhatia, 1993; Devitt, 1991). However, there is also 
a more problematic side to genres, since genres are habitual and may acquire what 
Paré has called an “illusion of normalcy” (2002). Genres may even, in Judy Segal’s apt 
phrase, become carriers of a “cultural reproduction of ignorance” (2007, 4; see also 
Segal, 2012). Genres are carriers of power relations, social roles, and ideologies, and 
may as such, both by their very existence and through conscious use by individual 
actors, hold back knowledge and skewer action.
The book, thus, takes up the ACC debate as a question of genre. It aims to dem-
onstrate how established genre structures both facilitate and hold back knowledge 
about ACC. Moreover, the book describes how individuals or groups of actors use, 
modify, contradict, manipulate, and sometimes even create genres to achieve their 
aim. Therefore, the basic idea from a knowledge point-of-view is to explore how a 
theory set can shed new light on a lingering conundrum. However, given the exigent 
character of climate change, and the unsolved problems in climate communication, 
the reach of such new light may prove to be much wider.
 © 2020 Sune Auken and Christel Sunesen
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1.1  The Protest Sign and the Research Article
Compare two statements about ACC. The first, written in upper-case letters across 
a hand painted picture of the world, is taken from a protest sign displayed at the 
Chicago People’s Climate March on April 29th, 2017. The text reads “Climate change is 
real. In other news, water is wet.” (See Levenson, 2017.) The second is from a research 
article dealing with the scientific agreement about the reality of ACC: “Climate sci-
entists overwhelmingly agree that humans are causing recent global warming. The 
consensus position is articulated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) statement that ‘human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed 
warming since the mid-20th century’ (Qin et al., 2014, 17)”. (Cook et al., 2016, 150).
The two statements carry the same basic claim – that the evidence for the reality 
of ACC is beyond reasonable doubt – and they share the assumption that this knowl-
edge should lead to political and societal action. However, the differences between 
the two statements are equally obvious, and neither would work in the context of 
the other. The protest sign juxtaposes the statement that climate change is real with 
another statement “In other news, water is wet”. This is an established expression 
that marks something as so blindingly obvious, that even saying it should be as trite 
as publishing a news story about water being wet. This kind of metaphorical argu-
ment would be unconvincing in a research article. 
The statement from the research article is an extended ethos argument; the article 
posits the reality of ACC by presenting the agreement of the scientist most knowledge-
able about the topic. This specific ethos argument, the argument from expertise, is 
well-known in science communication and prevalent in climate communication. As 
the overwhelming majority of the public, including politicians, investors, journalists, 
and debaters, are non-scientist they are unable to understand, much less vouch for, 
the science involved in establishing the reality, the causes, and the consequences of 
ACC, the “percieved consensus” of those who actually understand the topic becomes 
important (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2012). Cook et al. (2016) work to estab-
lish the evidence for that agreement. However, the statement is far too long, and 
requires too much prerequisite knowledge, to fit neatly on a protest sign.
The differences, thus, are not of message – or even necessarily of knowledge; a 
person knowledgeable in climate science could have written the protest sign too. They 
are differences of genre. Each of the two statements appear in a particular situation, 
with a particular communicative purpose and subject to a particular set of rhetorical 
constraints. The text on the poster is simple, and its message can be seen and read 
from a distance. It is written over a picture of the Earth and carried in a march along-
side other signs; it thus adds to the rhetorical strength of another genre, the march, 
and at the same time relies on said march to frame and carry its message. The text is 
whimsical, but it is also affirmative, strong and unhedged. 
The text from the research article also relies on its genre to make its point. Com-
pared to the protest sign it is hedged using terms such as “overwhelmingly agree,” 
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“consensus position” and “dominant cause” and “observed” each implying the exis-
tence of counter-information or counterclaims. The statement in question is embed-
ded in a research article, which provides the arguments and the evidence for the claim, 
mostly presented in statements that are even less likely to ever make it onto protest 
signs. However, when seen in the context of its own genre the article’s presentation of 
its claims are muscular and assertive; and the hedges in the quote are themselves of a 
sort that may hedge, but in fact leave little room for the alternate viewpoints implied. 
Language as strong as this is rare in research articles on complex systems such as the 
Earth’s atmosphere. Seen in the context of its genre, the statement comes very close 
to saying: “In other news: water is wet”.
The two concrete texts, the poster and the article, probably never touched. At 
most, it is possible, if unlikely, that the painter of the sign read the article. However, 
the two genres are clearly connected. Despite their differences, they are not at odds, 
but interdependent. The protest sign presupposes an established knowledge with 
strong enough evidence to support the claim, and the whole existence of the march, 
including the poster, is unthinkable without both an extensive climate science and an 
enormous effort in communicating the findings of said science. 
The research article on the other hand derives from a situation in which scientific 
agreement on ACC has become a critical issue in the public debate, in which it is nec-
essary, so to speak, to be able to say, “Climate change is real. In other news, water is 
wet.” It establishes part of the evidence for claims like this, and even discusses the 
usefulness in the public sphere of the scientific agreement on ACC. On the other hand, 
the research study itself can only communicate its findings to a relatively small group 
of scientists, researchers, and possibly a few other interested parties. It depends on 
an uptake from other actors into more popular genres; genres that are able to reach a 
wider audience and put pressure on decision makers in economy and politics. Beyond 
the protest sign, these genres could include petitions, tweets, and statements in par-
liamentary hearings, news satire, or subdued dissemination pieces that try to reach 
a less convinced audience, like the series of videos and articles on prominent climate 
scientist Katharine Hayhoe’s homepage.1
Thus, the two genres interlock. Even if an exact path of influence cannot be estab-
lished between the research article and the protest sign, it is fair to say that there is a 
clear connection between the genres. Articles like Cook et al. (2016) have, sometimes 
directly, but mostly through a variety of different channels, influenced public percep-
tions of ACC in such a way that it has become obvious to the painter of the protest sign 
to adorn it with the statement “Climate change is real. In other news, water is wet.”
1  Seen Feb. 21st, 2019. On blogging as genre see, among others, Devitt (2009a); Miller (2017); Miller 
& Shepherd (2004).
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1.2  Genre Research
In the context of genre research, the joint starting point for the chapters to follow 
is the North American Rhetorical Genre Studies (RGS) – albeit with excursions into 
related theoretical traditions depending on the topic of each chapter and the indi-
vidual research interest of each author. The established narrative about this goes back 
to Carolyn Miller’s trailblazing study “Genre as Social Action” (1984) and describes a 
change in which a genre is seen as “a situation-based fusion of form and substance” 
(153).2 The meaning of this is not – even if it has sometimes been taken up this way – 
that formal or thematic elements of an utterance are of little or no significance. In the 
case of the two genres mentioned above, for instance, Miller’s approach would mean 
that their formal characteristics and their thematic content (“substance” in Miller’s 
terminology) should be seen in relation to the function of the two genres. This is sug-
gested, of course, in the analysis above, but to reiterate: both genres, the protest sign 
and the research article, have a situation in which they are trying to act, and their 
form and content are organized to fit that purpose.3
Working from Miller’s study and other foundational publications (for instance, 
Bakhtin, 1986; Bazerman, 1988, Berkenkotter & Huckin, 1993; Bhatia, 1993; Devitt, 
1991, 1993; Freedman & Medway, 1994; Jamieson, 1975; and Swales, 1990), functional 
perspective scholars within the RGS tradition have developed genre into a multifac-
eted core concept of several disciplines: rhetoric, linguistics, communication and 
media studies, information studies, and composition. In the process, genre research 
has developed a nuanced vocabulary for describing, in particular, genre use in insti-
tutional and educational settings, often in a nuanced dialogue with the genre research 
from the English for Specific Purposes tradition, to which Swales and Bhatia men-
tioned above belong (See Devitt, 2015), and – to a lesser degree – the genre reseach 
prevalent within systemic functional lingustics. (For the distinction between the three 
traditions see Hyon, 1996). 
The functional perspective has been prevalent in contemporary genre research 
in the RGS-tradition, and is only rarely challenged in theory (but see Auken, 2015b; 
2  I refer to this as the “established narrative” of genre research because its basic structure is repeated 
time and time again in contemporary works on genre, and empahtically not because there is any-
thing wrong with the narrative. It can be challenged, of course, but there is much truth in it. For an 
extensive rendering of the development and positions of contemporary genre research see Bawarshi 
& Reiff, 2010; for shorter versions see Miller, Devitt, & Gallagher, 2018; and Auken, 2018. A number of 
the central studies in the RGS-tradition can be found in Miller & Devitt, 2018. Challenges against the 
overall narrative can be found in, for instance, Freadman, 2012. 
3  Throughout genre research, before and after Miller, the triad between the situational, the thematic, 
and formal sides of genre is rendered in a varied terminology and with differing interpretations of the 
relationship or hierarcy of the three sides. For a partial discussion and disambiguation, see Auken, 
2015.
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Devitt, 2009a). Alongside this development, the primary topic of contemporary genre 
research has come to be the genres in use. Thus, what is sometimes called humble 
genres, everyday genres, de-facto genres, or rhetorical genres have come to occupy 
center stage in the analysis of genre. Within RGS many important studies have been 
done on genres in practical use, and much less on the study of topics like literature, 
art, music, film, and high oratory which were at the center of attention in previous 
decades (but see Auken, 2014; Devitt, 2000; Frow, 2014; Nyboe, 2016; and Warren, 
2019). This is connected with the shift in emphasis to the functional side of genre, as 
a new theory focus enables new studies, and they, in turn, strengthen theory. Many 
central distinctions in genre theory have sprung from case studies. However, as will 
be evident also from the studies in the present volume, researchers in the RGS-tra-
dition rarely if ever isolate themselves to a functional perspective in their research 
practice. Rather, like Miller, they rely on a variety of situational, thematic and formal 
traits of the indvidual genres and utterances under scrutiny.
If we try to define genres based on existing research, we may say that they are 
flexible and versatile cultural categories structuring human understanding and com-
munication. On the one hand, they are strongly regulative, but on the other hand, 
they allow considerable freedom on the part of both the utterer and the recipient. 
Genres combine to form larger patterns through social and organizational structuring 
into genre sets, systems, hierarchies, and chains, and through creative uptakes on the 
part of individual genre users. This tentative definition can be expanded into the six 
basic tenets of genre reseach, described in Auken (2018) which hold that
• Genres are almost omnipresent in human culture
• Genres unite regulation and innovation
• Genres combine to form larger patterns including other genres
• Genres are connected in time through uptake
• Interpretation thorough genre is often tacit and rarely understood as interpreta-
tion through genre
• Genres are ideological, but our perception of them tends to naturalize them or 
take them as a given.
Genre research is an expansive field, and there are concepts, even core concepts, not 
covered by these six tenets, but they summarize much of what is agreed upon, or 
simply taken for granted, in genre research across the differing fields. In particular, 
the fourth tenet has risen to prominence in the last approximately 15 years, as Fread-
man’s bakhtinesque concept “uptake” has taken hold as one of the kingpins of con-
temporary genre research (Freadman, 1994, 2002; see also – among many others – 
Devitt, 2016; Dryer, 2016; Emmons, 2009; Thieme, 2006). This will be evident also in 
the chapters ahead. The broadened interest in uptake as an active act on the part of 
the genre user also marks a gradual shift in emphasis within genre research towards a 
more active appreciation of the role of the individual actor, as the uptake is an act by 
somebody and always involves an element of choice and freedom (Freadman, 2014). 
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This, in turn, affects how the second tenet is handled in genre research, as the “inno-
vation” side of genre use gets more attention. 
Recently, moves have been made in genre research to extend its reach further 
through anthologies about genres in the public sphere (Reiff & Bawarshi, 2016) 
and genres in new media environments (Miller & Kelly, 2017). For science, there is 
a notable change in genre use as the traditional distinction between professional 
genres and popularizations (see the already classic rendering in Fahnestock, 1986) is 
somewhat complicated with para-scientific genres (Kelly & Miller, 2016). The present 
volume continues the current trajectory in genre scholarship to explore how genres 
are changing, as traditional boundaries between professional and public spheres 
erode, and how the internet is influencing these changes. It does so by investigat-
ing a subject that to a very large extent plays out in the public sphere, and where 
genre emergence and the new media environments both have crucial roles to play, 
as evidenced by the chapters of Smart & Falconer (denialist discourse communities), 
Auken & Møller (news satire), and Mehlenbacher & Mehlenbacher (science activism 
on Twitter).
Furthermore, the volume adds a sustained engagement with a single crucial 
political topic. It thus takes one step further in moving genre research into a field 
of applied, or challenge-based, research in which the insights established in basic 
research are brought to bear on central societal issues. From the point of view of 
genre research, this means that a number of questions come into play that are if not 
neglected then at least underexplored in existing research. These questions include, 
but are not necessarily limited to, 1) the role and use of genre in campaigning to 
achieve – or limit – changes in society, and 2) the transmission of information and 
action across genre systems (Bazerman, 1994).
The first question picks up the understanding that genres are means to accom-
plish social purposes, as set out by Miller (1984) and systematized and expanded by 
RGS in the following decades, and moves it into the field of political debate and politi-
cal campaigning. It thus expands the reach of genre research into an area of study 
where only minimal work has hitherto been done, but where its insights promise to 
be relevant. This expansion will pave the way for future research into the workings of 
genre in politics and in public debate. To execute this move successfully, the volume 
includes both a targeted theory chapter aiming to discuss how genres can be used 
for campaigning and debate (Devitt), and numerous discussions of theoretical points 
relevant to the same issue in the other chapters (for instance Reiff & Bawarshi and 
Mehlenbacher & Mehlenbacher).
The second question concerning the uptake between genre systems expands 
another core idea of genre research, the concept of genre use as uptake. Uses of genre 
are seen as creative reactions to (or “uptakes” of) previous uses of genre in what is 
effectively a social perpetuum mobile. A particular challenge is connected to the 
movement of action and information across the boundaries of genre systems, which 
is precarious at best even when regulated by metagenres (Giltrow, 2002) and interme-
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diary genres (Tachino, 2012). (Metagenres are genres that regulate how other genres 
are to be performed; intermediary genres are genres that facilitate the uptake of one 
genre by another.) Freadman, who uses a different terminology, notes the problem as 
important, but it has yet to receive the attention in genre research it merits.
This problem is, however, at the core of the present volume, since the trans-
fer of knowledge and action between the genre system of the sciences and those of 
the surrounding society is the key starting point for the volume. The demarcation 
lines between the sciences and the surrounding society have been drawn to great 
rhetorical, institutional, and political effect (Gieryn, 1983, 1995; Taylor, 1991), but 
the strength of the demarcation also makes crossing it fraught with difficulty. From 
a genre perspective, the stronger and more formalized the boundary between genre 
systems is, the more it is “open to mistake or even to abuse” (Freadman, 2002, 44). 
More so to the degree that the transmission is weighted with political, economic, per-
sonal, or ideological consequences for the actors. Therefore, from the point of view of 
genre research the climate debate is an ideal subject to discuss the uptake between 
genre systems as it both deals with strongly established demarcations and with highly 
invested actors.
1.3  Scientific Evidence and Public Opinion
In the case of the protest sign and the research article, the back-and-forth transmis-
sion between the two genres was fairly straightforward, even if the concrete artifacts 
never met. Often however, the transmission between scientific evidence and public 
opinion is much less straightforward. As Cook et al. (2016) indicated, the scientific 
agreement about the reality and the severity of ACC is long-standing and well-nigh 
unanimous (see also Anderegga, Prallb, Harold, & Schneidera, 2010; Benestad et al., 
2016; Cook et al., 2013; Oreskes, 2004; Powell, 2016; Skuce et al., 2016), but no such 
agreement exists in public discourse. The public understanding concerning climate 
change has remained divided for decades (Brulle, Carmichael, & Jenkins, 2012; Ham-
ilton, 2011; Hornsey, Harris, Bain, & Fielding, 2016; Lewis, Palm, & Feng, 2019; Nisbet 
& Myers, 2007), and political and economic decision-making has progressed at a 
crawl. “Clearly, there is an urgent need for effective ways to engage diverse audiences 
about global climate change” (Wu & Lee, 2015). By consequence, the political and 
societal reaction to ACC has hitherto been far too weak compared to the magnitude of 
the problems. Indeed, with the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agree-
ment, progress may even be the wrong choice of words. This happens in the face not 
only of the overwhelming conclusive scientific evidence, but also of rising global tem-
peratures and a steep climb in extreme weather events. 
The key reasons for the slow pace of progress in the climate debate are fairly well 
known. There is widespread misinformation about the scientific agreement concern-
ing ACC, some of it caused by false balance-coverage of the issue in the media. There 
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are even strong political actors actively spreading disinformation about ACC (Lewan-
dowski, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013; Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Supran & Oreskes, 2017; 
Søe, 2016, 2017; see also Smart & Falconer, this volume). Moreover, to many the issue 
not only seems distant, delayed in time, affecting places far away, or working in ways 
we are to an extent shielded from, but it is also so scary, and potentially life-changing, 
that it makes many people reticent to even engage with the topic (Gifford, 2011). Thus, 
the gap between science and the public debate concerning ACC has less to do with the 
difficulties of translating complex scientific propositions, and more to do with differ-
ences of ideology, of political and economic interests, and with the general reluctance 
of the public to recognize the severity of ACC and act accordingly (Moser, 2010, 2016). 
Thus, the established channels for science communication have made progress, at 
points great progress, but much remains to be done, and – given the exigent circum-
stances presented by ACC – needs to be done. This includes trying to establish new 
approaches to the field. The studies in the present volume represent one such attempt.
1.4  Humanistic Climate Studies
The field of humanistic climate studies is vast, rapidly developing and spread across a 
number of individual disciplines (Moser, 2010, 2016). There are whole journals dedi-
cated solely to climate change issues (including WIREs Climate Change and Nature 
Climate Change), containing numerous articles relating to the humanities and the 
social sciences; others have it as a recurrent subject.4 Also, journals like Science Com-
munication and Global Environmental Change have climate change communication as 
one of their most pervasive topics. The disciplines working with climate change from 
a humanistic and social science perspective include, but are not limited to, science 
communication, sociology, law, rhetoric, ethnography, psychology, media studies, 
humor studies, and a variety of aesthetic fields.
Given all this, a claim for absolute novelty in the field is hard to sustain. However, 
there are indications that a valuable contribution is possible. There are very few 
studies that work with ACC from a genre perspective (the best examples are Smart, 
2016; and Bazerman, 2010. The latter study has been reworked into the context of the 
present volume. For a related treatment, see Tillery, 2003; see also Bazerman, Little, 
& Chavin, 2003). However, given that one of the core insights of genre research is that 
genre is an active factor in well-nigh all human culture, communication and cogni-
tion, it is to be expected that genre plays defining roles in the debate over ACC as well. 
4  By consequence of this, the representation of the topic in these short paragraphs is a meagre, and 
thus to an extent unfair, representation of a very large and – scholarly speaking – extremely rich 
research field. A full rendering of the state of the art in humanistic climate research is considerably 
beyond the scope of the present chapter. 
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Thus, it is unsurprising to find that a number of important humanistic climate studies 
analyze or rely on genre features in the ACC-debate, but do not relate to existing genre 
research. For example, Boykoff (2007; 2013), as well as Boykoff & Boykoff (2004; 2007), 
and Boykoff & Goodman (2009), all work with genre features in news media; Cecca-
relli (2011) discusses both uptake and known genre features of scientific and public 
debate, and Ouariachi, Olvera-Lobo, & Gutiérrez-Pérez (2017) discuss climate change 
communication in a strong recent genre, online games. However, only one of these 
studies, Boykoff & Goodman (2009), even mentions genre, and none of them relate to 
existing research in the field. This is not in any way a shortcoming in these excellent 
studies, but it does point to an unexplored, or at least under explored, approach. 
Furthermore, a literature review suggests that there is a widespread awareness 
of structural and ideological issues in humanistic climate studies. However, there is 
little awareness of the way the structural and ideological issues are determined by 
the genres in play, and individual genres are approached without knowledge of genre 
research as a coherent field of knowledge. Therefore, what the volume has to offer 
is an extensively developed and organized body of knowledge concerning the way 
genres shape and are shaped by human interaction. The present volume, thus, aims 
to shed new light on the implied knowledge and ideology (Devitt, 2009b; Paré, 2002; 
Segal, 2007) of the genres in use in the climate debate and on the complex generic 
interchange between genres and genre systems in the climate debate. 
1.5  The Structure of the Volume
The two chapters that follow the present introduction set out the theoretical back-
ground for the analyses and discussions of the volume. In chapter 2, “Genre for Social 
Action: Transforming Worlds Through Genre Awareness and Action”, Amy Devitt pres-
ents a more generalized analysis of the use of genre in activism. The title, obviously, 
mirrors Miller’s groundbreaking article with one major difference: The shift from “as” 
to “for”. This shift does not mark an opposition to Miller, but rather an extension of 
her argument into a new field. From the point of view of genre research, this sets the 
stage for the chapters to follow. Indeed, it is worth noting that the basic idea for the 
present volume springs from earlier sketches of this chapter. Genre research has estab-
lished an extensive vocabulary aimed at understanding how genres work in institu-
tions, in new media, in the public sphere and in personal exchanges. However, it 
has done little with politics and possibly even less with public campaigning. Devitt’s 
chapter establishes a central part of the theoretical groundwork needed for such an 
analysis; relocating the research from the general function of genre, “as”, to the active 
usage of it, “for”. Given Devitt’s extensive engagement with the foundations of exist-
ing research, the chapter can further serve as an orientation to the reader unfamiliar 
with genre research. 
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In chapter 3, “Scientific Knowledge, Public Knowledge, and Public Policy: 
How Genres Form and Disrupt Knowledge for Acting about Anthropogenic Climate 
Change", Charles Bazerman presents an analysis of the specific challenges and 
boundaries connected to the uptake from the genre system of the sciences to other 
central genre systems in politics, in the media, in business life, etc. This transmission 
– and the translation of it into action – is anything but automatic, and these spheres 
do not always work in concert. There are significant obstacles and even resistance 
to communication of knowledge across boundaries, and many of these boundaries 
have to do with the inter- and counterplay of the genres involved. The chapter details 
how citizen involvement has played a central role in driving the other spheres into 
action, and how governments have gradually taken over that role albeit still with 
major disruptions taking place, in particular from some business actors, for whom 
action to mitigate climate change was calculated to be more costly than the effects of 
the change. 
This is followed by two chapters discussing some ways in which knowledge about 
ACC is disrupted in the uptake between the genre systems of the sciences and the sur-
rounding society. In chapter 4, “How the US Congress Knows and Evades Knowing 
About Anthropogenic Climate Change: The Record Created in Committee Hearings, 
2004–2016” Charles Bazerman and Josh Kuntzman discuss the acceptance and non-
acceptance of knowledge about ACC in the political system in an analysis of hear-
ings on ACC in the US Congress. The chapter examines the records of congressional 
hearings as a crucial political genre, because hearings are one of the central genres 
through which the US congress recognizes knowledge relevant to its work. However, 
the actors performing the genre, particularly the committee chairs who control the 
agenda, have the option to disrupt the knowledge process. As a consequence, a 
contentious and wide-reaching issue like the reality and severity of ACC may not be 
recognized as the US Congress, despite the overwhelming scientific consensus, and 
despite the hearings, because committee members often challenge statements about 
its reality. Moreover, expert testimonies by scientists are often countered by testimo-
nies from denialists – in a variation of the false balance issues known within news 
media coverage of ACC as mentioned above. Thus, the hearings that should serve to 
inform the US Congress about ACC, are used by certain actors to hold back Congress' 
recognition of ACC. 
Whereas Bazerman & Kuntzman consider a highly official and formalized genre, 
chapter 5, “Genre, Uptake, and the Recontextualization of Climate-Change Science by 
‘Denialist’ Cultural Communities” by Graham Smart and Matthew Falconer addresses 
a quite different side of the debate. The chapter describes how the evidence estab-
lished in the sciences is taken up in denialist discourse coalitions. Specifically, Smart 
and Falconer look at how three denialist cultural communities use the digital dis-
courses of websites, blog posts, podcasts, e-newsletters, and linked e-documents in 
recontextualizing – that is, in this case, intentionally misrepresenting, transmuting, 
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and/or refuting – readily available information on the accepted scientific view of 
climate change in order to inhibit the intended uptake of this information. 
The following four chapters pick up individual genres that have potential to nav-
igate the gap between the understanding of ACC in the sciences and in the public 
sphere. The first two chapters address humor genres. In chapter 6, ““THINK BIG and 
then do absolutely NÜSCHTE”. News Satire and the Climate Debate”, Sune Auken 
and Mette Møller address the representation and use of ACC in the fast moving and 
independent news satire genre. The chapter approaches both the genre’s main tradi-
tions: TV-shows inspired by the work of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, which gen-
erally represents the actual news and satirises it, and the newspaper-mimicry of The 
Onion and its apprentices, which invents news stories that satirise current events. As 
a genre, news satire combines parody and satire, as it mock-mimics the established 
news genres and use them as vehicles of laughter, taunts and criticism against the 
surrounding society and against the news genres themselves. The chapter discusses 
how news satire represents ACC, and how the genre may affect climate change per-
ception. News satire transcends false balance issues in mainstream media and consis-
tently confirms the reality and severity of ACC, thereby highlighting the importance 
of climate action. 
In chapter 7, “This will all be yours – and under water: Climate Change Depictions 
in Editorial Cartoons”, Esben Bjerggaard Nielsen and Felix Felix Kühn Ravn discuss a 
genre that is generically bound and institutionally limited by its context in the edito-
rial section of newspapers and thus occupies a discursive niche that is markedly dif-
ferent from that occupied by news satire. The chapter details the social motives and 
formal intricacies involved in the editorial cartoon. The chapter focuses on different 
ways in which the editorial cartoon as a genre navigates between specific and more 
general contexts, as it targets ACC and the debate surrounding it. The chapter dem-
onstrates how the editorial cartoon may present different exigencies and policy posi-
tions by means of humor that skewers its satirical target. The chapter presents a range 
of argumentative themes such as “consequences”, “capitalism”, “climate change 
deniers” and “climate skepticism” that are prevalent in American editorial cartoons.
After this, the next two chapters each analyse genres used to influence politicians 
and public opinion. Again, one of these, the petition, is strictly bound and formalized, 
whereas the other, the tweet, is discursively much more free-floating. In chapter 8, 
“How to Turn Accumulated Knowledge into Action”: Uptake, Public Petitions, and 
the Climate Change Debate”, Mary Jo Reiff and Anis Bawarshi take up the public peti-
tion. The chapter discusses the actions and interactions that take place between and 
around the act of petitioning and provides further insight into the forces that shape 
uptakes of petitions and that limit and enable its social actions. The plural “actions” 
is intended, as petitions, though they look like singular actions, are complex sites of 
interaction where the supposed official uptake into corporate or government action 
may not be the actual, or for that matter: expected, uptake of the petition. It may lead 
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to mobilization, other kinds of activism, or a heightened attention to the subject peti-
tioned for, even if the official uptake is limited.
The subject of the following chapter, the tweet, is a genre of “backdoor action”. 
Chapter 9, “Rogue Rhetorical Actors: Scientists and the Social Action of Tweeting” 
by Ashley Rose Mehlenbacher and Brad Mehlenbacher, analyses tweets from sci-
entists who have been barred by political decisions from using their official genres 
for factually based ACC communication. The case describes a number of exchanges 
that broke out on Twitter as several government agencies received a gag order by the 
newly elected Trump-adminstration, and scientists took to tweeting to counter the 
gag. It describes their motives, their rhetorical strategies, and the challenges they 
face as they try to communicate about climate change on a fast-paced medium like 
Twitter. The chapter discusses how genre awareness is crucial in the fast paced and 
rapidly evolving genre landscape on social media. Thus, in the process, a genre of 
science communication shifted into a partisan political typification. Mehlenbacher 
& Mehlenbacher’s point is not that it is wrong or problematic for scientists to engage 
in new genres of public communication, but rather that this engagement needs to be 
carried out with a reflective awareness of the genres involved, their possible uptakes, 
and the situation in which they function.
The volume’s final chapter is a more personal reflection. In Chapter 10, “Genre, 
Anthropogenic Climate Change, and the Need to Smell your Body Odor. A Personal 
Postscript”, Sune Auken picks up the overarching themes of the volume and reflects 
on the role of genre in the debate over anthropogenic climate change. Genre is a dis-
cursive battle ground in which actors maneuver to achieve their social purposes; not 
just on a personal or organizational level, but even in large-scale attempts to influ-
ence the direction of society. Therefore, the postscript suggests that an increased 
genre awareness has the potential to transform our approach to the manifold genres 
that meet us as we try to make sense of the debate over anthropogenic climate change, 
and in that sense, the studies in the present volume are only a modest first beginning.
Therefore, the chapters form a progression from salient theoretical concepts and 
themes, and specific problems towards different ways of addressing these problems 
within the genre framework. Taken together they describe some of the genre chal-
lenges and opportunities involved when we move across the genres to activate know-
ledge from the sciences into society at large. We are faced with challenges and oppor-
tunities of genre whether we try to act as researchers and teachers, as private citizens, 
or as political actors and activists, and no matter whether we tweet, write science 
blogs, attend meetings, or carry around protest signs saying, “Climate change is real. 
In other news, water is wet.”
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Amy J. Devitt
2  Genre for Social Action: Transforming Worlds 
Through Genre Awareness and Action
Abstract: Redefining genres as social action in the 1980s has led to understand-
ing that genres reflect, shape, and reinforce worlds through the social actions they 
define and perform. The critical turn in genre studies in the following decades has 
led to more awareness of genre’s power to shape users unknowingly toward a com-
munity’s norms and values. This chapter argues for extending that critical awareness 
to critical action. Genres work not only as social action but for social action. Genres 
work for social action when people act through them deliberately, consciously, and 
toward desired social ends. This chapter defines and briefly illustrates four means of 
using genres for social action: genre mindfulness, genre resistance, genre revision, 
and genre creation. Critical awareness of those social actions can transform everyday 
social actions that get things done in the world into powerful actions with social and 
political purpose, actions meant to alter the world in meaningful and even structural 
ways.  
2.1  Introduction
This volume demonstrates that genres matter. Genres matter because they carry with 
them not just conventions but expectations and norms. Genres matter because they 
shape the people who use them into particular kinds of actors performing particular 
kinds of actions. Genres matter because people enact not just a genre but its accom-
panying system, institutional setting, and cultural values. Genres matter because 
people may use genres without being aware of genres’ ability to support or inhibit 
their motivations and goals; or people may use genres fully aware of how genres can 
manipulate those who are unaware. Genres matter.
Genres matter in the climate debate – or any debate – because their conventions, 
norms, actions, systems, and potential invisibility direct the debate in sometimes 
unnoticed and sometimes unintentional ways. Rhetorical genre studies of the last 
thirty years has argued that genres are social actions (Miller, 1984) and established 
that genres are the ways we do things in the world (Freedman & Medway, 1994).1 I am 
arguing here that, because they are social actions and the ways we do things in the 
1  For some overviews, see Devitt (2004b), Martin and Rose (2008), Bawarshi and Reiff (2010), and 
Auken (2015). This body of scholarship is so large today that references in this essay will represent 
only a few illustrations for readers who wish to learn more.
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world, genres shape argument, including and perhaps especially politically charged 
debate. Although genres can become so normalized that their actions are hard to 
resist2, becoming critically aware of genres’ effects can lead to more deliberate debate 
and to more deliberate action. Those who want to make changes in the world need to 
make those changes against and especially through genres. Genres operate not just as 
social action but for social action. 
To explain and illustrate genres for social action, I briefly review some key prin-
ciples of rhetorical genre theory, define four ways of using genres for social action, 
and offer a few examples of genres in action, with particular reference to this vol-
ume’s topic of climate debate. In the end, I argue for using critical genre awareness 
to exploit genres’ capacities for creating change in order to make a positive difference 
in our worlds.
2.2  Genres as Social Actions
Calling genres social actions originated with Carolyn Miller’s now-foundational 1984 
article entitled “Genres as Social Action.” Building from rhetorical criticism and espe-
cially the insights of Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson on Form and 
Genre (1978), Miller articulated a semiotic perspective on genre as combusting form 
and substance into socially meaningful action. Based on Miller’s 1984 article, rhetori-
cal genre studies has connected genres less to textual forms than to rhetorical acts. 
Genres don’t just sit there; they do something. 
Early studies of workplaces and professions investigated how genres functioned 
in communities and systems and explained how genres worked to fulfill the com-
munity’s purposes3. Genres developed out of communities’ needs and performed 
typified actions when the task and situation were perceived to be similar to tasks and 
situations encountered before. As I concluded in my study of “Intertextuality in Tax 
Accounting” (1991), all the texts tax accountants produce together “describe a genre 
system which both delimits and enables its work” (353). The notion of genre systems 
later developed to account for the interactions of genres both within and across com-
munities, including across multiple activity systems, creating complex interplays of 
genre sets in the performance of large scale institutional or societal social actions 
(Bazerman, 1994; Russell, 1997).
2  See, for example, articles in Coe, Lingard, and Teslenko (2002), or, more particularly, Luke (1996), 
Peters (1997), Fuller and Lee (2002), Paré (2002), Segal (2007), Devitt (2009b), among many more 
studies of genres’ ideological power.
3  For example, Swales, (1990), Devitt (1991), Bhatia (1993), Schryer, 1994; Berkenkotter and Huckin 
(1995), Artemeva (2009).
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Most of this genre research observed how genres worked in their communities, 
seeking to understand the genres from the perspective of their users. For example, 
in my study of tax accountants’ genres, I not only examined the sample texts that 
tax accountants supplied as examples of the kinds of writing they did; I also inter-
viewed the partners and associates to learn how those users categorized those genres, 
how they learned to write in the genres, and how those genres operated together for 
them in genre sets and systems (what Charles Bazerman later elaborated in “Systems 
of Genre” (1994) and Anne Freadman examines more interactively as uptake (1994, 
2002)). Genre researchers observed genres in their native habitats, recording what 
they observed and interpreting those observations through the lens of the partici-
pants.
While observing through the eyes of the users led to a much more complex under-
standing of how genres acted, genre scholarship was missing a much-needed criti-
cal perspective. The genres that resulted from fulfilling community purposes became 
norms – and normalized. For tax accountants, to continue that example, understand-
ing their texts required understanding “their genre systems and their rhetorical situ-
ations, their intertextual references and their underlying epistemologies, their uses 
and their community functions” (354). The critical perspective on genre that is now 
so widespread took some time to develop within genre studies, but it has become well 
established in theory, research, and pedagogy. In the past twenty or more years, genre 
scholars have built on the turn to genres as rhetorical rather than formulaic and as 
action rather than form to see genres as not simply functional and community-based 
but ideological and hegemonic4. 
The happy-sounding “communities” in which genres reside are sites of power 
and privilege, insiders and outsiders, gatekeeping and access. To succeed in their 
profession, the novice tax accountants I studied had to learn to write tax memoranda 
that did what the senior partners expected; had to learn how to distinguish their 
legal liability in opinion letters from other letters to clients; had to learn when to use 
memoranda for the files to provide a record of phone conversations and meetings. As 
Miller (1984) concluded, “what we learn when we learn a genre is not just a pattern 
of forms or even a method of achieving our own ends. We learn, more importantly, 
what ends we may have” (165). Though her conclusion at the time may have seemed 
simply descriptive, today that insight leads to the power of genres to shape novices in 
the master’s image. Genres used in schools act similarly as gatekeepers, shaping how 
students and teachers should act, thereby defining who belongs and who doesn’t. 
Recognizing that power of genres to define community membership, genre scholars 
like Ann Johns (1997), Ken Hyland (2004), and John Swales (2004) study the genres of 
power in schools and other institutions and systems and share that genre knowledge 
4  Again, this ideological perspective is particularly emphasized in Luke (1996), Peters (1997), and the 
collection by Coe et al. (2002); but also Beebee (1994) and Randazzo (2015).
with outsiders to help them gain access to institutions from which they might other-
wise remain excluded. 
Genres matter not just as gatekeepers but also as enforcers. Every genre carries 
with it sets of not just formal expectations but also cultural ones, worldviews. Genres 
have developed out of the values, beliefs, and norms of those in power within the 
community, institution, and culture. They enforce, as Miller (1984) said, “what ends 
we may have.” Tax accountants in the United States are governed by the Rules and 
Regulations of the Internal Revenue Service Tax Code; so tax accounting genres 
defer, refer, and accede to that code. In colleges and universities in the US, Aristo-
telian logic, evidence, and argument are highly valued, as reflected in their genres 
of research papers, literary analysis, and thesis-support argument papers, among 
many others. Scientists believe in research based on established methods, data, and 
replicable experiments, as reflected in their scholarly articles. Scientific scholarly 
articles ground their topics in prior research, present their methods, data, and results 
in clearly distinct sections, and claim only what the data support, with any specula-
tion or implications explicitly labeled as such and heavily hedged. Their students’ lab 
reports similarly describe their methods meticulously, their data in quantified charts 
and graphs, and their conclusions with ample qualifications and explicit limitations. 
Operating out of a different culture and worldview with different expectations, politi-
cians value, among other things, followers, visibility, and inclusion in media; hence 
the passionately delivered speeches with rallying cries and the frequent media inter-
views containing pre-written sound bites. Genres reflect the values and worldviews of 
their users, and to use the genre is to accept those values and worldviews.
That acceptance might, however, be unwitting. New tax accountants might not 
recognize their obedience to the tax codes; new politicians might not see themselves 
as catering to the media. These novices might just be doing what tax accountants and 
politicians do. Few students learning to write a research paper probably recognize 
that they are learning to think like their professors. Some might recognize that they 
are writing to please a professor (“just tell me what you want”), but some of those 
students might be horrified if they recognized that in writing to please their professor, 
they are practicing being like their professor. Students writing a lab report more likely 
understand that they are taking labs to learn how to conduct an experiment like a sci-
entist, to learn the scientific method; but they learn how to be a scientist through the 
lab report write-ups as well, learning to write like a scientist. The scientific method 
includes not just controlling for variables or adding this chemical before that one, 
but also taking detailed notes during the process, articulating hypotheses, and dis-
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tinguishing results from interpretation5. Since the values underlying a genre remain 
largely unstated, taking up the genre takes up those values unaware and uncritically6. 
That genres carry with them unstated assumptions and values applies to their 
shaping effects on readers as well as composers. Scientific articles position readers 
to accept the importance of method, the requirement of data, and the limitations 
of results. Research papers invoke readers who expect logic and evidence, and the 
genres of tax accountants assume shared belief in the authority of the IRS Rules and 
Regulations. Without conscious awareness of genres’ effects, readers and writers can 
find themselves inculcated into worldviews they might well have resisted.
But both writers and readers can get it wrong or can deliberately misconstrue, and 
genre’s power to enforce its norms and values has limits (Freadman, 2014; Fuller & 
Lee, 2002). Writers new to lab reports often mix results, discussion, and conclusions. 
Student researchers frequently make unsubstantiated statements in their research 
papers and unwarranted claims in their arguments. Readers of arguments may miss 
unwarranted claims. Clients receiving a letter from their tax accountant may not rec-
ognize that the advice isn’t a legal opinion. Readers of scientific reports may, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, miss the limitations or the validity (Smart & Falconer, this 
volume) of the methods used, not heeding the importance of that genre feature. 
Genres in different systems may have clashing values and purposes as well7. Jour-
nalists reporting on a scientific scholarly article about climate change may exaggerate 
the scientist’s claims, since the news reporters have their own genres with their own 
values to reflect, like starting with a catchy lede, holding readers’ attention, and pre-
senting the news-worthy facts. Politicians may translate the scientific research article 
into their own genres of sound bites, campaign speeches, legislation, and, increas-
ingly, tweets, all carrying the values of politicians rather than those of the original 
scientists. Activists and protesters may similarly reduce carefully worded implica-
tions in scientific articles to a few words on a poster (as in the protest sign described 
in the introduction to this volume). The implications of those scientific articles might 
even become extended to whole universes by writers of speculative fiction, dystopian 
novels, and cli-fi, with their own motivations and values.
So genres matter. Genres reflect, shape, and reinforce worlds through the social 
actions they define and perform. Genres carry with them values and norms that, 
like other ideologies, typically remain largely invisible or unnoticed, and sometimes 
overlooked. Especially because they are unnoticed, those values, norms, and actions 
shape readers and writers of genres – that is, all of us in all our interactions. Whether 
intentional or unintentional, knowing or unknowing, readers and writers then 
5  See Schryer (1999) on the experimental article as a shaper of perceptions of time and space.
6  For example, see Bawarshi (2000) on “The Genre Function” and Bastian (2010, 2017) on the dif-
ficulty of disrupting that genre effect.
7  See Russell (1997), Winsor (1999), and Bazerman (2004) for more on activity system theory.
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attempt to shape others through their choice and use of genres and the values they 
perform. Becoming aware of genres’ effects enables deliberate, conscious, and critical 
use of genres8. Becoming critically aware allows turning genres as social action into 
genres for social action.
2.3  Genres for Social Action
Genres work for social action rather than only as social actions when people act 
through them deliberately, consciously, and toward desired social ends. Genres work 
for social action when communicators actively choose and manipulate the genres they 
use rather than be used by them. Critical awareness of and deliberate work through 
genres can transform everyday social actions that get things done in the world into 
powerful actions with social and political purpose, actions meant to alter the world in 
meaningful and even structural ways. 
I see at least four ways that users can act through genres for deliberate social 
purposes, for social action: 
 – Genre mindfulness – choosing genres that reflect and reinforce desired world-
views 
 – Genre resistance – resisting genres that reinforce undesired perspectives 
 – Genre revision – revising genres to better perform desired actions 
 – Genre creation – creating new genres to fulfill different purposes and instill dif-
ferent worldviews
These four genre actions can shape what people believe and how they behave. They 
can, in short, influence people, and they can do so in ways both subtle and dramatic.
One of the clearest sites for studying how genres operate for deliberate and trans-
formative social action is in political debate and social activism. There the role of 
genres in resistance and the ability to resist genres becomes most deliberate and most 
visible. The chapters in this volume offer their own illustrations of the roles of genres 
in the climate debate. In the rest of this chapter, I will briefly sketch some examples of 
how those four categories of genre actions can influence public debate and activism.
2.4  Genre Mindfulness
Of course, I would prefer that every writer and reader in every situation were critically 
aware and choosing genres deliberately. Such constant deliberate choosing would 
surely slow down our operating in the world since we would no longer act automati-
8  As I argue in “Teaching Critical Genre Awareness” (Devitt, 2009b) and elsewhere.
cally in ways we have been trained to act. But it would also create much more mindful 
interaction. Such mindful deliberate genre choice – genre mindfulness – can be espe-
cially effective when trying to influence others. As participants debate the existence, 
importance, or necessary responses to climate change, the most persuasive may well 
be those who choose strategies deliberately through choosing strategic genres. 
Consider just a few of the many genres designed specifically for social activism, 
to influence legislators or public opinion – petitions, political cartoons, protest signs, 
public forums, sit-ins, rallies, marches, letters to the editor, op-eds, opinion columns. 
Such activist genres promote a culture of public responsibility, of valuing collective 
action as well as instilling power in individual action. At the same time, each activ-
ist genre acts differently, motivating different individual performances, targeting dif-
ferent audiences and using media – and news media – in different ways. Holding 
a protest sign at a 2017 People’s Protest March in Washington saying “There is No 
‘Planet B’ No EPA Cuts!!” (Levenson, 2017) is a different action from writing a letter 
to the editor of the local newspaper Lawrence Journal World in Kansas on “Climate 
awareness” (Boos, 2017). Choosing a genre chooses strategies and tactics grounded in 
different societal purposes and values.
Moving activist genres into digital spaces alters traditional genres even as they 
might be used for similar purposes. Activist political sites like moveon.org promote 
and distribute online petitions, offer cut-and-paste templates for writing to corpora-
tions, and provide talking points and phone numbers to ease the process of calling 
legislators. An online petition to fight climate change by stopping fracking of fossil 
fuels acts differently from a petition to stop fracking presented to grocery shop-
pers in Oklahoma as they leave the store. In addition to genres designed for activ-
ism, other existing genres online can be turned toward transformative social action. 
Social media create multiple platforms for activism, as well as for viral videos and 
trolling. For example, hashtags and tagging on Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, Snap-
chat, and newer emerging social media can become political and activist statements: 
#climatechange is one example at this moment of promoting a hashtag to raise aware-
ness and call for action. Facebook pages, including current ones like NASA Climate 
Change, can serve as sources of information, but that same genre can be used to 
promote particular agendas like climate change denial (for example, pages like the 
current version of Climate Change Discussion). Tweets can promote neutral or civil 
discussion of important weather events, or they can turn uncivil to promote a political 
position (Anderson & Huntington, 2017). Existing broad genres can narrow to focus 
on influencing others – for example, science blogs geared toward political action, 
campaign and other speeches, and even parody and satire, including news satire. 
Change to: Leighann Thone's study of the television show of the television show Last 
Week Tonight demonstrates how John Oliver turned passive viewers of news satire 
shows into political activists, rallying them to use hashtags, write emails and make 
phone calls, even send money to make political and social points. On an early show 
from 2014, Oliver presents the science behind climate change and then makes a politi-
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cal point visible by staging a “mathematically representative climate change debate” 
– with three climate skeptics and a room full of scientists waving research papers and 
shouting scientific research – to demonstrate that the scientific debate is settled (Last 
Week Tonight, 2014), a performance that one study demonstrated affected viewers’ 
beliefs in global warming (Brewer & McKnight, 2017). 
There’s nothing new about the existence of activist genres and the ability to use 
media for activist purposes. But recognizing that genres carry with them values and 
worldviews, seeing that genres enable or limit particular social actions, such genre 
mindfulness makes choosing a particular genre a political as well as social act.
2.5  Genre Resistance
That same conscious awareness can lead as well to deliberately resisting genres 
whose purposes, values, and worldviews conflict with one’s own. Resistance can take 
many forms, from ignoring a genre to countering it with a different genre, and options 
in between. At its core, genre resistance is a refusal to take up an existing genre, a 
resistance to acting within it as either reader or writer, consumer or composer. On one 
end of resistance, for example, critical awareness of news reports as a genre might 
lead some readers to resist them as sources of scientific information, about climate 
change or any other potentially hot topic. Some news reports value a sexy lede, so the 
initial claims might be taken with some skepticism. News reports also work to make 
information accessible to a wide audience, including those less educated about sci-
entific topics, so readers seeking more complex understandings might look to other 
genres. News reports consider some facts and statements more newsworthy than 
others, so genre-aware readers might assume that some scientifically important or at 
least relevant facts are probably omitted. All genres have their biases and particular 
purposes. Genre-aware readers can use that fact to seek the genres they need and 
resist the genres they don’t. 
Both readers and writers can resist genres. Scientists report their results in scien-
tific articles rather than news reports not only because that’s the norm but because 
the genre fits their values and worldview: scholarly articles support fuller report-
ing, encourage detailed accounts, and require inclusion of all relevant information, 
appropriately hedged. When scientists venture into other genres to reach a broader 
audience, they can meet both their own and readers’ resistance. A writer of a text-
book like Jeffrey Bennett, writing A Global Warming Primer: Answering Your Questions 
About The Science, The Consequences, and The Solutions, may do an excellent job of 
presenting scientific information and receive mostly rave reviews on Amazon, but he 
still may find his emphasis on scientifically sound information derided sarcastically 
by online reviewers and recategorized as a “cult pamphlet.” 
Even as they wish to reach more open readers and potentially affect public debate, 
scientists writing popularizing books may find that genre conflicting with their values 
as scientists, a conflict that may lead to their resisting the popularizing genre. Writers 
of trade books like Malcolm Gladwell, Stephen Pinker, Neil deGrasse Tyson, Daniel 
Kahneman and others have shown how to adapt expert knowledge to the genre. They 
lead with anecdotes or illustrative stories instead of previous scholarship in order to 
gain readers’ interest. The limitations of different methodologies may be ignored in 
favor of clearer conclusions. Complexities sometimes appear in notes at the end of 
the book instead of in the body. Environmental scientists like Stephen H. Schneider in 
Science as a Contact Sport: Inside the Battle to Save Earth’s Climate or Paul Epstein MD 
and Dan Ferber in Changing Planet, Changing Health might adopt that genre’s strate-
gies but, given their training, values, and identities, still resist the genre in ways that 
keep them from reaching as many readers as a journalist like Jeff Goodell in The Water 
Will Come: Rising Seas, Sinking Cities, and the Remaking of the Civilized World, who 
more easily submits to the genre by telling stories and including personal experience. 
That is not to say that those scientific trade books are bad, wrong, or false. But they 
serve different ends and derive from different values. 
The same is true for scientists who report their results in science blogs, tweets, 
LinkedIn or other professional connectors. Each genre embodies different values and 
perspectives and shapes the writer’s information in different ways, some of which suit 
the writer’s values and some of which the writer or readers might resist. Being aware 
of those generic differences can minimize surprise when a tweet is misunderstood, a 
blog or trade book receives harsh comments, or a professional post is reduced to its 
simplest application. Some writers might find that the trade-offs are too great, that 
a genre conflicts too deeply with the writer’s values and motivations. For them, one 
option is to refuse to write such public genres, just as readers unwilling or unable to 
listen to scientific research might refuse to read more scientifically complex genres.
For social activists in particular, resisting a genre though ignoring it might not 
be enough. Stronger genre resistance might mean not simply ignoring a genre but 
actively introducing another existing genre into the conversation. When univer-
sity lectures are seen as ideological propaganda (for example in campus speeches 
by white supremacist Richard Spencer and many others), activists might choose to 
resist the genre by ignoring the lecture and not attending, but others might confront 
that genre with protest signs, chants, shouts, and other disruptive genres. At my own 
university, students resisted a town forum on race led by a former Chancellor, one 
designed to allow members of the university community to share their experiences 
and difficulties with race on campus. While the Chancellor attempted to lead an 
orderly forum with individuals taking turns to tell their stories in polite language and 
respectful voices, a group of student activists took over the front of the stage with their 
own signs, loud chants, impassioned spokesperson, and a list of demands for action. 
Citing a history of calm discussions that had led to no change, the organizers resisted 
the purpose and values of the respectful town forum by inserting into it the genre 
actions of protest, rallies, and demands. 
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Resisting genres, then, is also choosing genres. Resisting a genre may mean 
choosing not to write or read it – avoiding fake news or sensationalized reporting, 
for example. Resisting a genre may mean adding to it other genres – seeking out the 
original scientific articles behind the news report, health newsletter, or viral Face-
book post. Resisting genres can also mean offering alternative genres – countering 
fake news with fact checking, meeting inflammatory political speeches with protest 
signs, or writing critical reviews of books. As Paré (2002) has noted, such restistance 
to a genre’s worldview can create chinks through which the need for genre change 
becomes more visible. 
2.6  Genre Revision 
Using genres for social action does not require either accepting genres as they are, 
with whatever values and worldviews they might reflect and reinforce, or substituting 
wholly different genres. Writers constantly revise genres, every time they compose a 
new and hence unique performance of it (Devitt, 2009a). For deliberately transforma-
tive social action, writers can revise genres deliberately toward those purposes, and 
communities working together can change a genre toward their own ends.
Unfortunately, revising genres to perform actions differently has become a spe-
cialty of some who wish to exploit the public’s general lack of genre awareness. Notice 
that many political speeches, in their action to rally supporters and gain media cov-
erage, have become more focused on generating anger and resentment of others, a 
move supporters might not initially have noticed and may now accept as the new 
norm. News reports from many sources have exploited viewers’ and readers’ depen-
dence and perhaps gullibility to revise news reports into biased and often inaccurate 
accounts, drastically altering the previous values of the genre (and probably creating 
a different, emerging genre, one that looks superficially like a news report but serves 
partisanship rather than accuracy and values viewership over integrity). While jour-
nalists for long-established newspapers like The New York Times and The Washington 
Post (among many, many others) are fighting against this change in news genres, the 
actions to change those genres are already so well in place that “fake news” may well 
be its own genre, a revised version of news reports with different values and pur-
poses which journalists can now only resist, not revise (see Tandoc et al. (2017) for 
a typology of “fake news”). Charles Bazerman details the manipulation from mul-
tiple spheres and genres that made their way into government reports, websites, and 
proposals (Bazerman, 2010). Other genres on platforms previously geared toward 
social sharing, like Facebook and other social media, have been revised by trolls and 
haters toward conflict, leaving posters feeling genuine hurt and shock when replies 
contain personal attacks and verbal assaults. The abuse of these genres, along with 
the manipulation of public opinion through fake news posts, has led the CEOs of 
Facebook and other social media corporations to revise the genres themselves, largely 
in response to social activists’ genre resistance. Genres always change as people use 
them differently, but not always for the better. 
With so many obvious examples of genres being revised for fraudulent and 
socially unjust purposes, I’d like to offer a quite different and more positive example, 
a less visible but even more powerful means of performing genre revision by silently 
refusing to follow the genre’s rules even while acting within it. In the United States 
legal courts, the action of jury nullification revises the genre of jury verdicts in ways 
that have significant impact on the legal system. According to the legal system, the 
jury’s duty is to return a verdict based solely on the evidence and the law presented. 
But juries have been known to reject that constraint when they view the law as unjust 
or the evidence as unfair. In jury nullification, the members of a jury in a trial system 
decide on a verdict in a way that values their own sense of rightness or justice over 
that of the law. Jury nullification has been used deliberately to make a comment about 
a social issue or a particular law, and it has been used to right a perceived wrong. 
Whether refusing to convict those who illegally liberated or harbored slaves in the 19th 
century or those who illegally assisted euthanasia in the 20th century, in voting for a 
verdict based on their own sense of justice, juries are rejecting the legal values inher-
ent in the verdict; they revise the verdict to be an action that values justice instead. 
Such dramatic revisions of a genre are rare, I suspect, but jury nullification provides 
an especially dramatic illustration of how a genre can be revised for social action 
through quieter means with even more impact. Although not yet applied, as far as I 
know, to the climate change debate or to its laws, resolutions, pacts, agreements, or 
executive orders, the illustration of jury nullification demonstrates that genres might 
be revised into actions with quite different values and purposes without necessarily 
calling public attention to that action.
Revising genres for social action thus requires both recognizing a flaw in the 
existing genre’s purposes or values and acting on that recognition by changing the 
genre. As these examples illustrate, though, what seems a flaw to some might be an 
important value to others. Genre revising for transformative social action can rarely, 
if ever, be achieved alone. The trick to revising genres for social action successfully 
is twofold: making changes oneself and through one’s communities that better serve 
desirable ends and reinforce desirable values; and others accepting those changes. 
Revisions can happen subtly, over time, creeping far into the norm before being 
noticed. Some “news” channels began sensationalizing the news early on, with so 
many viewers apparently approving of the change that their viewership increased. 
Other news channels resisted the change in the genre at first, but their conflicting 
values – accurate reporting versus high ratings – left many succumbing in the end. 
Voters who resisted the move to stir up anger and hostility stopped listening to those 
versions of political speeches and sought others to follow, but the strength of the 
genre’s need to motivate voter response left a paucity of alternatives. Genre revision 
for socially corrupt ends can happen more easily with an unaware public, whose lack 
of genre resistance becomes acceptance.
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Of course, the situation is more complicated than I’ve described, especially for 
changing a genre oneself. Most significantly, these genres interact with other genres 
and especially with genres in other systems, so the forces encouraging or inhibiting 
change or resistance are multiple and complex. In the case of argument and debate 
about political issues, media systems and their genres strongly influence political 
systems and politicians’ genres. Rather than creating change on their own, individu-
als are enmeshed in systems of power and institutional control that cannot simply 
be ignored without consequence (see Russell, 1997). In fact, it is the interactions of 
those systems that may create the cracks and chinks that make visible the need for 
genre change (Paré, 2002). Such clashing systems may have led to changes in schol-
arly articles in the humanities and social sciences, creating alternative versions of the 
genre. In scholarly articles, the genre’s distancing and “objectivity” began to clash 
with feminist scholars’ valuing of the personal, with feminist, cultural, and qualita-
tive researchers’ insistence on the importance of positionality, and with other phi-
losophies’ questioning of objectivity. These more particular communities of scholarly 
research held values and had purposes sometimes at odds with the action of scholarly 
articles. In some of those communities today, scholarly articles have normalized such 
values as researchers identifying their positions, including personal anecdotes and 
accounts, and valuing the voices of study participants as well as researchers. In turn, 
that revised genre effects changes in the values instilled in new researchers as they 
learn to write scholarly articles. The revised social action of scholarly articles thus 
offers new possibilities for transformative social action.
Interconnected and interacting systems of genres thus create space for revis-
ing genres for different and powerful social actions, which then reinforce those new 
actions in others. Genre-aware social activists might do well to seek out spaces where 
conflicting systems come together, perhaps in digital spaces or newly emerging alli-
ances; to recognize which existing genres represent conflicting values or purposes; 
to deliberately act to revise those genres toward desired motives and ends; and to 
spread those revised genres among others in their networks. One simple example 
might already be visible on Twitter. On that social media platform, like-minded fol-
lowers of one another have found that their tweets, previously valued for cleverness, 
humor, and information sharing, are coming into contact with tweets valued for over-
statement, capitalized yelling, and ad hominen attacks. In this space of conflicting 
systems with conflicting values, movements have emerged to change the action of 
retweeting (sharing others’ tweets with your followers) into a practice reserved only 
for tweets whose values you share rather than ones that are interesting in other ways. 
To make that process easier to achieve, hashtags like #ClimateAction have been added 
to identify those of like minds, rather than using hashtags to identify common topics 
or add humor. That clash of systems on Twitter created a visible chink through which 
to see how the genre needed to change. Through that awareness, participants were 
able to revise the genres to better fit newly defined purposes and more strongly rein-
force the community’s values, then encouraging others to take up the genre in revised 
form. Whether the creators and executives behind those social media platforms will 
take even stronger action to support similar changes remains to be seen.
Once those interacting systems make visible potential clashes of values and 
purposes, all three strategies of using genres for social action are available. Some 
might revise the genres, as I’ve just illustrated, a move that in its extreme, as jury 
nullification makes clear, can wholly replace an existing genre’s worldview. Others 
might resist the clashing genre rather than revise it, working to ignore it or counter 
it with other genres, while others might resist the genre and clamor for institutional 
genre revisions. And others, mindful of a genre’s action, might simply choose differ-
ent genres, walking away from tweets or even all social media, for example, and seek 
other genres that better fit their needs and values. In the search for other genres that 
work for desired social actions, a fourth action is sometimes possible – creating new 
or hybrid genres.
2.7  Genre Creation
Genres rarely appear as new because their origins can usually be seen in previously 
existing genres (Fowler, 1982; Jamieson, 1975). An exception might well be when new 
technology creates new media genres with new affordances (Giltrow & Stein, 2009; 
Miller & Kelly, 2017; Miller & Shepherd, 2004), though even those emerging genres 
might credibly be viewed as revising existing genres for those new media rather than 
creating something wholly new. Although the creation of a wholly new genre would 
seem impossible, since new genres are always already grounded in existing genres, 
one way of using genres for transformative social action is to perform what seems to 
be an action not already available, to create a seemingly new genre for new purposes 
and values. These alternative genres might emerge out of existing genres stretched 
far beyond their original actions, out of hybridizing two or more existing genres, or, 
potentially, out of claiming a wholly new social action that calls for a wholly new 
genre label (see Nyboe (2016) on the importance of genre signatures and what a writer 
calls a genre).
The genre of news satire might be a case of hybridizing two existing genres to 
create something new. When Jon Stewart and others began satirizing current events 
through apparent nightly news shows, they were turning news shows to serve the 
actions of satire. The resulting genre performed a social action not achieved by news 
or satire alone. Parodies existed, of course, but news satire did more than parody 
news. The case of John Oliver’s Last Week Tonight, mentioned earlier, stretched the 
genre even further toward not just social satire but social activism. 
Some literary genres may be cases of genres claiming new labels in order to 
perform new actions. The genre of climate fiction or cli-fi, for example, is sometimes 
a stretching of speculative fiction, but not necessarily. Cli-fi might seem a narrowing 
of dystopian fiction, but again not necessarily. It might be seen as a hybrid of science 
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and fiction or of many more genres, but it has become a genre with its unique social 
action around a shared topic (Bildsøe, 2016). So it does seem possible that newly 
described genres can develop toward new social actions. Whether traceable to exist-
ing genres explicitly or not, the point is that genres can be developed with particular 
social actions as their purposes and can be added to the genres available for transfor-
mative social action.
2.8  From Critical Awareness to Positive Action
To create genres for social action is not necessarily to create positive social actions. 
Genres can be used for good or evil, in simple terms, but they too often are perceived 
as only constraining rather than also enabling (Devitt, 2004a). Becoming aware of 
genres as social actions and becoming attentive to their underlying values and world-
views can lead to conscious use of genres for transformative social action – whether 
using genres for one’s own desired actions or resisting the genre actions of others. 
I’ve outlined four means of turning genres toward social actions – genre mindfulness, 
genre resistance, genre revision, and genre creation – but each of those (and varia-
tions that likely will appear to future scholars) can be used to manipulate as well as 
to persuade. In intense political debates, in arguments about significant world issues, 
these capacities of genres must be noticed, critiqued, called out, and reformed. Such 
debates are too important to leave to those who effectively manipulate genre actions – 
to those who choose genres that will influence others unconsciously, who resist genres 
of transparency and reason, who revise existing genres to mask motives or heighten 
the worst in people, or who create new genres to attack others. The fact that those 
manipulations seem the dominant ones at some political moments doesn’t require 
giving up. In fact, it requires even more vigilance. If genres are to be used for purpose-
ful social action, conscious awareness of how they operate and alertness to change in 
progress are the best defenses. (Of course, those are my own values as an academic 
and intellectual, one who has faith in reason and believes in the inherent rationality 
of human behavior. Those values and beliefs have certainly been challenged by some 
events and, in fact, by much of human behavior throughout our species’ history.)
With my beliefs and values – and idealism, perhaps – intact, though, I also see 
people using genres for respectful debate and positive action. I see more people more 
frequently choosing genres of marches, rallies, protest signs, public forums, petitions, 
organized letter campaigns, and phone calls to decision makers. I see more active 
resistance to fake news, viral videos, and trolling, and I see more deliberate revision 
of tweets, hashtags, and fact checking to create positive alternatives. In short, I see 
more conscious awareness of genres’ effects on beliefs as well as actions and more 
deliberate use of genres in response. 
Once you see how genres are social actions, you should see how genres can be 
used for social action. Once you see genres as ideological and value-laden, you should 
see how genres can instill and reinforce desirable as well as undesirable values and 
norms. I use the “you” here deliberately and knowingly. Along with others, I am 
arguing that scholars should not just critique but also act on that critique. Now is 
the time to turn to see genres not just as social action but for social action. It’s not 
enough just to become aware that genres can be used for social action; it’s time to do 
something about it.
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3  Scientific Knowledge, Public Knowledge, 
and Public Policy: How Genres Form and Disrupt 
Knowledge for Acting about Anthropogenic 
Climate Change
Abstract: Knowledge about anthropogenic climate change is produced, stored, and 
accessed in specific genres associated with different activity systems. Alignment of 
knowledge across spheres facilitates coordinated action among diverse groups. Our 
knowledge of the environment has been created in recent history by the interaction 
of discourses in military, scientific, public, political, corporate and governmental 
spheres. These spheres do not always work in concert, with significant obstacles and 
even resistances to communication of knowledge across boundaries. Citizen con-
cerns, expressed in public genres, have been crucial over the last sixty years in cre-
ating environmental knowledge, in contrast to governmental or corporate interests, 
even though government has since taken on major responsibilities for the production, 
dissemination, and authentication of environmental information. Those with a desire 
to disrupt remedial action on the environment and more particularly anthropogenic 
climate change have found disrupting the certainty of knowledge within governmen-
tal genres an important tool.1 
3.1  Introduction
Cooperation on action to mitigate anthropogenic climate change requires the commit-
ted engagement of people of many countries with many different interests. Concerted 
and effective action mitigating climate change requires that these many groups rec-
ognize that an urgent problem exists, that the problem has particular characteristics, 
and that certain actions will likely be effective. Further they must agree that the situ-
ation is so dire and of such great priority that they will be willing to sacrifice other 
valued goods and to make adjustments to well-established ways of life and business. 
This alignment over the existence, urgency, and solutions to anthropogenic 
climate change requires that each of these groups understand, trust, and accept 
the importance of a series of scientific findings, theories, and projections. To under-
stand, trust, and accept this scientific work requires that they learn to engage with 
and make sense of the many kinds of professional knowledge that have transformed 
1  An earlier version of this chapter appeared in Linguagem em (Dis)curso, (2010, 445–463).
 © 2020 Sune Auken and Christel Sunesen
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License.
our view of the climate. Climate knowledge is grounded within, and gets evidentiary 
warrant from certain citizen-oriented scientific genres. This knowledge is then taken 
up (Freadman, 1994, 2002) and operationalized into public, government, and corpo-
rate action through other genres. The problems and solutions are only identifiable 
and persuasive through the forms of evidence, calculation, and reasoning existing 
in these genres. Insofar as people are not skilled in engaging with these genres they 
are not able to build trust and engagement with the solutions, even if they accept 
the authority of the texts and their authors. It is only through these genres that we 
know, and it is only when we know that we can act with energy and conviction (for the 
demotivating effects of uncertainty of climate change knowledge see Cook, Lewan-
dosky, & Ecker, 2017; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007.)
The case of anthropogenic climate change shows how knowledge is produced, 
stored, accessed, and deliberated upon in specific genres within specific activity-ori-
ented social formations, and then how that knowledge may or may not be transmitted 
into other activity systems. What is known in one activity system is not immediately 
and automatically known in another. Genres must exist that allow for the transmis-
sion following specific procedures and criteria; further, writers must carry out that 
work of translation in these intermediary genres (Tachino, 2012). Individuals or 
groups with stakes in the deliberations of the receiving activity system may then seek 
to control which knowledge enters into the new system and how it may influence 
decisions to be made upon that knowledge by contesting the legitimacy of the trans-
mission (Bazerman, 2009, 2013). 
The phenomenon of anthropogenic climate change itself cannot be directly and 
reliably experienced by any individual, nor is it even directly visible from the inspec-
tion of typical local weather records (Moser, 2010). Seeing anthropogenic climate 
change as a phenomenon, let alone recognizing that it poses a problem, requires a 
kind of professional vision (Goodwin, 1994), seen through the lenses of scientific the-
ories and literature, aggregated planetary data, and computer models. Awareness of 
our problem depends on projection of future conditions by those computer models, as 
is identification of potential remedial actions. Without trust in those aggregated data, 
models, and projections, climate change is hard to recognize. The problem anthropo-
genic climate change poses has gained widespread attention of the scientific public 
only in the last four decades and of citizens and governments only in the last two. 
While there is high agreement in the scientific community and strong consensus 
that action is needed (see, for example, Cook et al. (2016) and the introduction to 
this volume), agreement and action consensus among citizens is uneven although 
increasing as a result of extreme weather events now commonly attributed to climate 
change (Moser, 2016). Further, cooperation among governments is only recent, and 
corporate engagement is only sporadic and subordinate to perceived interests. Our 
future hangs on gaining more consistent engagement with scientifically based knowl-
edge and its policy imperatives. 
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This essay examines that process of social learning and alignment to relevant 
scientific knowledge, from a genre and activity theory perspective. In this essay I will 
be bringing together the work of a number of my prior studies where more detailed 
evidence and analysis are available (Bazerman, 2001; Bazerman, Little, & Chavkin, 
2003; Bazerman & de los Santos, 2005). These studies are based predominantly on 
events and evidence from the United States, but given the US role in science and in 
the international economy along with the recurring episodes of US governmental and 
corporate recalcitrance, the harnessing of US political will is an important element 
in global negotiations on addressing climate change. Thus, this story is of more than 
local interest. In addition, because cooperation of people and organizations in every 
nation is essential for effective global climate cooperation we need similar under-
standings of the formation of politics and policy in each nation and region. 
3.2  Knowledge Resides within Genres
Theoretically, the studies in the present volume are grounded in the idea that knowl-
edge is inscribed, reasoned about, stored, and accessed in specific genres. Bakhtin 
noted that each genre is associated with a specific time and space, or chronotope, 
populated by expected types of characters, objects, scenery and other elements, 
which then are part of an expected set of unfolding of events (Bakhtin, 1981). Some 
genres in fact exist with the specific aim of producing, warranting, evaluating, or 
distributing specific forms of knowledge (Bazerman, 1999). Engaged and knowledge-
able participants in activity systems know where relevant knowledge is to be found. 
This is an extension of the observation that most of what we consider knowledge 
is embodied in linguistically produced artifacts, typically in a written, rather than 
purely spoken form. Different kinds of knowledge are produced, warranted, and used 
by particular groupings of people who are bound together by series of publications 
and related communicative forums in which the typical genres of the groups are pro-
duced, rehearsed, and discussed (Bazerman & Rogers, 2008). Further productions are 
intertextually linked to prior texts and the knowledge produced therein. Evidence, 
including empirical evidence gathered from outside the textual world, must be gath-
ered and inscribed by methods and forms that are accepted within the knowledge-
producing social group. Only then is the evidence available for evaluation and as 
warrant for further knowledge claims. This production, collection, and mutual articu-
lation of knowledge and evidence within disciplinary or professional forms create the 
basis of coordinated future action. 
When actions require cooperation across many groups of people, it is important 
that knowledge is taken up from one sphere of coordinated knowledge to another. This 
is a consequence of the fact that different communicative spaces – particular genres 
within particular activity systems – gain the attention and belief of different groups 
of people, and knowledge does not readily flow from one to another. For example, 
the rules and purposes of evidence within the law are very different than those of 
science. If scientific knowledge bears on a court case, elaborate procedures for car-
rying information across the boundaries transform the nature and particulars of the 
knowledge as well as their operational effect, often leaving scientists unhappy with 
what knowledge gets to the courts (see Bazerman, 2009). Thus, large group actions 
involving many people in many different roles and configurations must somehow 
coordinate their different kinds of knowledge to share recognition of a problem to be 
addressed; otherwise, the groups will not be able to act with mutual clarity, convic-
tion, and commitment.
3.3  Knowing the Environment
So how do we know the environment? While we may walk through forests and enjoy 
the sounds of birds and refreshing breezes, when we talk of the environment we are 
more likely to have in mind things we have read – in public media drawing on specific 
scientific literature. Indeed, until recent decades we would not even be likely to refer 
to ambient nature as an environment, let alone as an interdependent system. Even 
among scientists the concept of environment was an invention of the mid-nineteenth 
century (Jessop, 2012) and ecosystem of the 1930’s (Willis, 1997). Both remained of 
limited attention and interest until the latter half of the twentieth, circulating only 
in a limited set of genres within some biological specializations. Few scientists, let 
alone policy makers or citizens, had reason to turn to the pages of journals where the 
concepts resided. 
Within the US public sphere, Rachel Carson’s drawing together of the work of 
researchers whose work had not formed a coherent body of knowledge marked the 
introduction of the idea of environmental threat as she publicized the problems 
created by DDT and other pesticides. Earlier concerns about pollution, such as air pol-
lution from industrial and vehicle emissions were seen more as problems of direct con-
tamination rather than systemic degradation. Carson herself was a government natu-
ralist, who had written a number of popular books of nature appreciation. In writing 
Silent Spring (1962, 1995), she created a compelling public account that changed the 
public’s ways of viewing their actions as potentially having long-term systemic con-
sequences on the conditions of our life as ramified through complex interdependent 
processes (see Waddell, 2000 for useful contexts and analyses of Carson’s book). The 
wide circulation of Silent Spring created political and policy discussions leading to 
government regulation of pesticides. This pesticide legislation differed from earlier 
food and drug regulation by controlling small amounts of chemicals that, though not 
immediately destructive, would have long range aggregate consequences. This kind 
of reasoning and the need to have associated regulation gave rise to new scientific 
specialties such as ecotoxicology that statistically calculated long term results under 
field conditions in contrast to the controlled laboratory experiments of traditional 
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toxicology (see Bazerman & de los Santos, 2005 for a study of the divisions and recon-
ciliations that impeded and eventually allowed evidence to travel between genres of 
these specialties). We can also see the continuing effect of the communicative model 
Carson created in the introductory comments of Al Gore to the 1995 reissue of Silent 
Spring, indicating the direct genre genealogy of Earth in the Balance (Gore, 1992).
For me personally, Silent Spring had a profound impact. It was one of the books we read at home 
at my mother’s insistence and then discussed around the dinner table. My sister and I didn’t 
like every book that made it to that table, but our conversations about Silent Spring are a happy 
and vivid memory. Indeed, Rachel Carson was one of the reasons I became so conscious of the 
environment and so involved with environmental issues. Her example inspired me to write Earth 
in the Balance, which, not coincidentally, was published by Houghton Mifflin, the company that 
stood by Carson through all the controversy and that has since earned a reputation for publi-
shing many fine books about the environmental dangers facing our world. (Gore introduction 
to Carson, 1995)
Concurrently, another set of events was creating a related set of genres at the intersec-
tion of science, public issues, and government policy (Bazerman, 2001). We can pick 
up this story with the Manhattan Project, which developed the atom bomb under con-
ditions of the highest secrecy. Under the exigencies of WWII, academic science, which 
had been used to the free flow of information, acquiesced to the military discipline of 
a restricted flow of knowledge. After the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic detonations 
and the end of the war, scientists exerted pressure to allow open access to the scien-
tific findings (Smith, 1965). Advocates of civilian monitoring and democratic decision 
making also wanted the science to be publicly available. The rapid emergence of the 
Cold War created new pressures for secrecy, so that major restrictions remained (mon-
itored by the newly-formed Atomic Energy Commission) keeping much of the knowl-
edge about nuclear weaponry and its effects within classified military documents. 
However less than a decade later, after atmospheric testing of hydrogen weapons 
produced radiation fallout, public pressure increased for more detailed information 
about the effects of fallout, particularly strontium 90 (Wittner, 1997). Strontium 90 
was chemically similar to calcium, thus fallout onto grasslands was ingested by cows 
and concentrated in milk. Children drinking milk from contaminated cows would 
then further concentrate the strontium 90 in their bones and teeth. 
After government and military sources remained vague on details about fallout 
and its effects despite public pressure, an alliance between academic scientists and 
citizen groups formed in St. Louis to make knowledge available and pressure for limit-
ing testing and the associated nuclear fallout (Sullivan, 1982). The St. Louis Citizens’ 
Committee for Nuclear Information began producing newsletters called Information, 
then Nuclear Information. Those newsletters provided scientific knowledge from the 
perspective of public problems, though presenting the political message only by impli-
cation. The selection and organization of the texts, nonetheless, clearly made evident 
governmental actions were putting citizens at threat by disrupting the safe environ-
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ment for human life. The organizers of this movement were self-conscious about 
advancing citizen science in the public interest, and were gathered by scientists who 
considered themselves as citizens, rather than being in the employ of government, 
military or industry. Such scientists would develop their research questions from 
public need rather than the internal dynamics of science. The direct linkage between 
this movement and the environmental movement is indicated by the name changes 
of the newsletter as it transformed into a journal. Nuclear Information became retitled 
Scientist and Citizen and then Environment. Even as the articles became more techni-
cal they kept the focus on public problems (Bazerman, 2001).
The increasing public concern for the environment became a major political issue 
to which Congress responded with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970. The 
perceived lack of information available on which to base policy led to the requirement 
that an Environmental Impact Statement be produced for any government action that 
might affect the environment. The adequacy of this new genre created by fiat has been 
a matter of debate; nonetheless, the genre both monitored actions from the citizen’s 
perspective and expanded the market for the production of such information. Further, 
it identified governmental agencies as responsible parties for the collection of such 
information, taking some of the impetus away from grassroots citizen groups (Bazer-
man et al., 2003).
So in less than twenty-years we had new communication channels that fostered 
public attention and access to certain kinds of scientific information viewed as rel-
evant for public well-being, particularly because the normal conditions of life were 
under threat by human actions. These new communicative channels created a market 
for scientists who would adopt a public interest perspective. These channels in turn 
fostered new developments within more purely scientific and political communities.
3.4  Knowing about Global Warming
Among the issues taken up in these new communicative spaces was global warming, 
as it was then called. Awareness of global warming also had begun in military spon-
sored science. While the concept of greenhouse warming of the atmosphere was first 
proposed by Fourier in the 1820’s and revived by the engineer Callendar in 1850, it 
initially gathered little attention, and little evidence suggested its reality. Military 
interests in the Cold War period, however, led to monitoring of the oceans and atmo-
sphere as potential sites of military engagement. Working for the Office of Naval 
Research, Roger Revelle in 1957 noted that recorded ocean uptake of excess CO2 was 
less than anticipated, which meant that atmospheric CO2 produced by hydrocar-
bon combustion would be increasing (Weart 2003, 2008). To track this and similar 
data the National Center for Atmospheric Research was founded in 1960. In 1970 this 
agency was reorganized under a new National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce. Most of the foundational research on 
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global warming at that time and since has been done by governmental agencies or 
under related government funding, often tied to national security concerns, though 
increasingly with attention to the potential disruption of everyday life of citizens in 
the US and elsewhere. James Hansen, perhaps the leading figure in global warming 
science, was employed at the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies in New York 
City from 1972 to 2013 and was its director from 1981 until he left the Institute. NASA, 
although an independent government agency, has been from its founding deeply 
intertwined with military interests; nonetheless, it has increasingly addressed more 
general citizen concerns. 
Much of global warming research has been based on computer models of global 
and regional climates, with historic data and projections forward, looking to climate 
impacts and turbulence, as well as impacts on sea level, agriculture, and other climate 
sensitive phenomena. Recognition of this broader view of the complex impacts of 
increasing greenhouse gases has led to the current preference for the term climate 
change, with the even more recent preference for the term anthropogenic climate 
change, recognizing the role of humans in producing greenhouse gases. Even today, 
nonetheless, all three terms are in use by different participants, and in the following 
historical account I will follow the usage of each participant I am discussing.
Climate models always have a degree of speculation, extrapolation, and simplifi-
cation so authoritativeness and certainty was an issue from the beginning, with many 
competing models and projections, using both different data collections and different 
algorithms. Nonetheless, by the mid 1980’s, an increasing numbers of reports raised 
alarms about potential harm (see http://www.globalwarmingarchive.com/Timeline.
aspx). In particular governmental reports from the Environmental Protection Agency 
in 1983 made public concerns that climate change would begin to be evident in the 
1990’s with serious consequences for food production and sea levels. The New York 
Times article describing this report had to provide not only an introduction to the 
scientific principles of greenhouse warming, and a survey of the evidence, but also a 
discussion of the nature of the computational models with their uncertainties (Sha-
becoff, 1983). The public needed to be educated into the scientific issues and given a 
primer on atmospheric science in order to understand the issue, evidence, and spe-
cialized form of argument.
The EPA report indicated that by 1983 strong scientific consensus had already 
emerged that serious climate change would be occurring because of human produced 
carbon dioxide, though there were some differences on timing and severity. A series 
of UN sponsored scientific panels also tracked the solidifying scientific consensus. In 
1988 the World Meteorological Organization and UN Environment Programme formed 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (http://www.ipcc.ch/). The 
first assessment report of the IPCC in 1990 expressed some differences and uncertain-
ties about the specific scenarios that might unfold, but confirmed the importance of 
the issue and established a framework for addressing the climate change issue and 
gathering data for future reports. The second assessment report in 1995 confirmed 
with confidence the existence and magnitude of global warming and offered specific 
projections. This report formed the framework for deliberations of the Kyoto Proto-
col in 1997. The third assessment in 2001 presented strong evidence that change had 
already occurred, examined the mechanisms of the change, and offered options for 
intervention. The fourth assessment in 2007 noted substantial effects that had already 
occurred and will be continuing, and offered scenarios that might mitigate the conse-
quences. The fifth assessment in 2014 reported that human activity had raised emis-
sions of greenhouse gases to the highest in history, already impacting human and 
natural systems, with greater impacts and risks to come, even if emissions were to be 
stopped immediately. The assessment identified some pathways for mitigation and 
adaptation to reduce the worst risks, and became a central background document 
to the Paris Agreement of 2015. The sixth assessment is scheduled to be completed 
in 2022.
3.5  Knowledge for Policy Action
It is quite unusual for adjudication panels to be formed in science, as codification of 
knowledge is usually left to implicit processes of review, citation, and incorporation 
into future work, reviews, and textbooks (Bazerman, 1991). The EPA and IPCC reports, 
based on panel judgments and circulation among wide numbers of scientists for their 
approval, indicate firstly the intersection with policy and public concerns and sec-
ondly that governmental action and intergovernmental cooperation require a high 
degree of sharing of knowledge considered authoritative and trustworthy. A citation 
count or review of the literature is not an adequate sign of scientific agreement for 
governmental policy action. Rather a governmentally or intergovernmentally autho-
rized body must authenticate findings with the explicit comment of a wide sample of 
the authoritative scientists in the area. 
But scientific consensus, even government-authorized adjudication of consen-
sus, is not enough for concerted action. The knowledge needs to gain the belief and 
commitment of segments of the population and institutional groups who will have to 
cooperate with the action. Earlier citizen engagement with environmental knowledge 
had already spread through journalism, specialized reports, and non-fiction public 
problem policy books by the 1990’s laying the grounds for public knowledge and sub-
stantial public consensus that climate change was occurring. By 1992, 68% of the 
US public believed that global warming was real as a phenomenon – a number, that 
despite a dip in 1994 – has since only increased to around 75% with under 20% skep-
tical. Recent polls indicate that concern about global warming continues to increase 
along with belief that effects are already being seen (Saad, 2017). Curiously, however 
beliefs about scientific certainty lagged behind with 28% of the sampled public 
believing that there was scientific certainty in 1994, 46 % percent in 1997, 61 % in 2001 
and 65% in 2006. The bulk of the other responders, however, rather than exhibiting 
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belief that scientists were not convinced rather stated they were unsure (58% in 1994, 
37 % in 1997, 30% in 1991, and 29% in 2006). This indicates that the overwhelming 
certainty among scientists, expressed in the 1983 EPA and 1995 IPCC reports was not 
being communicated clearly to segments of the public, even though awareness of the 
phenomenon had. In 1994 there was a 29% disparity between citizens’ own certainty 
and their estimate of scientific certainty, 21 % in 1997, 16% in 2001 (Nisbet & Myers, 
2007). More recent polling, however, indicates greater public awareness of scientific 
consensus (Saad, 2017).
Government under the Clinton administration also expressed strong alignment 
with knowledge about global warming, evident in reports, websites and other docu-
ments, as did the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment reports in the early 
1990’s (though Congress eliminated the agency in 1995). The Clinton Administration 
was also active in negotiating and supporting the Kyoto protocols in 1997. Vice Presi-
dent Al Gore in particular advanced many environmental initiatives and advocated 
for the Kyoto Protocol. 
3.6  Interfering with what Publics and Governments Know
Republican control of Congress in 1994 and the Bush presidency in 2001 changed the 
stance of branches of government and their role in the knowledge process, follow-
ing the interests of the corporate sector. The corporate sector generally resisted the 
emerging consensus about global warming and did its best to disrupt communica-
tion and alignment of knowledge within the public and government. This is the story 
behind the Republican Congressional opposition in the 1990s, the Bush positions, 
and the curious anomalies in the public perception of science. 
But before we go into the specifics of the activities of the corporate sector, par-
ticularly the energy sector, we need to look at the underlying causes of the stance they 
take toward the environment from a genre and knowledge perspective. Businesses 
typically have a short to middle range time horizon on making financial decisions to 
enhance profitability and growth in the foreseeable future, usually from one to eight 
years (Das, 1987; Naylor & Schauland, 1976). The uncertainty of long range, or even 
middle range, economic forecasting also mitigates against longer planning. What 
planning does occur has to rely on historic conditions and trends. Thus, the genres 
that collect knowledge for decision-making and then attempt to extrapolate forward 
consider the future much like the past. Projections beyond the immediate upcoming 
quarters and years fade from view, particularly futures that might incorporate radical 
changes in conditions. In publicly held companies, further, maintaining or increas-
ing stock prices through growth of quarter-to-quarter profits keeps calculations even 
more in the near term. This short time frame has been further tightened by the tying of 
executive compensation to stock prices through options and bonuses. In this short to 
middle time frame, climate change does not turn up substantially in past or projected 
balance sheets and thus does not seriously enter into calculations. Losses through 
extreme weather and other natural disasters are covered by insurance. At worst, 
increased risk of climate induced disasters turns up as increased casualty insurance 
premiums – in most industries not a significant cost. It is only when predictable 
changes in sales might occur as a result of changing consumer needs and desires 
(such as a cultural preference for green products) or changes in production costs 
(such as caused by climate-related agricultural shortages) would the climate really be 
worth taking into account. Government regulation and other mandated adjustments 
might put greater pressure on the business model, and thus concerted government 
action on climate change would be more of a threat to projected profitability (the core 
goal in corporate economic planning) than direct loss from global warming. 
The insurance industry, however, has for centuries had a longer time frame for 
data gathering and planning. Since its business is built on balancing current income 
against rarely occurring events, the insurance industry since the seventeenth century 
has developed actuarial tools of determining long-term costs and risks and match-
ing that to current income and profitability. Accordingly, the insurance industry has 
developed genres for displaying the long-time frame and calculating profit within 
it. Even more directly, climate-induced disasters incur direct business expenses and 
cannot be laid off to anyone else, except maybe the large reinsurers. Therefore, it is 
quite understandable that insurance, with the reinsurers leading the way, was the 
first industry to recommend action on global warming. By early 1990s some European 
insurers became concerned with global warming’s impact on their industry (Mollin, 
1993). Large reinsurers such as Munich Reinsurance Company hired their own mete-
orologists and climatologists to prepare internal reports (Mills, 1998). Indeed, the 
industry began encouraging eco-friendly behavior and basing investments on envi-
ronmental and sustainability audits (Hoeppe & Berz, 2005). 
But for most industries, action to mitigate climate change was calculated to be 
more costly than the effects of the change itself. Climate change action might even 
require a fundamental restructuring of industry and restriction on business. The oil, 
coal, and electrical power industries, in particular, began to pay worried attention 
to predictions about global warming as early as the late 1970s before any substantial 
public, political, or public policy awareness had emerged. But as scientific knowl-
edge gained activist, political and even government attention, suppressing informa-
tion about global warming became less possible. Instead, the energy sector adopted 
a strategy to disrupt the confidence and direction of the emerging public discussion 
of what, if anything, needed to be done. This tactic, called agnotology (Proctor & 
Schiebinger, 2008, see also Michaels, 2008) – the active production of uncertainty – 
was first developed by the tobacco lobby to maintain the appearance of “controversy” 
which undermined certainty of knowledge with its imperative for action. The strategy 
was carried out by producing the appearance of scientific disagreement through mag-
nification of minor differences and the sponsored production of legitimate seeming 
but questionable research that appeared to contradict more independent and solid 
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work. Then, on the basis of this manufactured appearance of uncertainty, lobbies 
could argue for more research, delays in action, or simply avoiding action that might 
appear as an expensive and unnecessary gamble. 
One of the key organizations for this production of disruptive knowledge about 
global warming became the George C. Marshall Institute, which had previously been 
engaged in arguing for Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, known as Star Wars. 
Interestingly, two of the key players in this organization as it turned its attention 
to energy had long experience with the production of quasi science for the tobacco 
lobby. S. Frederick Seitz, chair of the Marshall Institute, was a consultant to tobacco 
company RJ Reynolds until 1989. S. Fred Singer, who authored 35 Institute-sponsored 
articles and books questioning global warming, had also learned this strategy through 
tobacco research (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). As part of the same strategy, ExxonMo-
bil beginning in 1987 sponsored a series of misleading public statements question-
ing climate change (Supran & Oreskes, 2017), and after the negotiation of the Kyoto 
accord funded the “Cooler Heads Coalition” to argue against US ratification.
The energy lobby found its allies in the political sphere where they brought the 
knowledge disruption tactics first to Congress and then to the Bush administration, so 
government deliberations also could not be carried out in an atmosphere of scientific 
certainty. Frank Luntz, a chief Republican political strategist, in a 2002 memo urged 
the Republicans to “make the lack of scientific certainty a primary issue” (Burkeman, 
2003). Republican Senator James Inhofe, who since his election to the Senate in 1994 
had called global warming a fraud, in 2003 became chair of the Senate Committee 
on Environment and Public Works and organized hearings to make that case. When 
George W. Bush became president, his administration almost immediately announced 
it would not implement the Kyoto Protocol. Further, the White House then began to 
participate in the disruption of public certainty about scientific knowledge. Previ-
ous reports were expunged from the EPA website, and new scientific reports were 
edited by a lawyer Philip Cooney who had previously been a lobbyist for the American 
Petroleum Institute. His handiwork typically involved adding words such as perhaps, 
maybe, or uncertainty at key locations in scientific reports that had originally been 
drafted with full certainty (Revkin, 2005). The US National Assessment on Climate 
Change, mandated by the UN, was near silent on global warming. The 600-page draft 
of the 2003 report had only six paragraphs on climate change; the White House then 
deleted five and added a reference to an ExxonMobil-funded study disputing the 
global warming hypothesis (Revkin, 2003). So as to further disrupt the flow of sub-
stantial scientific information, James Hansen, still head of the Goddard Institute, was 
ordered not to speak publicly on global warming issues. Only under court order, in 
its closing days, after a four-year delay and too late to influence any policies, did the 
Bush administration release a legislatively mandated report of the impact of global 
warming (Revkin, 2008).
The new Obama administration in 2009 realigned with scientific knowledge, with 
new government reports, websites, and proposals acting in consonance with science. 
Extensive scientific data was made publicly available through the websites. The 
administration supported legislation to decrease carbon dioxide through cap-and 
trade – which creates economic incentives by setting emissions allowances which 
can then be traded on a market. Gaining congressional approval, however, presented 
a challenge and no law emerged, as will be examined in the next chapter in this 
volume. Nonetheless, the Obama administration engaged in international negotia-
tion in Copenhagen in 2009 and Paris in 2015, resulting in the Paris Agreement, to 
which the US committed by executive action, avoiding Congressional deliberation. 
Despite congressional resistance to the accord, the Obama administration began 
implementing the commitments through his previously initiated Presidential Climate 
Action Plan and Clean Power Plan.
The election in 2016 of Donald Trump, however, again reversed direction. 
While Trump earlier in his career had, prior to the Copenhagen climate conference, 
co-signed a paid advertisement in The New York Times on December 6, 2009 calling for 
action on climate change (Adler & Leber, 2016; Davenport & Lipton, 2017), as a candi-
date he repeatedly claimed climate change was a hoax for the benefit of the Chinese, 
scientists, and other interests. Immediately upon his inauguration, the EPA and other 
governmental sites began to remove climate change data or make it less accessible 
(Davenport, 2017; Mooney & Eilperin, 2017). In anticipation of the Trump’s admin-
istration’s attempt to change the public record on climate change, scientists began 
to preserve on independent servers the data from US government websites (Dennis, 
2016; Holthaus 2016). Trump also withdrew Obama’s Presidential Climate Action 
Plan and Clean Power Plan (Davenport & Rubin, 2017) and announced his intention 
to withdraw the U.S from the Paris Agreement. While the Trump administration has 
obscured where it stands on climate change and climate change denial has regained 
force with the political right (Davenport & Lipton, 2017), local jurisdictions such as 
states (Bromwich, 2017), cities, universities, and corporations have aggressively regu-
lated greenhouse gases and invested in green energy and other technologies. Con-
sortia of these local jurisdictions are forming to coordinate their efforts (Tabuchi & 
Fountain, 2017) and have the potential of entering into international efforts in lieu of 
national US withdrawal (Hernández & Nagourney, 2017).
So, we are now in a position in the US where different groupings of people know 
different things, with different collections of knowledge visible within their systems 
of reasoning, justification, and calculation. This is despite almost all other countries 
now being in agreement as signatories of the Paris Agreement and implementing 
related domestic policies, including China, India, and the EU. In the US however, 
the efforts of different groups pull in different directions and remain uncoordinated, 
lacking a common understanding of the problems facing society as a whole, let alone 
how they can pursue their separate interests and concerns within a shared set of facts. 
The state of knowledge within each of these systems is the product of ongoing epis-
temic work of creating effective speech acts or contesting the speech acts of others, to 
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leave sets of facts standing, obliterate others, or create uncertainty to weaken the will 
and focus of action. 
Within the uncertainties that face us as the material, political, and economic situ-
ations unfold on the global stage, one thing seems certain: what people do depends 
on what the social and institutional groups that they participate in know, and that 
what these groups know is the result of active rhetorical work to represent and justify 
the knowledge which is the basis of problem definition and action. That struggle for 
which knowledge gets represented with the certainty that demands action will not 
end until the problem is considered resolved or moot for all interested parties. For 
example, at one time the genealogy of various European royal families was a major 
concern to establish legitimacy of regimes, but now it is mostly moot as political 
changes have made claims of royal lineage matters mainly for the social register. Sim-
ilarly, complex identification and parsing of various sins and their place in various 
circles of hell are no longer much of a theological concern. But the facts of climate 
change are currently very much of a concern, with impacts for all and needed engage-
ment of all in solutions. 
3.7  Final Comments
This chapter highlights how certainty of knowledge comes about through coordinated 
information within key knowledge genres in each sphere, how certainty expressed in 
the genres of one sphere does not necessarily translate into certainty of knowledge in 
others, how alignment of knowledge across the genres of different spheres is neces-
sary for coordinated action on complex matters, and how disruption of knowledge 
translation can be disruptive of action. With respect to the environment the case of 
anthropogenic climate change has highlighted the centrality of science as a producer 
of authoritative knowledge; the necessity and difficulty of getting other spheres to 
attend to and understand the scientific consensus in order to incorporate the find-
ings into their reasoning; and the power of disrupting that process of shared knowl-
edge construction and deliberation. Further, this case has highlighted the role of the 
federal government within the US system has taken as a central gatherer, authorizer, 
disseminator, and site of action calculation – and how disrupting government pro-
cesses of knowledge can disrupt action initiatives, even when science and the public 
remain convinced of anthropogenic climate change, and the disruptive insertion of 
distracting claims and inappropriate doubts is transparently obvious to all players. 
Not only does disruption of government knowledge stall the internal deliberations 
and actions of the US government, but also places major obstacles within interna-
tional climate negotiations.
Finally, while national governments play such a central role in the production, 
sponsorship, authentication, and dissemination of knowledge as well as its direct use 
for deliberation on action, we should remember that all governments are beholden to 
many forces and pressures. While the US government took on some responsibility for 
the citizens’ need for knowledge and action, citizens as citizens are not its only client. 
Actions in the name of citizens can often be betrayed or hijacked by other interests, 
so that citizens must maintain citizen genres of knowledge production and evalua-
tion of knowledge from other spheres. They must then monitor government knowl-
edge and actions within certain genres of inspection and evaluation, and must mount 
political pressure through various communicative genres to hold the government to 
its responsibility for maintaining and acting on solid science in the public interest. 
However, when government defaults or draws back, disrupting what is known from 
scientists, other actors, such as industry, activists, individuals, and other political 
jurisdictions can attempt to step in. These in turn may become political forces that 
will impact the government, as political knowledge is the specialty of governments, 
and it cannot deny the facts of political forces as long as a semblance of democratic 
procedures remain. Vote counting, fundraising, actions of other government bodies 
in a distributed federal system with separation of powers among branches – these 
form facts that are noted and calculated within democratic governments whether 
climate knowledge is viewed to be firm or uncertain.
3.8  Postscript
At this time of final editing in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, the implications of 
this study for government and citizen action or inaction are even more immediately 
salient.
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4  How The US Congress Knows and Evades Knowing 
About Anthropogenic Climate Change: The Record 
Created in Committee Hearings, 2004–2016
Abstract: Anthropogenic climate change is a global problem requiring international 
coordination, depending on shared knowledge leading to shared formulation of 
problems, solutions, and mechanisms of action. Each nation’s governmental bodies, 
however, have their own processes of admitting and evaluating knowledge, defining 
interests, deliberating, and coming to commitments. This essay examines the tran-
scripts of relevant committee hearings from the 109th to the 115th Congresses to con-
sider what the US Houses of Congress come to know or not know about climate change 
in their deliberations, within the structures of their procedures and regulations by 
which discussion is controlled. Committee hearings are an important activity system 
with corresponding genres for putting on the record information bearing on delibera-
tion and decision making, but what goes on the record in the hearing transcript genre 
is limited by the questions asked and the witnesses called, both controlled by the 
committee chair from the majority party. Depending on the party in control and the 
purview of each committee, fundamental issues may or may not be addressed and 
members of Congress may or may not be required to go on the record with their views 
of climate change. Often members of the party opposed to climate change action may 
nonetheless act in ways consonant with anthropogenic climate change belief, as long 
as they do not directly address climate change knowledge. On the other hand, this 
arrangement offers chairs and other high-profile members of certain committees to 
advance oppositional agendas. Members of the minority party have limited scope to 
put knowledge relevant to their own positions on the record.
4.1  The Complexity of Congressional Deliberation
In order to understand the context of the control of knowledge within the US Con-
gress and thus the limited attention given to anthropogenic climate change, we need 
first rehearse some basics of US governance. The United States has separation of 
powers both at the national level, with divisions among executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches, and between federal and state jurisdictions. Further, Congress is 
divided into the Senate and the House of Representatives. These divisions of power 
mitigate against a unified, stable response to anthropogenic climate change, which 
would require Congressional approval and Presidential signature. Because of politi-
cal divisions at the Federal level, the Paris Agreement negotiated by the Executive 
Branch was never submitted as a treaty for Congressional approval, and only stood 
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as an executive commitment of President Obama’s administration. President Trump 
has since announced his attention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Because of 
separation of powers between federal and state governance, however, some states, 
cities, and other jurisdictions have stated their intention to abide by the agreement 
(Tabuchi & Fountain, 2017). 
A core challenge in gaining unified national US commitment to the Paris Agree-
ment or any major international climate agreement has been gaining the agreement 
of Congress which must approve treaties and laws. Despite the prominence of global 
climate issues, the scientific consensus, IPCC reports, international meetings and 
even the Paris accord, and despite extensive hearings on the issue in both houses, 
Congress has passed no major climate legislation or international agreement, the 
authoritative formal genres by which action is taken in the legal system. This failure 
of legislative action affects not only the United States, but all nations attempting 
coordinated action. This lack of action on the part of Congress, therefore, is a serious 
puzzle, leaving us to ask if the House and Senate don’t know there is a problem. In an 
institutional sense, this is so, as the following analysis shows.
In contrast, the executive branch, despite differences among officials, can appear 
unified under the direction of the President, with internal processes and divisions 
hidden from view. This can result in rapid policy reversals (and changes in adminis-
trative genres) with the change in administrations, as has happened between Presi-
dents Obama and Trump with respect to the Paris Agreement. Congress is a different 
matter, with 435 voting representatives and 100 senators, divided into two parties, 
with multiple factions and individual interests, each responsive to multiple pressures. 
Further, deliberations are somewhat transparent with debate, hearings, reports, and 
votes published regularly. 
As a deliberative body Congress has multiple procedures to gather facts to deter-
mine what areas under their charge warrant legislative action (see Krehbiel, 1991 for 
the classic study of the role of information in legislative bodies). Congress regularly 
receives reports from the Congressional Research Service, the US General Account-
ing Office, the Congressional Budget Office and other agencies in the legislative and 
executive branches. Further, each Senator and Representative has staff to gather and 
select facts they need. Further the Senate and House have organized committees 
with staffs, procedures, rules, and powers to gather information and expert opinion. 
Among these procedures are open public hearings, which invite documents and wit-
nesses. The hearings are then transcribed and made public. Among all the informa-
tion procedures, these hearings and their published transcripts create the most public 
face of the knowledge commitments of each member of Congress within a deliberative 
setting, the place they are seen to be engaged in fact-finding.
From this simple, even naive, view hearings could be seen to provide the knowl-
edge upon which rational decisions are made, in the same way that evidence enters 
into a court through specific rules and procedures (Bazerman, 2009). From a rhe-
torical perspective (Aristotle, 1991), Congress engages in deliberative rhetoric. From 
activity theory (Russell, 1997) and genre perspectives (Bazerman, 1994; Miller, 1984), 
Congress is an activity system with the object of legislation, where evidence and rea-
soning would be represented and brought to bear on issues within the genres of delib-
eration. From a theory of organizational knowledge (Krehbiel, 1991; Nonaka, 1994), 
the record of hearings indicates what any Congress knows, how it learns, and how it 
goes about making decisions. 
Congress, however, is more than a deliberative body; it is a legal, representative, 
governmental, and political body. As a legal body it is accountable to rules overseeing 
its actions. As a representative body each member is accountable to voting constitu-
ents, including beliefs, sentiments, and interests of those constituents. As a govern-
mental body, it acts within a system of checks and balances within the separation 
of powers. As part of a political body, Congress members are accountable to voting 
constituents and other stakeholders, in order to gain reelection every two years for 
the House and every six years for the Senate (Arnold, 1990; Mayhew, 2004). Within 
current political practice, stakeholders include corporations, interest groups, and 
media who can provide financial, publicity, or other reelection supports, whether or 
not they are located within any particular Congressional district. 
Further, electoral politics are organized through political parties that also provide 
internal structure within Congress. Party members caucus together, and party lead-
erships control positions on committees and other privileges that can advance or 
impede individual careers. In recent decades partisan strategies have diminished 
deliberative functions and bipartisan committee staffs in order to increase the roles of 
party leadership (Mann & Ornstein, 2006). 
Despite partisan activity systems that control the operations of both houses and 
that influence the operations of committees as activity systems, members of Congress 
have a stake in appearing deliberative in the best interests of the nation and their 
constituencies. Accordingly, they seek placement and seniority on committees of 
value to their constituencies (Weingast & Marshall, 1988). While we cannot assume 
a simple deliberative function to the knowledge presented in congressional hearings 
and memorialized in the genre of public transcripts of hearings, those documents do 
provide a record of what an overtly deliberative body claims to know as a rationale 
for action or inaction and a record for accountability. Understanding the processes by 
which knowledge appears on the record and who controls these processes can illumi-
nate the rhetorical dynamics of Congressional decision-making and give guidance in 
how to interpret and perhaps influence knowledge that guides legislation. 
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4.2  Knowledge in Hearings: Theories of Genre, Stasis, 
and Relevance
Knowledge presented in hearings is constrained and directed by the genres of hear-
ings with associated social situations, the questions or stases defined within the 
genres, and what is considered relevant to the particular stases of the hearings. 
Genre theory identifies that each genre within its appropriate social situation 
(Miller, 1984; Russell, 1997) activates expectations of information appropriate to the 
genre, which an effective text would need to address (Bazerman, 2013; Bazerman 
& Self, 2017; Burke, 1931; Miller & Selzer, 1985). Congressional committee hearings 
genres include confirmation, legislative (including budgetary), oversight, and investi-
gative, usually held in Washington with full membership of the committee or subcom-
mittee (with absences, noted and unnoted). The printed hearing transcript is prefaced 
with membership of the committee (and subcommittee where appropriate), table of 
contents, and sometimes the call and agenda for the meeting. The hearing proper 
opens with a statement by the committee or subcommittee chair that defines the 
purposes of the hearing, sets the rules for statements and questioning, and perhaps 
anticipates the witnesses and their testimony. The chair describes the value of the 
session and perhaps takes a position. The ranking minority member then typically 
makes a statement. Other members of the committee also usually have the option 
of making a statement. Written statements supplementing oral comments or from 
absent members may also be added to the printed transcript. Witness statements and 
responses to oral and written questions are also in the printed transcript. 
Within these larger generic expectations, the chair defines the specific question 
for the hearing. In classical rhetoric the framing of this question to be discussed is 
called the stasis. The stasis is the issue that a rhetor chooses to take a stand on and 
generate arguments about. The traditional stases are fact, definition, value, and pro-
cedure/jurisdiction. The classical four stases are most clearly seen in legal contexts for 
which they were developed (Cicero, 1949; Quintillian, 1920). A defense that has com-
pelling evidence that the accused cannot have done the alleged act wants to argue the 
facts. If, however, the evidence is weak, the defense may argue on the definition of the 
act, claiming the alleged murder was actually self-defense. Failing that, the defense 
might argue value, admitting the crime, but saying the act was a good, such as the 
assassination of a brutal dictator. A last resort is to say the trial is not being carried 
out properly or the case does not belong in the jurisdiction of the court, and thus the 
judgment is illegitimate. These stases may operate in non-judicial settings and not 
follow sequentially but rather be invoked in relation to audience, domain, or genre 
(Fahnestock & Secor, 1988). In Congressional budgetary hearings the issue of value 
or jurisdictional legitimacy of programs may be the primary question rather than the 
program’s existence or the underlying conditions addressed by the program. Apart 
from the four classical stases, the more general idea of stasis helps us identify the 
issue being held constant or stable for argument.
With hearings, the stasis is frequently revealed in the title of the hearing, along 
with a stance and burden of proof, as in the March 23, 2007 hearing of the Investiga-
tions and Oversight Subcommittee of the House Science and Technology Committee 
of the 110th Congress, “Shaping the Message, Distorting the Science: Media Strate-
gies to Influence Science Policy.” The opening statement by the subcommittee chair 
Representative Brad Miller then further defines the issue to be considered, the stance 
embedded in the stasis, and perhaps the weight of the evidence to be presented by 
witnesses, as in the latter
The topic of today’s hearing is a consorted effort by opponents of measures to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, to bully scientific facts into submission, and, under intense pressure, the facts 
about global warming caved in and proved much more elastic [...] According to the testimony we 
will hear today, since 2001, the Bush Administration has been part of the effort to manipulate the 
public debate about climate change [...]
The opening statement for the minority then identifies the argumentative stance and 
particular stasis within the larger stasis to be taken by the minority. In this case Rep-
resentative Dana Rohrabacher diverts the stasis of whether science was suppressed to 
whether there in fact is a scientific consensus to be suppressed.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me note if there was ever a case of the pot calling the 
kettle black, this hearing is that example. For Pete’s sakes, we have had tens of billions of dollars 
over the last 20 years spent on climate change research, and in the last 10 years or so, it may have 
been 15 years, there is ample evidence, and I will be submitting these quotes for the record, of 
prominent scientists who have been complaining that they have not been able to get grants if 
they voice skepticism about the global warming “consensus”. 
With the choice of witnesses under the control of the majority chair, the minority can 
assert their views and facts only in their statements, questions, and supplementary 
documents or perhaps through one or more courtesy witnesses granted by the chair. 
The chair’s power to set the stasis is recognized by the committee members of both 
parties and some witnesses who often thank the chair for holding a hearing on a 
particular topic, even when presenting an opposing position. Occasionally as in the 
case above, a minority member may instead complain about the stasis in order to 
undermine the kind of evidence that would be collected under it. Both thanks and 
complaints recognize the power of the stasis to control the information presented as 
relevant.
Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) theorize relevance cognitively as what an auditor 
or reader perceives as necessary to understand a message, tempered by the cognitive 
effort necessary to process the input. These informational needs and expectations 
oblige a statement maker to anticipate and provide the information expected by the 
auditor in as unencumbered way as possible (Grice, 1975), minimizing the cognitive 
load. While relevance theory is framed in cognitive terms, genre and stasis theories 
provide a social framing for relevance within organized institutional, political, and 
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rhetorical settings. In Congressional hearings relevance at the largest level is defined 
by the overall purposes and rules of the committee, enforced by the chair and the spe-
cific genre, such as a budgetary hearing. The framing question or stasis of the hearing 
further specifies relevance. Each speaker then frames a particular point of response, 
offering a more local stasis. Within these stases we will examine how the facts of 
climate change are relevantly placed on the record, or contested, or evaded. We will 
also examine how other facts related to other stases are made relevant to the record.
4.3  The Committee System, Hearings, and Records of Hearing
While committees have existed since the early years of the Congress, they have 
become increasingly autonomous under the control of the majority party commit-
tee chairs. The committee chair has authority over what business and issues will be 
placed before the committee, which hearings will be held, how they are framed, and 
what witnesses appear, although the chair may consult with the ranking minority 
member or other committee members. Certain kinds of hearings require testimony of 
particular witnesses, such as confirmation hearings where the candidate appears, or 
budget and oversight hearings, where the relevant agency head appears. Also often 
some witnesses are granted the minority as a courtesy.
The basic procedures of committees have been set out in official governmental 
documents and a few descriptive studies (Galloway, 1959, 1961) along with the career 
strategies pursued by congressmen in seeking placement on committees (Weingast & 
Marshall, 1988). Fenno (1973) and Deering and Smith (1997) have studied in greater 
detail the functions and operations of committees. None of these, however, have 
given more than passing mention of hearings, nor have they examined how hearings 
work and what they accomplish, nor the kinds of knowledge they produce with what 
consequences for Congressional action. Neither has more recent scholarship taken up 
these issues, despite hearings providing evidence in the study of other topics or spe-
cific legislative initiatives. The current study, in the course of studying how evidence 
of anthropogenic climate change becomes consequential for Congrssional delibera-
tions, is a step toward unpacking how hearings are organized and with what effect in 
creating institutional knowledge. Perhaps the findings here will revive an interest in 
the workings and reform of these deliberative processes. 
This study is based on a corpus of hearing transcripts as made available at the 
Government Publishing Office website.1 These hearing transcripts are not verbatim 
1  In the early years of the republic, partial records of congressional deliberations were published in 
The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (1789–1824), the Register of Debates 
in Congress (1824–1837), or the Congressional Globe (1833–1873). But in 1873 the Congressional Record 
began providing a fuller transcript of debate in both the house floor and committees (Mantel, 1959). 
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reports, because they include editing, emendations, written comments, extensions, 
and additions (Mantel, 1959). Nonetheless, the printed document stands as the per-
manent record of the deliberations. This study does not look at the political or back-
room processes behind the framing of topics or selection of witnesses, nor on the 
work of the staff members in arranging for and preparing witnesses. Rather this study 
examines all committee hearing transcripts in both houses of Congress from the 109th 
Congress starting in 2005 to the 114th Congress ending in 2016 that we have identified 
as mentioning climate change or related terms. We also include partial hearings of the 
115th Congress, relying on the transcripts available as of February 15, 2018. Publica-
tion can lag several months behind the actual hearing dates, so the hearings studied 
extend only into fall, 2017. The period from 2005 to 2017 included various combina-
tions of party control of both Congressional houses and the Presidency, allowing for 
contrastive study of the effect of differing political alignments.
Using the Government Publishing Office repository of congressional hearings2 
we searched all committees during the 109th through the 115th Congresses that might 
attend to climate change. We also included the hearing transcripts available for the 
115th Congress still in session at the time of this writing. These committees ranged from 
the obvious Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and House Energy and 
Commerce Committee to the less obvious Senate Foreign Relations Committee and 
House Small Business Committee. Within the list of hearings for each of these com-
mittees, we identified hearing titles indicating possible mention of climate change, 
and then searched for the terms climate change, global warming, carbon dioxide or 
greenhouse gas. Even a single mention of any one of these terms would lead to includ-
ing the hearing transcript in the corpus, resulting in 1372 hearing transcripts collected 
for analysis. While anthropogenesis was occasionally mentioned, it was not a strongly 
identifying term; the search terms we used, however, did pick up the instances when 
anthropogenesis was a topic of concern. Therefore, we did not use it as a search term 
and in the following narratives we rely on the terms used in the transcripts. Though 
our procedures may have missed a few hearings, we are confident that we identified 
virtually all the major discussions of climate change and the overwhelming majority 
of minor or passing mentions. Figure 1 lists the number of hearings included in the 
corpus by Congress, House, and committee.
We downloaded each of these hearings and logged it on a spreadsheet by title, 
committee and subcommittee, major issue of the hearing, and centrality of climate 
change to the discussion indicated by frequency of mention or implied relation to 
the primary issue. Each hearing was further characterized as to how climate change 
Transcripts of committee hearings, although published by the Government Publishing Office as is the 
Congressional Record are not officially part of the record, but only an adjunct, and they began being 
made available for purchase only in 1924 (Schmeckebier, 1925; Schmeckebier & Eastin, 1969).
2  https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/home.action
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was presented by supporters and resistors of action. The analysis was carried out by 
determining the stasis of the hearing from the opening statements, and then exam-
ining each invocation of each of the key terms to see who was using it, whether in 
support or contestation, in what argumentative context, as part of establishing what 
position.
4.4  Historical Analyses 
An historical analysis of hearings reveals how, within the relatively stable genres of 
hearings, committee chairs control stases in response to changing partisan control, 
political strategies, legislative priorities, and events within government, the country, 
and internationally.3 Within the defined issues of hearings we can see how individ-
ual members attempt to narrow or reorient the stases to advance their positions. The 
knowledge presented and recorded is determined by relevance to the questions that 
chairs ask and contested by members. The following summative narratives for each 
of the 109th to 115th Congresses characterize the political control, internal and external 
3  Pace and issues for hearings are to some degree also shaped by the two-year electoral calendar, 
with a surge of new hearings during the first months of a new Congress asserting the themes or posi-
tions of the newly elected majority. Confirmation hearings also tend to be bunched at the beginning 
of the four-year Presidential term. After the summer break for the remainder of the first year, hear-
ings tend to decrease, and are further reduced in the second year as possibilities of action become 
more limited and reelection takes more of the attention. Certain work, however, must be carried out 
throughout the term, such as budget hearings. 
Figure	1.	Hearing	Transcripts	Included	in	Corpus	for	Analysis
Congress	(Years) 109th	(2005-6) 110th	(2007-8) 111th	(2009-10) 112th	(2011-2012) 113th	(2013-14) 114th	(2015-2016) 115th	(partial,	2017)
House	of	REPRESENTATIVES	(Total) 22 98 146 121 127 82 46
Agriculture 0 0 8 2 0 1 3
Appropriations 0 5 25 16 16 6 5
Armed	Services 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Budget 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Education	and	Labor 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Energy	and	Commerce 8 16 12 51 32 17 6
Foreign	Affairs 0 0 5 1 10 2 2
Natural	Resources 12 18 22 16 27 15 14
Oversight	and	Government	Operations 0 7 0 9 5 6 1
Science	(Science	and	Technology;		Science,	Space	and	Technology) 2 28 34 21 32 35 14
Select	Committee	on	Energy	Independence	and	Global	Warming 11 20
Small	Business 0 1 2 4 2 0 0
Transportation	and	Infrastructure 0 8 12 1 2 0 0
Ways	and	Means 0 2 4 0 1 0 0
SENATE	(total) 68 144 149 93 141 95 30
Agriculture,	Nutrition,	and	Forestry 1 1 1 0 0 3 0
Appropriations 12 39 37 26 44 28 6
Banking,	Housing,	and	Urban	Affairs 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
Commerce,	Science,	and	Transportation 10 2 9 3 23 1 2
Energy	and	Natural	Resources 27 36 42 50 48 36 0
Environment	and	Public	Works 18 59 49 14 26 26 22
Finance 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Foreign	Relations 0 4 7 0 0 0 0
Health,	Education,	Labor,	and	Pensions 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Indian	Affairs 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Small	Business	an	Entrepreneurship 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total	House	Hearings	mentioning	Climate	Change	Issues	examined=652
Total	Senate	Hearings	mentioning	Climate	Change	Issues	examined=720
events impacting hearings, and the framing of hearing stases that influence the pub-
lished record of Congressional knowledge. 
The narratives presented below for each Congress are complex because of the 
different positions not only of the political parties, but also the different committees 
in the two houses and even of individual members. Further as elections changed 
control of the houses of Congress and the Presidency and events outside of the US 
government changed the situation, responses in Congress also changed. We have 
necessarily left out much and focused on major differences, but still each of the 
stories is hard to encapsulate in a few sentences. To help readers follow the summa-
tive narratives, for each Congress we provide a table quantifying the number of rel-
evant hearings in each committee, the number where climate change was a central or 
major issue or assumption, and whether there was any opposition. We characterize 
the levels of expressed opposition as follows: 1) Contesting the science or scientific 
processes; 2) accepting the science but opposing action on other grounds, such as 
the costs or inefficacy of regulation, the preference for technological and free market 
solutions, or the difficulty of gaining international cooperation leaving the US at a 
disadvantage; 3) not opposing climate change action but arguing for protection of 
coal or other fossil fuels; 4) no opposition or contestation. For the purposes of count-
ing, cases where two or three of these kinds of arguments were made, the hearing 
was assigned only the most oppositional of the categories, so that, for example, 
hearings with contestations on the basis of science, government overregulation, and 
concern for the coal industry would be counted under contestation to science. Thus 
protection of the interests of coal and other fossil fuel industries was far more perva-
sive than the numbers might suggest. 
4.5  109th Congress (2005-2006)
As Republican President George W. Bush began his second term, both houses of Con-
gress were under Republican control with 230 votes to 203 Democratic votes, and the 
Senate 55 to 45.4 The previous Third IPCC report was four years old, and did not create 
new exigency for comment, and concerns about extreme weather events such as Hur-
ricane Katrina were deflected by the difficulty of attributing any particular storm or 
series of storms to long-term climate change. 
4  The party alignment numbers reported for this and following Congresses reflect the alignment re-
ported in the Congressional Research Service, updated toward the end of each Congress, but numbers 
vary slightly over each Congress because of deaths and other departures, special elections, or party 
switches. These numbers also include independents with the party they caucus with, but not the non-
voting Delegates (American Samoa, District of Columbia, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Virgin 
Islands) and Resident Commissioner (Puerto Rico).
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Prior to this period, the Bush Administration had largely opposed action on 
climate change and expressed denial or equivocal positions. It had expunged much 
climate change information from official websites. Its 2002 Clear Skies Initiative did 
not address greenhouse gasses or climate change. On the other hand, some executive 
agencies carried out research and development activities with the aim of minimiz-
ing greenhouse gas emissions, although many Democrats saw these actions as too 
limited.
The Republican Congress also sent mixed messages on its stand on global 
warming, leading to some weak action. The proposed Clear Skies Act, which fol-
lowed the administration Clear Skies Initiative and ignored greenhouse gasses, failed 
to pass in the 108th Congress, and was reintroduced at the start of the 109th in 2005. 
Hearings in the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and a subcommit-
tee, however, were framed around “multi–emissions legislation.” This stasis allowed 
minority senators to raise the possibility of regulation of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gasses, offer evidence on climate change, and question the witnesses 
on other pollutants about greenhouse gasses. Those opposing including greenhouse 
gasses in the bill generally did not contest the existence of climate change, instead 
arguing procedurally that this issue should be addressed in other legislation. The 
climate change issue led one Republican to vote with the eight Democratic votes to 
deadlock the committee, killing the proposal. 
Instead, Congress rapidly passed with no Senate hearings and only one House 
subcommittee hearing The Energy Policy Act of 20055 which reflected an “all of the 
5  The legislation was referred to eight House committees for two days only, April 18–19, 2005, and the 
bill passed the House on April 21, 249–183 on a bipartisan vote. The Senate moved to consideration of 






















House of REPRESENTATIVES (Total) 22 2 3 2 1 16
Energy and Commerce 8 1 2 0 0 6
Natural Resources 12 0 1 2 1 8
Science (Science and Technology;  
Science, Space and Technology) 2 1 0 0 0 2
SENATE (total) 68 8 8 5 5 50
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 1 0 0 0 0 1
Appropriations 12 1 0 0 1 11
Commerce, Science, and Transportation 10 1 3 0 0 7
Energy and Natural Resources 27 2 1 3 4 19
Environment and Public Works 18 4 4 2 0 12
above” approach to energy, matching incentives for technology to reduce greenhouse 
emissions with support for the coal industry and hydraulic fracturing. In this hearing, 
climate change was uncontested and greenhouse gas reduction was regularly cited 
as a benefit for various energy sources, including coal, though several witnesses and 
members of the committee criticized the law for not doing enough on climate change. 
Despite the limitations, this is the only act directed at climate change that passed Con-
gress during the entire period studied, beyond regular agency budget bills. 
The limited hearings and the protection of all energy interests in this act meant 
that Congress members did not need to expose their positions on climate change. 
Nonetheless, some committees in the Republican majority Congress soon began to 
take a more activist stand. The Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee’s two 
hearings on climate change showed unanimous bipartisan recognition that climate 
change was occurring, with much evidence setting a predicate for further action. 
In the first, the contested questions with appropriate evidence concerned the pace, 
degree of human contribution, and nature of solution. A second hearing’s stasis was 
which action--market mechanisms, mandatory government controls, cap and trade, 
or other means--would be most effective and balance best with economic growth. Also 
the Senate Commerce Committee formed a special subcommittee on Global Climate 
Change and Impacts which held a hearing where members, bolstered by the testi-
mony of scientific witnesses, expressed bipartisan agreement on climate change and 
its dire consequences, the Committee Chair Senator Stevens of Alaska and the Sub-
committee Chair Senator Vitter of Louisiana, although both known as conservatives 
and friends of energy interests, were from states visibly impacted by climate change, 
as each explained.
The Senate Environment Committee chaired by the outspoken climate change 
denier Senator Inhofe of Oklahoma, however, framed the issues and established 
the record quite differently. A hearing on science in environmental policy making 
presented three witnesses denying climate change, but since the stasis was formed 
around the reality of climate change, two other witnesses, likely as courtesy conces-
sions to the minority, reported that evidence for climate change was now incontro-
vertible, formed a scientific consensus, and warranted international action. This 
hearing left the record on reality of climate change divided and uncertain.
In another hearing Inhofe questioned whether the Kyoto Protocol, which the US 
had not signed, was faulted, which even climate change advocates had conceded. 
After evidence about Europe’s inability to implement the protocol effectively, the 
question turned to whether the US administration was nonetheless acting adequately. 
This question made relevant the presentation of evidence about the pace of climate 
the bill with no committee involvement at all June 11–23, passing on June 28 with an 85–12 bipartisan 
vote. The conference bill passed both houses in late July and was signed by the President on August 8, 
2005. 
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change and urgency of action, but also allowed consideration of economic costs of 
regulation and the benefits of technological and market-based solutions. The ques-
tion of how to best advance US economic interests in the face of climate change also 
underlay a hearing on an energy partnership with Asian Pacific nations. One of the 
witnesses6 notably presented data that the cost of climate change will not fall as 
much on the richer countries, so it would not be in their interests to sacrifice to serve 
the interests of the poorer countries. A fourth hearing in the same committee under 
Inhofe’s chairmanship questioned whether the media was stirring alarmism over 
climate change. In 12 hearings where climate change took a smaller role, however, it 
went uncontested.
Overall, in the Senate, beyond the hearings, which considered climate change 
in a high profile way, in the 59 hearings where climate change a minor or inciden-
tal role it was almost never contested. In 12 Appropriations Committee hearings, for 
example, climate change was accepted as part of the mission of the agencies exam-
ined, as it was in almost all appropriations hearings in both houses throughout the 
period studied. 
In the House, there was a similar divide in the stance of the hearings in the dif-
ferent committees. The House Oversight Subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce 
Committee, led by Representative Whitfield of coal state Kentucky held a hearing on 
“Questions Surrounding the ‘Hockey Stick’ Temperature Studies.” The stasis nar-
rowed further by questioning statistical procedures in the eight-year-old study, as 
criticized by the first two statistician witnesses. Although minority members and 
further witnesses pointed out more current studies supported the article’s conclusion 
of rapidly increasing greenhouse effects, this hearing, in questioning methodologi-
cal and publication procedures presented climate change science as questionable, 
lacking the clarity needed for action.
Two other house committees, however, considered climate change as an eco-
nomic opportunity, with bipartisan acceptance of climate change. The Science Com-
mittee in considering climate change technology invited testimony about how indus-
try can create profitable solutions and how government actions can affirmatively 
support that economic growth. A subcommittee of the Natural Resources Committee 
saw coal’s economic future dependent on clean coal technology. In the other eigh-
teen house hearings mentioning climate change in a minor or incidental role, the 
reality of climate change was never contested. As in the Senate, contestation tended 
6  This witness was Danish political scientist Bjørn Lomborg, well known as a climate denier. He 
was called on at least five times to testify against climate action in committee and subcommittee 
hearings in the period studied. Other frequently appearing opposition witnesses were the University 
of Alabama earth scientist John Christy, testifying at least nine times, and the British journalist Lord 
Monckton, testifying at least three times. These three were also frequently cited in other hearings.
to occur in focused settings led by a few individuals who wished to set down a record 
of uncertainty.
4.6  110th Congress (2007-2008)
The election switched control in both houses to Democrats who favored more vigor-
ous action (with 235 votes to 200 Republican votes in the House and 51–49 in the 
Senate). Additionally, the fourth IPCC assessment released in the early days of the 
new Congress provided “unequivocal” evidence that climate change was occurring 
and was driven by human actions. The Bush administration, despite earlier ambiva-
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House of REPRESENTATIVES (Total) 98 53 15 12 4 67
Appropriations 5 0 1 0 0 4
Budget 1 1 0 1 0 0
Education and Labor 1 0 0 0 0 1
Energy and Commerce 16 14 3 9 3 1
Natural Resources 18 6 2 0 1 15
Oversight and Government Operations 7 6 4 0 0 3
Science (Science and Technology; Science, 
Space and Technology) 28 14 4 0 0 24
Select Committee on Energy Independence 
and Global Warming 11 9 1 1 0 9
Small Business 1 0 0 0 0 1
Transportation and Infrastructure 8 1 0 0 0 8
Ways and Means 2 2 0 1 0 1
SENATE (total) 144 67 14 20 13 97
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 1 1 0 0 0 1
Appropriations 39 7 0 0 1 38
Commerce, Science, and Transportation 2 0 0 0 0 2
Energy and Natural Resources 36 25 0 3 8 25
Environment and Public Works 59 28 14 15 2 28
Finance 1 1 0 0 1 0
Foreign Relations 4 3 0 2 1 1
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 1 1 0 0 0 1
Small Business and Entrepreneurship 1 1 0 0 0 1
lence, endorsed the report, and Bush in his 2007 State of the Union address referred 
to the ‘‘serious challenge of global climate change.’’ (Bush, 2007) The Supreme Court 
then ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency could regulate greenhouse gases 
under the Clean Air Act, even though the Bush administration did not intend to act 
on this authority (Greenhouse, 2007). With all these conditions favoring action, the 
Democratic majority proposed a cap and trade system to limit the greenhouse gasses 
each producer would be licensed to emit. These licenses could then be sold or traded. 
Legislation, however, faced a threatened Presidential veto, so Democrats turned to 
the strategy of establishing a compelling record to justify action in the future.
The proposed America’s Climate Security Act of 2007 eventually obtained a 
48–36 positive vote in the Senate, but failed to reach the filibuster threshold of 
60 votes. The filibuster is a procedure in the Senate by which a minority can block 
debate or vote on a decision (Wawro & Schickler, 2006). While formal floor consid-
eration and vote occurred only in the Senate, the house held related hearings, to 
make climate change more visible in the record. The number of hearings mentioning 
climate change increased from the previous Congress in both houses from 22 to 98 in 
the House and 68 to 144 in the Senate. Hearings where climate change was the central 
or a major issue increased at an even greater proportion, from 2 to 47 in the house and 
from 8 to 67 in the Senate. In all committees but one climate change’s reality was not 
seriously contested, though protecting energy interests, was sometimes expressed. 
In the Senate even committees apparently peripheral to the issue held hearings 
on implications for small business or public health. More expectedly, the Senate 
Energy and Natural Resources committee had 36 hearings related to climate change 
with 25 centering on climate change issues. In all there was uniform bipartisan accep-
tance, sometimes explicitly stated, with only a few expressions about protecting coal, 
clean coal technologies, or specific oil leases. The hearings made relevant extensive 
data on the reality and impacts of climate change, current initiatives and actions, and 
other potential solutions. The Appropriations Committee had 39 hearings relevant to 
climate change with no contestation. 
The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, now under the chairman-
ship of Senator Boxer with Senator Inhofe the ranking minority member, however, 
became the center of contestation. With 59 hearings mentioning climate change 
issues, 24 centered on climate change, with 4 more as a major concern. 24 of these 28 
were contested. 24 of the remaining 31 hearings where climate change took a lesser 
role showed no opposition or contestation. The most complete debate occurred when 
the stasis addressed direct actions, such the proposed Climate Security Act, policies 
to decrease greenhouse gasses, and implications for implementation of the Supreme 
Court decision.
On the first day of the new Congress, in an unusual hearing of this committee, 
all Senators were invited to present their views and supporting arguments. Of the 
thirty-four senators who put their views and evidence on the record, 28 affirmed 
climate change and supported immediate action without reservations. This included 
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five Republicans, including one member of the committee. Four other Republican 
members of the committee also affirmed climate change was occurring, but had res-
ervations about the approach to be taken and concern for the impacts of action on the 
economy. From the committee, only Senator Inhofe actually questioned the reality of 
climate change and the science behind it, along with one other Republican not on the 
committee. Three Republicans on the committee who did not testify elsewhere com-
mitted to recognition and action on Climate Change.
Inhofe’s denial of climate change continued in hearings throughout the term. 
Four other Republicans at times questioned policy choices, approaches, or economic 
consequences of particular proposals, but did not contest the reality. The four remain-
ing Republicans on the committee almost never opposed and sometimes supported 
action. For example, in a hearing devoted to former Vice-President’s Gore’s testimony 
on the science and costs of climate change, Senator Inhofe was the sole voice citing 
scientists to the contrary and asking skeptical questions. Two other Republican Sena-
tors spoke in support of Gore’s testimony. 
The House also had more hearings with little or no contention except for a 
single committee. Of the 98 hearings in the House, in 67 showed no resistance to the 
climate change or action. In the 32 instances of resistance or support for fossil fuels 15 
involved questioning the certainty or meaning of scientific findings or processes, and 
that sometimes only in passing.
Even the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, espe-
cially created this term by the Democratic leadership, evoked remarkably little conten-
tion, even though 9 of 11 hearings considered climate change as the central challenge, 
in considering geographic and economic impacts, current initiatives, and policy alter-
natives. The only opposition to action was by Representative Sensenbrenner, who at 
one point questioned anthropogenic causation and elsewhere opposed regulation 
and argued for free market solutions following what he called the four principles of a 
Republican solution: tangible environmental benefits to Americans; advancing tech-
nology; protecting US jobs; and requiring global participation. 
The Science and Technology Committee held 28 related hearings of which 10 
had Climate Change as central, including one presenting the findings of the recently 
released fourth IPCC report. This hearing over three days, presented fifteen scientists, 
all who took part in the IPCC reports, allowing full and direct presentation of the 
current case for climate change. The findings were not contested, but some represen-
tatives argued for technology and free market approaches instead of regulation. In the 
other hearings of the committee climate change was contested only four other times, 
in passing, from the disempowered sidelines.
In the eighteen relevant hearings in House Natural Resources committee the story 
was much the same, with no contestation on such issues as water policy, wildlife, and 
carbon sequestration. In a shift of venue and stases from the hearings in the Environ-
ment Committee in the previous Congress, hearings on distortion of governmental 
and scientific processes were now carried out in in the House Oversight Committee 
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and the Science and Technology Committee and focused on suppression of climate 
science rather than climate change activist biases in science or the media.
The Energy and Commerce Committee was the one House location of major 
contestation to climate change action in its sixteen hearings mentioning the issue. 
Ranking Minority Member Joe Barton was the most vocal, but still somewhat muted. 
Stases on technological and economic opportunity, such as carbon sequestration or 
alternative fuels evoked no opposition but only evidence of economic potentials, as 
long as they were not encumbered by what was perceived as burdensome regula-
tion. Other hearings about policy choices such as involving fuel standards, state and 
local concerns, or international cooperation made some opposition relevant. In two 
cases questions over the pace of climate change suggested there was no need to rush 
plans, and in two others there was some questioning over whether dissenting science 
was ignored. Overall, fifteen of the sixteen showed opposition to proposed actions or 
concern to protect fossil fuels.
Only three hearings in the Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality showed 
direct contestation of climate change. A hearing directly posing the question “Climate 
Change: Are Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Human Activities Contributing to the 
Warming of the Planet?” invited negative response and evidence. In a hearing on 
automobile emissions standards, while all witnesses from auto manufacturers and 
unions presented themselves as proactive on addressing climate change and emis-
sions, Barton asked skeptical questions about nonanthropogenic greenhouse gases 
outweighing anthropogenic. Finally, a joint hearing between this subcommittee and 
a subcommittee of the Science Committee pitched the testimony of Al Gore against 
that of longstanding climate skeptic Bjørn Lomborg. Gore first laid out the full case 
for action. Lomborg accepted that climate change is real, but argued that impacts are 
exaggerated, and that solutions need to ensure that costs do not outweigh benefits or 
obscure other problems.
So with the switch of control of both houses, the stases move towards acceptance 
or assertion of climate change. Building the case for major legislation expanded the 
opportunity for presentations of the positive evidence and created opportunities for 
opposition. However, the fourth IPCC report and the Bush administration acceptance 
of climate change made it more difficult for the opposition to argue denial or the 
science was unsettled. Further, the door was opened to exploring the relevance of 
climate change to a wide range of issues from health to polar bears to small busi-
nesses. 
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4.7  The 111th Congress (2009-2010)
The election of the Democratic President Barack Obama brought even greater Demo-
cratic dominance with 255 votes to 180 Republicans in the House and 59 to 41 in the 
Senate. The financial crisis of 2008 and health care dominated the legislative agenda. 
Nonetheless, work continued on cap and trade legislation. As various agencies and 
programs took a more active concern for climate change, more committees considered 
it relevant to more hearings, for a total of 149 in the Senate and 146 in the House. 
Some anticipatory hearings considered how US might position itself in the Copenha-
gen climate conference in December 2009, but absence of a meaningful agreement 
was followed by no congressional hearings. 
In the Senate the newly perceived extended relevance of climate change is exem-
plified by the seven hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee directed towards 
US leadership at the Copenhagen conference, cooperation with China, and the role 
of climate change in national security and global economic recovery. More typically, 
the Senate Appropriations Committee had 37 hearings with no contestation. The 
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House of REPRESENTATIVES (Total) 146 69 30 31 2 83 
Agriculture 8 6 2 2 0 4 
Appropriations 25 3 1 3 0 21 
Armed Services 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Education and Labor 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Energy and Commerce 12 11 3 8 1 0 
Foreign Affairs 5 4 3 0 0 2 
Natural Resources 22 9 4 5 0 13 
Science (Science and Technology;  
Science, Space and Technology) 34 11 11 0 0 23 
Select Committee on Energy 
Independence and Global Warming 20 18 3 11 1 5 
Small Business 2 1 0 0 0 2 
Transportation and Infrastructure 12 1 0 0 0 12 
Ways and Means 4 4 3 1 0 0 
SENATE (total) 149 48 8 26 3 112 
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Appropriations 37 6 0 0 0 37 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 4 1 0 0 0 4 
Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation 9 2 0 0 1 8 
Energy and Natural Resources 42 16 1 5 1 35 
Environment and Public Works 49 16 7 19 1 22 


















Energy and Natural Resources Committee’s forty-two related hearings contained only 
sporadic resistance to the climate change agenda. In the fourteen hearings centrally 
devoted to climate change issues, only one had any questioning of the science, and 
only three others raised economic costs or problems with regulatory solutions. Based 
on hearings in the previous congress in July 2009 the committee passed the Amer-
ica’s Climate Leadership Act of 2009 by a 15–8 bipartisan vote. Without 60 votes to 
overcome the filibuster threshold, however, the full Senate did not vote on it. Other 
hearings considered house-passed legislation, policies related to water, forest, and 
energy, funding agencies, and approving nominations, all under the uncontested 
assumption of the need for action climate change, despite some concerns for the 
interests of various energy sectors, including coal. 
The Environment and Public Works Committee with ranking minority member 
Inhofe, however, remained the locus of resistance in the 111th Senate. While Inhofe 
continued to question the science, four other minority members accused the EPA of 
biased science, claimed regulations were ineffective and harmful, complained about 
using the Endangered Species Act to carry out climate policy, and argued the priority 
of economic growth over climate issues. Two other minority members of the commit-
tee, however, did not object to action. In all twelve hearings where climate change 
was the central issue, and four where it was a major concern showed some contesta-
tion. In November 2009, nonetheless, the Committee passed a version of the house 
bill, renamed the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act of 2009, by a vote of 11–1 
with all Republicans boycotting. This bill also failed to overcome the filibuster thresh-
old for a full Senate vote. In all 22 hearings where climate change only took a minor or 
incidental role, there was no contestation.
In the House, while anticipation of Copenhagen and major legislation also created 
potential sites of contestation, chairs strategically controlled stases to limit opposi-
tion. The Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming continued 
as a key site for considering climate change with all 20 of its hearings mentioning it 
and 18 centrally focusing on it or relying on it as a central assumption. All members 
of the committee regularly reiterated bipartisan agreement on climate change, with 
contestation limited to policy differences. In four hearings preparing for Copenhagen, 
all members shared concern for establishing the US position, including the protec-
tion of US intellectual property. In other hearings, all members agreed that fraudulent 
letters sent to Congress before a vote and black carbon soot were bad and smart grids, 
resilience and adaptation, clean coal technologies, and jobs were good. But hearings 
about government programs and regulation allowed questioning of whether govern-
ment actions were effective, wasteful or harmful. In three hearings on the science 
itself, however, the minority questioned the IPCC data set, said the science was unset-
tled, and repeating details of the six-year old Climategate email scandal where some 
British scientists were accused of manipulating data. In fact, in one hearing Repub-
licans attempted to shift the stasis from examination of the administration position 
to Climategate. 
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The Energy and Commerce Committee had 11 hearings where climate change 
was the central issue, all dealing with energy policy issues, most of them related to 
the American Clean Energy Security Act of 2009. Each one of these hearings evoked 
contestation, but carefully framed issues limited the contestation. The initial hearing 
of the series was devoted to the Climate Action Partnership of industry and NGO 
leaders testifying how their organizations were working to prevent climate change; 
no representative picked a fight against such a strong alliance of industrial leaders. 
The next hearing on the climate crisis, however, did invite contestation whether a 
crisis existed, and the minority witness presented findings that suggested the science 
wasn’t settled. Since hearings on coal, consumer protection, or offsets, all sought 
economic efficiency, contestation and supporting evidence concerned only details 
impacting specific groups. In a lengthy hearing devoted to marking up the drafted 
bill, discussion focused on particulars of the legislation, with no attention to the 
science.
In the Science and Technology Committee, with 34 hearings mentioning climate 
change, 6 where it was central and 5 others a major concern, some minority members 
contested climate change action, led by the climate change skeptic Representative 
Rohrabacher. Hearings on water policy, research, clean coal, or other technological 
fixes evoked no contestation. But others evoked confrontation on the basic science, 
most notably in a hearing on monitoring emissions, which created an opportunity 
to discuss whether there was a scientific consensus on climate change. In another 
hearing “A Rational Discussion of Climate Change” nine majority witnesses present-
ing a full scientific case were countered by three minority witnesses, claiming that 
climate change was slower and less pressing than predicted, that scientific consensus 
was lacking, and that the Climategate email scandal discredited advocates. The email 
scandal comes up in other hearings, as do other claims of politicization of science. 
Overall 11 hearings include some claim about the insufficiency, lack of consensus, or 
bias of the science. Even the Ways and Means committee, which rarely held hearings 
related to climate change, had four where climate change was central, three of which 
had some skepticism about science. 
The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, on the other hand, held 
no hearings related to climate change. The Democratic committee chair did not wish 
to raise questions about the scientific process, government support of it, or media 
presentations. Two hearings in the Small Business Committee seeing opportunities 
in new energy sources, and 12 in the Transportation Committee examining impacts 
of climate change for planning also evoked no contestation. The House Appropria-
tions Committee, in its 25 relevant hearings, showed little substantive challenge to 
climate change or action, though four had passing comments on unsettled science or 
misplaced priorities.
In both houses, the stases were uniformly directed towards expanding the rel-
evance of climate change to a wider range of issues, taking action, and passing major 
legislation, though the latter ultimately failed. The hearings developed a broad record 
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of evidence. In the Senate this record was only contested in one committee, while in 
the House, the minority in a number of committees sought within hearing stases to 
question both science and policies. The committee chairs, however, used control of 
stases to narrow contestation. 
4.8  112th Congress (2011-2012)
The election gave Republicans control of the House with 241 votes to 192 voting Demo-
crats. The Senate, however, maintained a Democratic majority of 53 votes to 47 Repub-
licans. Though the Democratic President Obama continued in office, the Republican 
House eliminated the possibility of major climate change legislation, thereby decreas-
ing exigency to connect climate change to a range of other issues and initiatives. Yet, 
climate change remained an accepted assumption when most matters of ordinary 
business arose. 
Even though the Senate remained Democratic, hearings examining direct action 
vanished, and the total number of hearings mentioning climate change decreased 
to 93 from the previous 149. Even more dramatically, it was the central issue in 
only 6 hearings, down from 37. While the Environment and Public Works Commit-
tee remained a site of substantial resistance, the Chair scheduled no hearings where 
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House of REPRESENTATIVES (Total) 121 18 7 58 7 49 
Agriculture 2 1 0 1 0 1 
Appropriations 16 0 0 5 2 9 
Energy and Commerce 51 13 2 28 2 19 
Foreign Affairs 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Natural Resources 16 0 2 4 0 10 
Oversight and Government Operations 9 2 0 6 2 1 
Science (Science and Technology;  
Science, Space and Technology) 21 2 3 10 1 7 
Small Business 4 0 0 4 0 0 
Transportation and Infrastructure 1 0 0 0 0 1 
SENATE (total) 93 14 2 10 1 80 
Appropriations 26 5 0 0 0 26 
Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation 3 1 0 0 0 3 
Energy and Natural Resources 50 7 1 6 1 42 
Environment and Public Works 14 1 1 4 0 9 
climate change was the central issue, and there was only one mandatory nomination 
hearing where it was even a major concern. Ranking Member Inhofe was limited to 
trying to limit the mandate of the Director of the US Fish and Wildlife Service and the 
Assistant Secretary of Interior for Fish, Wildlife and Parks on procedural grounds. In 
an EPA budget hearing Inhofe contested whether CO2 should be considered a pol-
lutant under that agency. In a hearing on the Clean Air Act and Jobs, two witnesses 
in passing raised uncertainties about the degree and pace of climate change. In the 
eleven other hearings, where climate change was mentioned in passing, only once 
did Inhofe mention the wasted expenses of regulation. The other minority members 
did not even raise objections throughout the term.
The Energy and Natural Resources Committee did have five hearings where 
climate change took a central role, down from thirteen in the previous Congress. 
These addressed only mitigating impacts (such as on water resources) or protecting 
interests of coal through clean energy technology, rather than combatting climate 
change directly. In all these there was no contestation of climate change. In the forty-
five other hearings where climate change had a lesser role, only six had minor skepti-
cal asides. In the 26 hearings in the Senate Appropriations committee on the budgets 
of various agencies, climate change was unquestioned as part of the agencies’ work.
The Republican-controlled House, however, created hearing stases calling into 
question overregulation, mismanagement, and scandal involving climate change ini-
tiatives. Yet the facts of climate change or human causation were little questioned. The 
elimination of the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming 
both removed a venue to advance climate change regulation and delinked climate 
change from energy independence. 
The renamed Science, Space and Technology Committee had previously estab-
lished evidence for climate change, but now focused on removing regulation or 
advancing economically advantageous technologies in its 21 hearings mentioning 
climate change. The two hearings where climate took a central role called into ques-
tion biases in administration science and policy processes, including inappropriate 
shifting of agency missions. Twelve other hearings overseeing administrative agen-
cies and budgets raised similar questions.
The Small Business Committee’s four hearings mentioning climate change took 
stases from the costs of environmental regulation for small business, such as “Are 
Excessive Energy Regulations and Policies Limiting Energy Independence, Killing 
Jobs and Increasing Prices for Consumers?” The Oversight and Government Reform 
Committee’s nine hearings similarly examined the job and economic costs of regu-
lation, with such titles as “How Obama’s Green Energy Agenda is Killing Jobs.” In 
these hearings the relevant facts concerned ineffective government actions, costs to 
businesses and the economies, and anecdotes that highlighted regulatory overreach. 
The Democratic members could only object from the sidelines that regulations were 
needed and were being carried out fairly and moderately. 
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The House Energy and Commerce Committee, as in the past, was a major locus 
of contention with 51 hearings, with seven centrally focused on climate change and 
six others treating it as a major concern, but stases switched to jobs and the eco-
nomic consequences of regulation, with a related switch of the relevant facts pre-
sented. Many of these hearings were part of a series of 29 hearings on the American 
Energy Initiative in the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, setting out an economic 
agenda, including critiques of regulation. In other hearings where climate change 
was mentioned in lesser roles, the same objections were made concerning burdens 
and costs of regulation, including scandals and mismanagement. Only one hearing 
centrally raised the science of climate change with four scientific witnesses present-
ing evidence of climate change matched with four others that questions doubts about 
the scientific consensus. 
The House Natural Resources Committee, however, was much quieter with less 
contention, and fewer hearings that mentioned climate change with none where 
it took a central or major role. Nine had no contestation, four others had passing 
mention of overregulation or agency bias, and one had a passing accusation that 
climate change was a hoax with proposed actions a waste of money. The sixteenth 
climate change related hearings in the Appropriations Committee, while raising ques-
tions about the efficiency of the agencies, did not raise any doubts about climate 
change or the necessity of related programs.
With split leadership between the houses, the Senate did not push a positive 
agenda in its hearings, just carrying forward existing programs, while the House used 
hearings to establish the case for a deregulatory, energy growth agenda. Between the 
two little was added to the record to advance action on climate change, but much was 
added to the oppositional record, even though the facts of climate change were only 
sporadically contested.
4.9  113th Congress (2013-2014)
Congress remained divided. The House had 234 Republican votes to 201 Democratic; 
the Senate had 55 Democratic votes to 45 Republican. The Democratic President 
Obama, reelected for a second term, announced in June 2013 his Climate Action Plan, 
to be carried out by executive actions. The Fifth IPCC Assessment Report was final-
ized in 2014 with parts released over that year. Both these elicited active, but different 
responses from the two houses of Congress. 
In the Senate, as in the previous Congress, with no climate change legislation 
being pursued, climate change was central to few hearings, and little contestation 
appeared, except for one committee. The Energy and Natural Resources Committee 
held 48 hearings mentioning climate change, but only one regionally focused hearing 
on sustainability goals in the Pacific centrally focused on it. It was a major concern 
in only seven others, on such issues as drought, water infrastructure, and the nomi-
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nation of the Secretary of Energy. In these, only a few questions were raised about 
regulations and their costs, impact on coal, or limiting the scope of action of various 
agencies. The Commerce Committee as in the past showed bipartisan recognition of 
climate change and support. Of 23 hearings mentioning climate change, it was central 
only in one on coastline adaptation in Florida, driven by local challenges rather than 
the larger problem. The Appropriations Committee had 44 hearings with no contesta-
tion of climate change.
The Environment and Public Works Committee, however, had seven hear-
ings where climate change was central. These centrally focused hearings mostly 
addressed the President’s Climate Action Plan and the new IPCC report. With titles 
such “Climate Change: It’s Happening Now” the stases made relevant a full review 
of the evidence for action. With Inhofe continuing as the Ranking Minority Member, 
6 of the 7 had some contestation (including 4 contesting the science). Of the total of 
26 hearings mentioning climate change, 13 had some form of contestation. Senators 
Inhofe, Barroso, and Vitter offered some flat denials of the scientific consensus, of 
a link between climate change and extreme weather events, and of human causa-
tion. In other cases, the minority scientific witnesses argued that the costs were not 
as great as other scientists were projecting, and that adaptation was preferable to 
aggressive regulation. Elsewhere the concern was the economy, jobs, or the ineffec-
tiveness and harms of regulation. 
In the Republican-controlled House, three committees--Energy and Commerce; 
Science, Space, and Technology; and Oversight and Government Reform--actively 
framed hearings in opposition to climate change. In the other committees, such as 
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House of REPRESENTATIVES (Total) 127 24 6 44 8 69 
Appropriations 16 0 0 0 0 16 
Energy and Commerce 32 11 0 19 4 9 
Foreign Affairs 10 0 1 0 0 9 
Natural Resources 27 2 1 6 0 20 
Oversight and Government Operations 5 0 1 4 0 0 
Science (Science and Technology;  
Science, Space and Technology) 32 11 3 15 3 11 
Small Business 2 0 0 0 1 1 
Transportation and Infrastructure 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Ways and Means 1 0 0 0 0 1 
SENATE (total) 141 23 4 19 1 117 
Appropriations 44 4 0 0 1 43 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation 23 2 0 0 0 23 
Energy and Natural Resources 48 8 0 10 0 38 
Environment and Public Works 26 9 4 9 0 13 
Appropriations (with 16 hearings mentioning the issue), Foreign Affairs (10), and 
Natural Resources (27), climate change took a back seat and evoked little opposition 
beyond a few comments on the futility or harms of regulation. In Foreign Affairs, 
climate change in fact was frequently recognized as a threat to international peace in 
relation to such issues as water shortage conflicts.
In two of the three committees that contested climate change action in a focused 
way, the stases were framed on value (coal and the economy) and procedure (the 
dangers or ineffectiveness of regulation), and not on the evidence of climate change 
and its impacts. Of the Energy and Commerce Committee’s 32 hearings mentioning 
climate change, 25 raised difficulties with administration actions such as in the hear-
ings on “The EPA’s Regulatory Threat to Affordable, Reliable Energy: The Perspective 
of Coal Communities.” The supporters of actions argued for the necessity and value 
of actions, but they were granted few witnesses beyond the administration officials 
being-cross examined. Where issues were framed around economic development, 
however, mention of climate change was let pass without comment. Similarly, the 
House Oversight and Government Reform committee continued the attack on Obama 
administration actions in five hearings. 
The Science, Space, and Technology Committee, however, continued to question 
the science. The hearing “Examining the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change Process” presented four witnesses with smaller roles in the IPCC process 
who reported marginalization of dissident views. The hearing record questioned the 
authority of the IPCC findings that served to justify Obama administration actions. 
Of the 32 hearings in this committee involving climate change (including eight as 
a central issue, with 3 more as a major concern), 21 contested climate change and 
administrative actions. A recurrent issue was bias in administration science, such as 
diverting funding from weather monitoring to climate sensing. Most of the 11 noncon-
tested mentions were incidental; only in one budget hearing was climate change a 
major concern with no contestation. 
4.10  The 114th Congress (2015-2016)
During the last two years of the Obama presidency, both houses of Congress came 
under Republican control, in the House 247 to 187 and the Senate 54 to 46. During this 
period the Obama administration participated in the Paris Climate Agreement com-
mitting nations to self-determined goals for decreasing greenhouse gas emissions. 
In anticipation of the Paris Conference Pope Francis released an encyclical Laudato 
Si. On December 12, 2015, the agreement was passed by consensus among the nego-
tiating nations, and later signed by 196 nations. Obama committed the US by execu-
tive action rather than Congressionally approved treaty. Committee hearings in both 
houses contested the economic and procedural premises of the agreement, but with 
little questioning of climate change’s existence or the role of human causation. Other 
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than those hearings, the general strategy was not to hold hearings where climate 
change would take a central role, with only 12 with 6 more as a major concern in the 
House (out of 82 total) and 9, with 3 more a major concern in the Senate (out of 95).
The Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee had 36 hearings mention-
ing climate change, but mostly because of incidental interjections by Democratic 
senators in discussions of other issues such as forest health, energy efficiency or 
Arctic economic opportunities In a few cases witnesses mentioned climate change or 
greenhouse gases in passing. Such comments were regularly ignored by the majority, 
with only three minor demurrals. The same strategy of ignoring incidental mention 
appears in the three hearings in the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee 
and one in the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee. These committees 
have no stases framing climate change as a central or major issue, or paying attention 
to the Obama Clean Energy Plan, Pope Francis, or the Paris Agreement. Even in the 
28 hearings of the Appropriations Committee, agency reports or witnesses mentions 
of climate change are regularly ignored, except for three occasions questioning spe-
cific rules.
The Environment and Public Works Committee, with Senator Inhofe returning as 
the committee chair, however, directly contested action in 13 of the 26 hearings men-
tioning climate change, but they generally accepted the reality of climate change, and 
the contestation moved to other stases. Seven hearings made climate change central, 
with two directly on Paris, ahead of the meetings. The first focused on overregula-
tion and government overreach, though the stasis did provide an opportunity for the 
proponents to make the affirmative case for climate change action. Even the chair in 
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House of REPRESENTATIVES (Total) 82 18 4 50 3 25 
Agriculture 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Appropriations 6 1 0 2 2 2 
Energy and Commerce 17 7 0 16 0 1 
Foreign Affairs 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Natural Resources 15 4 4 5 0 6 
Oversight and Government Operations 6 0 0 4 0 2 
Science, Space and Technology 35 6 0 22 1 12 
SENATE (total) 95 12 2 20 0 73 
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 3 0 0 0 0 3 
Appropriations 28 0 0 3 0 25 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Energy and Natural Resources 36 0 0 3 0 33 
Environment and Public Works 26 12 2 14 0 10 
Indian Affairs 1 0 0 0 0 1 
selecting witnesses had to give respect to the strength of the evidentiary argument, 
with three of the five witnesses testifying on the pressing need for action. The final 
two witnesses, however, made legal arguments that the president did not have the 
power to act independently of Congress in entering into international agreements. In 
another hearing just before the Paris meeting, economic concerns were raised along 
with the procedural. 
Four hearings on aspects of Obama’s Climate Action Plan and other EPA poli-
cies, answered every argument for action with a counterargument. For example, one 
former military officer’s testimony presenting the national and global security threat 
from climate change is matched with another retired officer testifying climate change 
is not a cause of war. Finally, one hearing centrally questioned whether greenhouse 
gasses should be regulated at the national or state level. Federalism in regulation also 
came up in hearings where climate change took a more minor role. 
Confirming the general tacit acceptance of climate change in all the Senate hear-
ings (but also the majority’s concern for the economic interests of the energy indus-
try) was the 98 to 1 approval of an amendment to an act approving a controversial 
pipeline that “climate change is real and not a hoax.” Even Inhofe and Sessions (then 
senator from Alabama also with a long record of climate change denial) voted for 
this amendment. But a follow-up amendment attributing the change to human action 
received only a 50–49 majority, falling short of the 60 votes needed to avoid filibus-
ter. Similarly, a resolution later that year introduced by Democrat Franken in support 
of the papal encyclical “Laudato Si” gained a 50–38 majority, with some bipartisan 
support, but again fell short of the filibuster mark.
The House took a more confrontational strategy, even though the science of 
climate change again was little contested. Three committees held hearings actively 
opposing Obama administration regulation. The Energy and Commerce Commit-
tee held 17 hearings that mentioned the issue, with two focusing centrally and five 
more with a major role. Six of these seven the stases questioned the economic con-
sequences and ineffectiveness of the EPA’s actions. The seventh, on the EPA budget, 
accepted climate change within the agency mandate, with no contestation; the Demo-
cratic minority, however, used this ordinary business to assert the need for action and 
the value of the EPA programs. Of the remaining 10 hearings where climate change 
took a lesser role, all but one evoked opposition to regulatory action. 
In the 15 hearings in the Natural Resources Committee mentioning climate 
change, four had climate change as the central issue with all focused on regulation 
or the policies and science behind the regulations. While three of them had argu-
ments over the scientific bases of actions, there was no contestation of climate change 
itself, but only that the phenomenon was more complex than the administration was 
presenting it. Several other hearings framed around related areas of regulation such 
as endangered species, oceans and water policy, transportation or energy, included 
evidence of overregulation, costs, and ineffectiveness of regulation. The six instances 
where climate change was not contested were all minor or incidental.
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The most vigorous questioning of climate change action occurred in the Science, 
Space, and Technology Committee, with 35 hearings on the topic. The seven hear-
ings where climate change took a central role focused on administration actions, 
with typical titles as “Impact of EPA’S Clean Power Plan on States” and “Paris Climate 
Promise: A Bad Deal for America.” All of these, nonetheless, provided the opportu-
nity for proponents of action to present the reality of climate change and the need 
for regulatory and international action. Eight other hearings questioned government 
science or regulatory action, with seven of them contesting ineffective regulation, 
costs, and alarmist manipulation of science. One avoided contestation because the 
stasis centered on whether investment should be made in carbon sequestration to 
protect coal’s position in the future energy mix. As elsewhere, when climate change 
served economic interests, it was rarely contested. The twelve other instances where 
climate change was not contested were incidental or minor mentions.
In six hearings in the Appropriations Committee, however, climate change was an 
accepted part of the work of the agencies examined, despite passing remarks about 
overregulation and its costs, as in one hearing in the Agriculture Committee. In the 
Foreign Affairs Committee two incidental mentions were let pass with no comment. 
Even in the six hearings mentioning climate change in the Oversight Committee, none 
took on climate change regulation as a central or major issue, even when the EPA was 
the focus of attention; questions of overregulation or management of climate change 
issues came up in only 4 in passing.
So in the 114th Congress, with the fact of climate change no longer an issue, but 
also no legislation likely, the Senate was largely quiescent on climate change issues, 
avoiding discussion, even when events such as the Paris Conference called for com-
ment--except in one committee with a strongly oppositional chair aiming to create an 
oppositional record. Multiple House committees, however, widely questioned regula-
tion, cost, and procedures to create a negative record on actions, though not on the 
reality of climate change. The minority could only make the case for action from the 
sidelines and only when the stasis created space to make the arguments. 
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4.11  The 115th Congress (2017-Partial)
With the 2016 election of President Trump and the continuing Republican control of 
both houses, climate change became even less of an issue in the 115th Congress, still in 
progress at the time of this writing. Trump’s has stated an intention to withdraw from 
the Paris Agreement (Tabuchi & Fountain, 2017), has appointed climate skeptics and 
opponents of regulation to head administrative agencies relevant to climate change-
-such as Scott Pruitt at the Environmental Protection Agency (Davenport, 2017), and 
has loosened environmental regulation. So the majority in Congress which already 
expressed no desire to act, now had little motive to investigate the executive, and 
therefore little need to collect facts on administrative action or inaction. On the other 
hand, many Majority members of Congress seemed to accept the reality of climate 
change, but preferred not to act or even discuss it; therefore, they had little motive 
to either raise or contest scientific facts. As of this writing, the record of Congressio-
nal hearings is incomplete; nonetheless, the number of hearings discussing climate 
change seems to have further decreased from the previous Congress with climate 
change taking on a more marginal role discussed. From the published hearings avail-
able in mid-February 2018, transcripts are available for only 30 relevant Senate hear-
ings in 2017 and 46 in the House, with mentions tending to arise only in questions 
from the minorities or in statements of witnesses, with only rare comment by majority 
members of Congress.
The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee presents a striking case of 
the current strategy. Inhofe, having served as chair for as long as his party regula-
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House of REPRESENTATIVES (Total) 46 7 3 15 0 28 
Agriculture 3 0 0 0 0 3 
Appropriations 5 2 0 2 0 3 
Armed Services 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Energy and Commerce 6 0 0 2 0 4 
Foreign Affairs 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Natural Resources 14 1 2 3 0 9 
Oversight and Government Operations 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Science (Science and Technology;  
Science, Space and Technology) 14 4 2 6 0 6 
SENATE (total) 30 3 0 0 0 30 
Appropriations 6 0 0 0 0 6 
Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation 2 1 0 0 0 2 
Environment and Public Works 22 2 0 0 0 22 
tions allowed, was succeeded by Barrasso, who also had opposed action but had not 
opposed the science so vigorously. In the 22 hearings of this committee relevant to 
climate change (over 2/3 in the entire Senate during this period), climate change’s 
reality was not contested a single time. In 16 of these, no opposition of any sort was 
expressed. In the nominating hearing for Scott Pruitt, minority Senators grilled him 
on his beliefs about Climate Change and he kept insisting he did believe in it and 
was at odds with President Trump on this matter. In several other nomination hear-
ings for multiple positions, the candidates also avoided stating they opposed climate 
change or climate change action. Climate change was central in only two hearings, 
both devoted to emissions technology and the role of industry as the source for inno-
vation and economic leadership. In both climate change was accepted as an uncon-
tested fact. Similarly, in another hearing devoted to biofuels, climate change was an 
accepted assumption, and the debate was only whether corn based ethanol or other 
forms of biofuels were preferable.
The Senate Appropriations Committee when considering funding of agencies 
responsible for climate change research and action, as much as possible avoided use 
of directly mentioning or opposing climate change. Three of those hearings were just 
statements from non-governmental organizations with no Congressional questioning 
or response. In the three other relevant hearings, witnesses from governmental agen-
cies in response to minority questions used evasive language, for example saying only 
they had an interest in climate, but not that they acted on climate change.
The Commerce Committee only had two hearings relevant to climate change, and 
one had only an incidental mention in a question, which evoked no opposition. The 
other was a field hearing in Florida looking into flooding. With only the local Senator 
present, no one questioned that the floods were indeed a result of climate change. 
In the House the majority in most committees followed as well the strategy of 
not discussing climate change but not talking about it as much as possible except to 
consider free market and industrial solutions. In the Agriculture, Foreign Relations, 
and Armed Services Committees, the assumption of climate change was accepted as 
a relevant factor for considerations and was not contested. In the six hearings in the 
Energy and Commerce Committee, on one occasion the value of market-based solu-
tions was offered and on another concerning hydropower a Senator pointed out that 
reservoirs also released greenhouse gases. In the five relevant hearings in the Appro-
priations Committee, in two hearings relief from regulation was argued, most fully in 
Secretary of Interior Zinke’s testimony that the Paris Agreement was a bad deal, but 
there was no contestation of the existence of climate change or human causation. In 
the fourteen hearings of the Natural Resources Committee, which considered climate 
change as a factor, however, twice Representatives asserted that climate change was 
not so rapid or certain as assumed and on two other instances it was argued that 
specific current administration practices were effective, but the previous administra-
tion’s identification of land for protection were ineffective.
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None of the 32 aforementioned hearings in all these committees had climate 
change as the central focus or assumption and only three placed it as a major con-
sideration. 
Only in the Science, Space, and Technology Committee did the majority take a 
vocal, consistent position in opposition to climate change action, attacking the sci-
entific consensus and actions of the previous administration. In its fourteen hear-
ings related to climate change, two made the issue central and two others treated it 
as a major concern. Of those, “Making the EPA Great Again” and “Climate Science: 
Assumptions, Policy Assumptions, Policy Implications, and the Scientific Method” 
presented focused attacks on the findings and methods of climate science, and gov-
ernment use of the findings. Another hearing questioned the costs of climate action, 
presenting economic evidence. Interestingly, however, a hearing on creating resil-
iency in the electric grid considered climate change as the major threat, with no 
contestation or objection. Five of the remaining hearings where climate change took 
a lesser role offered arguments for free market solutions or against the efficacy or 
appropriacy of government action, and five others offered no objections or contesta-
tions to the mention of climate change.
Overall in the first year of the 115th Congress, all but one of the committees largely 
avoided discussing climate science or executive action; moreover, the questions of the 
minority were evaded without contestation. In fact, a number of the more extensive 
discussions of climate change occurred when administration witnesses were ques-
tioned by minority members and presented themselves as recognizing the problem 
and taking adequate, appropriate action. Only a few in the Congress or the Adminis-
tration denied climate change or anthropogenesis, but action was still evaded by the 
dominant majority party largely by avoiding discussion or pointing to free market and 
technological solutions. Only the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee 
made climate change a contested issue.
4.12  Discussion
The road to understanding how Congress does or does not act on climate change 
has gone through understanding the genres by which knowledge is made part of the 
record, how these genres are produced, who controls the production, and the tools by 
which production is controlled. Understanding these processes and tools can, in turn, 
identify for us as citizens the pressure and intervention points to influence Congres-
sional action on climate issues. While these processes and tools are endemic within 
Congress on many issues, the great exigency of anthropogenic climate change calls us 
to unpack and make more transparent previously unexamined mechanisms of collec-
tive institutional Congressional knowledge-making.
The genres of hearings transcripts record knowledge ostensibly relevant for 
Congressional action. These genres are shaped through the particular mechanisms, 
opportunities, and constraints of the committee processes. The record of knowledge 
in these genres is produced through the activities of the respective committees, under 
the control of the committee chair from the majority party in each house. Events and 
changing political alignments and agendas create opportunities for committee chairs 
to schedule hearings. However, which opportunities are taken up, with what stases, 
depend on each chair’s policy commitments, political calculations, and strategies 
that influence the kind of record they would like created in the resulting hearing tran-
script.
Though purposes may be partisan and contexts change, these tools of scheduling 
hearings, framing stases, and inviting witnesses are shared by committee chairs of 
either party when they are in control to create knowledge records to serve as predi-
cates and justifications for action, oversight, and budgeting – and accountability for 
reelection. Congress members may vote and act on bases other than the official knowl-
edge, and even in contradiction to it, but these tools present what Congress officially 
knows within the deliberations of each term. The tools of the minority members led 
by their ranking member are more limited, to call the majority constructed knowledge 
in doubt, or perhaps just to open up a wider range of considerations. The minority 
can be granted witnesses, but these witnesses and their testimony must be selected 
within relevance to the stases established by the majority chair. The statements of the 
ranking member and committee members also offer space to present facts and views, 
again with relevance to the stases, though occasional strategic digressions are pos-
sible. Finally, the minority members can ask questions of witnesses that press them 
on sensitive issues, comment on difficult facts, or pose alternative positions. 
Both sides attempt to create a record that gets the facts relevant to their position 
on the record, in order to define or diffuse a problem to be acted on (or not). The 
main device for creating the public record is framing the questions of the hearings on 
which testimony is presented and follow-up questions constrained. This device is in 
the hands of the chair of the majority party, and the minority party is largely limited to 
call into doubt the record being created by the majority’s framing. In short, the major-
ity can talk about what it wants, and the minority can only object within the limits 
of that discussion. While giving the appearance of deliberations, hearings currently 
limit discussion in the interests of the majority and limit the record of knowledge.
Casting doubt on the recorded knowledge is typically a strategy of the minority, 
but the majority can also adopt such a strategy when addressing consensus knowl-
edge among significant relevant publics, such as with anthropogenic climate change 
over this period. As IPCC reports have become more insistent and major climate events 
have been widely experienced, opponents of action must narrow evidentiary doubts 
to the degree of human causation, the pace of change, or potential bias and scandals 
in science. Opponents of action also switch stases to values that are claimed to out-
weigh climate change, such as the costs of regulation to the economy and jobs, or the 
protection of particular industries. Opponents also adopt procedural stases, such as 
the legality of administrative actions, the extension of other laws to address climate 
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change, or the appropriate jurisdictions for regulating harms. Procedures for equita-
ble international cooperation on climate change are also regularly invoked. Even with 
evidentiary and value agreement on acting on climate change, the deliberative ques-
tion remains of which procedure or mechanism for action should be chosen. This last 
stasis strongly invokes fundamental beliefs about the best ways to solve problems, 
whether government regulation, market mechanisms, or technological advances.
Since the 535 voting members of Congress have varying beliefs, experiences, 
interests to represent, and political identities within their constituencies, they may 
come to individual positions even when party discipline calls them to respect party 
positions. On each side a few individuals adopt the most vigorous public stances, 
often committee chairs or ranking minority members. Democrats seem to uniformly 
accept the need for action on climate change, even when attuned to protecting partic-
ular energy interests. Republicans, however, seem to have a spectrum of views behind 
the general party opposition to government regulation, but vigorous argument was 
largely limited to opponents of action, situated in a few committees. In other commit-
tees, Republican chairs and ranking members raise few objections to the scientific 
consensus, and at times announce their recognition of climate change and support 
action, though without extensive facts and argument. Rather they tend to remain 
silent or act quietly on issues before them accepting climate change assumptions. 
Even some Republican members of committees whose leadership express opposi-
tional views and arrange for opposition witnesses, act in consonance with belief in 
climate change. Finally, when climate change is mentioned only peripherally, even 
vocal opponents of climate change action frequently simply say nothing. 
This suggests that a bipartisan majority of both houses, no matter which party 
is currently in control, actually recognizes climate change and the need for action, 
though disagreeing on the kind of action to be taken. The Republican strategy of 
leaving the dominating voice to a few individuals who oppose action may even, by 
stalling government action, serve the interests of those who accept climate change, 
but believe in free market solutions and technological advances without government 
intervention.
Whatever may motivate the various positions, and however we may evaluate their 
substance, the structure of committees, hearings, and stases allow the construction of 
a record of knowledge that can either advance or obstruct vigorous legislative action 
to mitigate climate change and support for executive action through Congressional 
oversight, depending on the parties in control. Whether these processes are inevi-
table or even good, they are currently part of how Congress works or doesn’t work, 
how it knows or avoids knowing. It all comes down to what you know depends on 
what you ask and whom you allow to contribute to what part of the answer. And what 
you ask depends on the rules of asking, the conditions that prompt the asking, and 
who leads the discussion. So apart what Congress members may know as individuals, 
Congress as an institution represents itself as knowing what its influential members 
and leadership want it to appear to know.
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5  Genre, Uptake, and the Recontextualiza-
tion of Climate Change Science by ‘Denialist’ 
Cultural Communities
Abstract: This chapter presents a case study that asks why information about the 
prevailing scientific view of human-caused climate change – information that has 
circulated widely in the public realm for decades – has not had its intended influence 
on the beliefs and actions of a large part of the public. Following the “cultural turn in 
climate change studies” (Hulme, 2013, 298), we present several culture-related con-
cepts from the social-science disciplines that we believe, when taken together, cast 
significant light on this climate change conundrum. Drawing on these culture-related 
concepts in combination with aspects of genre theory, we look at how three ‘denialist’ 
cultural communities (Kahan, 2012, 2017; Klein N., 2015) employ a digital genre set 
along with a repertoire of rhetorical strategies in recontextualizing – that is, in this 
case, intentionally misrepresenting, transmuting, and/or refuting – readily available 
information on the prevailing scientific view of climate change in order to inhibit the 
intended uptake of this information by members of these cultural communities. From 
our analysis we identify a digital genre set comprising website texts, blog posts, pod-
casts, e-newsletters, Facebook pages, and Twitter messages as well as repertoire of 
discursive strategies which are both widely used by denialist cultural communities in 
performing the ‘rhetorical alchemy’ of taking up meanings from texts communicating 
aspects of the prevailing scientific view of climate change and recontextualizing this 
discourse in an attempt to prevent it from challenging the communities’ ideologies.
5.1  Introduction 
The primary aim of this volume is to examine the role that genres play in organizing 
discourses in the ongoing controversy over global climate change – an instance of 
what Leah Ceccarelli (2011) calls a “manufactured scientific controversy” (195). At the 
same time, we note that the editors identify an urgent ‘real-world’ need to explain “the 
gap between the near-unanimous agreement in science about the basics of human 
made, or anthropogenic, climate change (ACC), and the widespread lack of accep-
tance of this agreement in the public sphere”.1 George Marshall (2014) asks a similar 
question: “Why, despite overwhelming scientific evidence, do we still act as if climate 
change doesn’t exist? … What is this psychological mechanism that allows us to know 
1  From the introduction to the present volume.
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something is true but act as if it is not?” (n.p.n). Extending this line of questioning to 
consequences, Stoknes (2015) points to the danger of this “climate paradox,” as he 
calls it: “The more [scientific] facts that pile up about global warming, the greater the 
resistance to them grows, making it harder to enact measures to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and prepare communities for the inevitable change ahead” (n.p.n.). 
 Taking up the trail of this “climate paradox,” our uptake in this chpater of the 
editors’ prompt is four-fold: first, we discuss several concepts from genre theory that 
are relevant to our research; second, we discuss the notion of the social represen-
tation, recasting it as a ‘rhetorical representation’; third, we introduce a number of 
culture-related concepts from social-science disciplines that we believe, when taken 
together, can, in concert with genre theory, contribute insights into the causes of the 
climate paradox; and fourth, we apply these various concepts in our empirical investi-
gation. In this investigation we explore how different ‘denialist’ cultural communities 
(Kahan, 2012, 2017) employ the digital genres of website texts, blog posts, podcasts, 
Facebook pages, Twitter posts, and e-newsletters to take up and recontextualize – that 
is, in this case, to misrepresent, transmute, and/or refute – widely circulated infor-
mation on the prevailing scientific understanding of climate change. The primary 
research question we address in the chapter is this: What discourse genres and rhe-
torical strategies do denialist cultural communities employ in taking up meanings 
from texts conveying aspects of the ‘official science’ on climate change – a term used 
here to refer to the prevailing view among climate scientists – and recontextualizing 
these meanings to create different and typically antithetical meanings reflecting the 
communities’ own ideologies?2
In what follows, we begin with some background on the science of climate 
change as well as on the social actors – the individuals and groups – often referred to 
as ‘climate change deniers’.3 Next we discuss relevant research and theory and then 
present our case study with its findings. 
5.2  Background: Climate Change Science and its Deniers
“[The science] of climate change is ultimately an amalgam of scientific facts based on 
modeling, projections, and empirical observations of current and historical records 
2  The term ‘ideology’ has been given many different meanings in the scholarly literature (see Ea-
gleton, 1991). For our purposes in this chapter we employ a definition taken from the work of Ana-
bela Carvalho (2007): “I understand ideology as a system of values, norms and political preferences, 
linked to a program of action vis-à-vis a given social and political order. People relate to each other 
and to the world on the basis of value judgments, ideas about how things should be, and preferred 
forms of governance of the world” (226).
3  We use the term ‘social actor’ here to refer to any individual, organization, or institution communi-
cating a perspective on the issue of climate change.
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found in tree rings, coral reefs, ice cores, sea ice cover, and other forms of data” (Cal-
lison, 2014, 2). We would add several details to this description that will become rel-
evant later in the chapter. The first is that scientists focusing on climate change in 
their research come primarily from the fields of atmospheric physics, atmospheric 
chemistry, glaciology, oceanography, and physical geography. Second, the foremost 
analytical tool employed by these scientists in their work is the ‘global climate model’, 
a highly complex computer-driven mathematical representation of the Earth’s climate 
system and its primary interacting components – atmosphere, land surface, oceans, 
sea ice – that is used both to simulate current and historical climate systems in order 
to better understand their dynamics and to strengthen the basis for predictions of 
future trends in global and regional climates. And finally, the recognized authority on 
climate-science research is the UN’s International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
Historically, the IPCC has published a report every five or six years, beginning in 1990 
and continuing through to 2014 with the release of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report. 
Each of these reports conveys the current state of accepted scientific knowledge 
on climate change, based on a review of hundreds of peer-reviewed and published 
research papers on different facets of climate change produced by scientists around 
the world. Accordingly, hereafter in the chapter we will refer to the scientific facts and 
claims presented in the IPCC’s most recent publication, the IPCC Fifth Assessment 
Report, as the ‘official science’ of global climate change.  
Although we obviously lack an Archimedean vantage point from which to judge 
whether the ‘official science’ on climate change issuing from the IPCC is accurate, 
we nevertheless accept the validity of the following five claims originating in reports 
from the IPCC and supported by numerous national science academies and govern-
ment environmental agencies: (1) global warming is occurring: the temperatures of 
the atmosphere and the oceans have been steadily increasing since the early 19th 
century; (2) this warming has been caused primarily by human activity – specifically, 
by fossil-fuel emissions adding CO2 to the greenhouse gases in the Earth’s atmo-
sphere; (3) CO2-driven global warming has already begun to cause climate change 
– that is, severe and repeated disruptions to the Earth’s climates – and this is likely 
to intensify in the coming years; and (4) if global warming is not curbed, the future 
impacts of climate change could be extremely dangerous, causing widespread mate-
rial, social, and economic damage; and (5) consequently, by inference, effective mea-
sures must be taken immediately to avoid, or at least mitigate, the impending catas-
trophe of climate change.  
Climate change denial plays a central part in this chapter. So who are these social 
actors – individuals, organizations, institutions – labelled as ‘climate change deniers’? 
While this is a highly contested term, nonetheless we need to define it for our purposes 
here. We use the term ‘denier’ (and ‘denialist’) to refer to a person or group that dis-
putes one or more of the five IPCC-originating claims mentioned above. Research has 
shown the extent to which denialist groups have formed discursive networks around 
their shared antipathy towards the ‘official science’ on climate change (Farrell, 2016). 
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Research has also shown how such networking has been greatly facilitated by the use 
of social media (Bloomfield. E. & Tillery D., 2019).
5.3  Related Research and Theory
In this section we review research and theory from genre studies, social psychology, 
and other social sciences that we use in the present case study to help cast light on 
the ‘climate paradox’ mentioned earlier (Stoknes, 2015). This body of research and 
theory, when applied in analyzing the digital texts collected as data for our study, 
helps us explain why the ‘official science’ on climate change, though extensively com-
municated around the world, has not had the anticipated public response in belief or 
action. We begin by discussing several concepts from genre studies.
5.3.1  Digital Genres and Genre Sets
We see a ‘genre’ as a textual form of rhetorical action arising in response to the exigen-
cies of a recurrent situation, all occurring within a particular social context (Miller 
1984, 1994). Extending this notion, we employ the idea of a ‘genre set’ (Devitt 1991; 
Bazerman 1994) to refer to two or more genres performing different but related rhetori-
cal actions within a common social context, such as, for example, a school classroom, 
a corporate head office, a community of social activists, or, in this instance, denialist 
cultural communities bent on disputing the official science on climate change. 
The question of how climate science is represented in public discourse is of clear 
importance for our case study. In addressing this question, we take as a starting point 
recent research looking at the role played by digital genres in both accomplishing 
scientific work and communicating scientific knowledge to public audiences (Gross & 
Buehl, 2017; Kjellberg, 2014; Luzon, 2013, 2014; Smart, 2016). This developing area of 
inquiry has shown, for example, how the affordances of science-related blogs make 
possible new networks of social interaction among experts, para-experts, and inter-
ested members of the public, interactions that enable the construction, communica-
tion, and critique of new scientific knowledge; facilitate ideological relations among 
blog authors and readers, leading to the formation and strengthening of group iden-
tities; and, most germane for this chapter, provide those who would challenge the 
official science of climate change with discursive spaces in which to express their 
opposition to this science and to communicate with others of like mind. 
The emergence of digital genres in the discourses of climate change has enabled deni-
alist cultural communities to more easily employ digital genre sets as discursive vehi-
cles for distributing their counter-messages on the credibility of mainstream climate 
science to a broad range of audiences. Such genre sets provide their originators with 
a rhetorical synergy in which the whole exceeds its parts.
5.3.2  Rhetorical Representations of Science
Another area of scholarship relevant to the representation of science in public dis-
course is the theory of ‘social representations’, developed by social psychologist 
Moscovici (1963) in his research on the French public’s understanding of Freudian 
psychoanalysis. 
Muscovici defined the social representation as “a social object [collectively pro-
duced] by the community for the purpose of behaving and communicating, [an object 
reflecting] the community’s values, ideas and practices” (251). Other researchers have 
added to the conceptual reach of Moscovici’s term. Potter (1996) sees the act of social 
representation as a discursive practice, viewing discourse as the site of social rep-
resentations. Billig (1988) argues that social representations are best understood as 
discursive constructions deployed for rhetorical purposes. Applying this discursive 
perspective on social representations to the public understanding of science, Potter, 
Wetherell, Gill, and Edwards (1990) claim that the public’s access to science neces-
sarily comes through spoken or written (and we would add multimodal) discourse. 
Bauer and Gaskell (1999) expand on this idea, claiming that the public depends 
solely on social representations for access to the professional world of scientists, 
their specialized expert work, and scientific knowledge created through this work. 
For our purposes in this chapter, following the scholarship above, we hereafter refer 
to social representations as ‘rhetorical representations of science’. Analyzing a corpus 
of approximately 1000 Web-published texts in a cluster of different digital genres, 
Smart (2011) identified ten recurring rhetorical representations of science, each used 
with persuasive intent either to promote or to undermine public acceptance of the 
official science on climate change. Of these ten recurrent genre-crossing rhetorical 
representations of science, five are particularly relevant to the present case study: 
(1) science as a unified, a-temporal, location-less social institution – as in “Science 
tells us that…”;  (2) as an epistemic activity involving a wide range of disciplinary 
experts, working in different local sites, who employ various social, technical, con-
ceptual, and textual practices in producing specialized forms of knowledge; (3) as an 
under-controlled activity that has repeatedly created major risks for the planet and for 
humankind; (4) as an institution personified in an individual scientist or in a group of 
experts (an association, society, or other organization); and (5) as a body of evidence-
supported theories about the natural world that are human-constructed, provisional, 
and consensus-seeking. As we will see later in the chapter, the denialist social groups 
we have studied employ six of the ten representations of science in their challenges to 
the ‘official science’ of climate change as a denialist group recontextualizes – that is, 
in this case, misrepresents, transmutes, and/or refutes information in texts conveying 
aspects of this science in an effort to undercut its claims and the evidence supporting 
them.
89   Genre, Uptake, and the Recontextualization of Climate Change Science
 Related Research and Theory   90
5.3.3  Genre Uptake and Recontextualization 
In introducing the term ‘genre uptake’ to discourse studies, Anne Freadman (1994) 
described it as a dialogical interaction between two genres, occurring when a text 
in one genre regularly elicits a responding text in another specific genre (as with an 
evening theatre performance and a next-day newspaper review, for example). Fread-
man (2002, 2012) later broadened this definition of uptake to include any rhetorical 
situation where the use of a genre prompts consequent discursive events, ways of 
thinking, and/or related human actions. Kimberly Emmons (2009) added further con-
ceptual detail to Freadman’s characterization of uptake in arguing that “to account 
for the power […] of uptake, we must redefine uptake not as the relation between two 
(or more) genres, but as the disposition of subjects that results from that relation” 
(140). Taking the “disposition of subjects” to include the thinking, beliefs, and poten-
tial actions of an ‘uptaker’ of prior discourse, we will see later in the chapter how this 
relates to public responses to the official science on climate change, with its constitu-
ent facts and claims.  
Per Linell (1998) provides a description of recontextualization as a discursive 
activity, a perspective that aptly serves our aims in the chapter. Linell begins with a 
concise definition of recontextualization as “the dynamic transfer-and-transforma-
tion of something from one discourse/text-in-context… to another” (144-145). He then 
expands on this definition: “Recontextualization involves the extrication of some part 
or aspect from a text or discourse, or from a genre of texts or discourses, and the 
fitting of this part or aspect into another context, i.e., another text or discourse (or 
discourse genre) and its use and environment” (145). 
Researchers have empirically investigated instances of recontextualization in a 
range of professional contexts and genre systems, such as the fields of health care 
and science (Coupland & Coupland, 1998; Sarangi, 2001). Doris Ravotas and Carol 
Berkenkotter (1998) have examined the “inscribing practices [and] micro-level textual 
activity” (217) employed by a psychotherapist in recontextualizing the “session notes” 
she had scribbled during an initial interview with a client into part of a “written 
assessment document”, a genre used to produce the professionally conventionalized 
account of the client’s mental state required for the institutional purposes of justi-
fying the psychotherapist’s diagnosis of a particular mental disorder in the patient, 
prescribing a treatment plan, supporting medical insurance claims, and performing 
other bureaucratic purposes. Ravotas and Berkenkotter identify a number of rhetori-
cal devices used by the physiotherapist observed in their study in converting the cli-
ent’s expression of her personal experiential meanings into the different forms of 
reported speech featured in the psychotherapist’s “written assessment document.” 
Researchers have also investigated how scientific information is recontextualized 
through chains of different digital genres. In her study of science blogs, for example, 
Maria Jose Luzón (2013) describes how bloggers – intent on making specialized 
expert-produced science accessible to diverse public audiences, thereby advancing 
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the public understanding of science with its evidence-based facts and claims – take 
up and recontextualize specialized scientific discourse in order to make it compre-
hensible for these audiences. Luzón identifies four rhetorical devices used by science 
bloggers to achieve these ends: “adjusting information to the readers’ knowledge and 
information needs; deploying linguistic features typical of personal, informal, and 
dialogic interaction to create intimacy and proximity; engaging in critical analysis 
of the recontextualized research and focusing on its relevance; and using explicit 
and personal expressions of evaluation” (428, original formatting altered by the 
authors). Later, in the findings of our case study, we build on the work of Luzón and of 
Ravotas and Berkenkotter in identifying a range of rhetorical strategies used by deni-
alist groups in taking up and recontextualizing the official science of climate change.
Per Espen Stoknes (2015), for his part, situates the discursive activity of recon-
textualization more specifically in the context of the climate change debate, urging 
us to “look into how the facts from the climate consensus [of the official science] are 
being shape-shifted into uncertainty, irrelevance, divisive fiction, hysteria, hoax, and 
conspiracy in the thinking of too many” (xi, italics in original). Later in the chapter 
we take up Stoknes’ prompt as we examine the collective uptake and recontextualiza-
tion of the ‘official science’ of climate change within a number of denialist cultural 
communities. 
5.3.4  Culture-related Concepts from Social-science Disciplines  
To date, the larger part of social-science research attempting to account for public 
apathy and inaction in the face of the extensively communicated ‘official science’ of 
climate change has concentrated on individual cognition and behavior (Norgaard, 
2011). Central to this research has been the ‘information deficit model’ (Wynne, 1995), 
which, when applied to our discussion here, assumes that individuals have not been 
responding appropriately to the growing threat of climate change because they lack 
sufficient scientific knowledge, with the corollary that if climate scientists were only 
better at conveying the facts of climate science to the public, the problem would be 
resolved and people would begin to think and behave differently. Another concept 
focused on the individual is ‘ontological [in]security’ (Giddens, 2011, cited in Nor-
gaard, 2012) – the risk of losing one’s known, ordered, predictable way of life and, 
with this, suffering a threat to personal identity – an existential condition which can 
lead to the ‘psychology of denial’ (Stoknes, 2015), a defense seen as particularly likely 
to occur in the face of invisible contested problems with largely future effects, such 
as climate change. 
Sociologist Karin Norgaard (2012, 2018) contends that this focus on individual 
thinking and behavior in social-science investigations of the indifferent public 
response to climate change in many quarters has impeded this area of research from 
contributing to a better understanding of the roots of the public response, an under-
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standing which could inform efforts to change people’s thinking and motivate them 
to act in helping mitigate the risks of global climate change. In a similar vein, Envi-
ronmental Studies scholar Andrew Hoffman (2015) argues that while certain useful 
insights regarding the public response to climate change have been achieved in 
social-science fields such as Sociology, Psychology, Anthropology, Political Science, 
and Environmental Studies, researchers in each of these disciplines have tended to 
work independently of their counterparts in other disciplines, thus limiting their 
potential impacts. Hoffman maintains that the full contributions of such discipline-
specific work can only be achieved if they are brought together in conceptual frame-
works providing a more comprehensive perspective on how denialist social groups 
have contrived to subvert the ‘official science’ of climate change. In what follows, we 
take up Hoffman’s proposal and bring together several culture-related concepts from 
the social sciences in an effort to better understand why and how certain denialist 
cultural communities (Kahan, 2012, 2017) have collectively taken up and recontextu-
alized the official science on climate change in order to render it less threatening to 
them, ideologically. As described below, research by Human Geography researcher 
Mike Hulme (2013) suggests a promising path of inquiry in this regard. 
5.4  The Cultural Turn in Climate Change Studies 
Hulme (2013) has pointed to a “cultural turn in climate change studies” (298), with 
researchers focusing on the joint construction of shared meanings within cultural 
communities. Hulme argues that “science alone cannot impose meaning on any 
physical phenomenon [and that] scientific evidence […] is always contextualized and 
interpreted through cultural filters” (139). According to Hulme, the relatively weak 
public response to the official science on climate change can be explained, at least 
in part, by the fact that for many people the meanings accorded to scientific claims 
about climate change are interpreted collectively within the ethos of cultural com-
munities to which these individuals belong. According to Hulme, common priorities, 
motivations, feelings, and beliefs within a community can inhibit its members from 
accepting the validity of the official science of climate change, ultimately resulting in 
apathy and inaction on their part.  
Below we turn to the question of how denialist cultural communities take up 
and recontextualize – that is, in this case, transform and repurpose – the texts of 
digital genres containing facts and claims that constitute part of the official science 
on climate change, thereby creating new texts with meanings that are clearly anti-
thetical to the original meanings. At the same time, we investigate the digital genre 
set and repertoire of rhetorical strategies used by denialist cultural communities in 
attempting to achieve their ends. First, though, we will consider three culture-related 
social-science concepts that can help us better understand this discursive phenome-
non: ‘social organization of denial’, ‘cultural cognition’ and ‘vernaculars of meaning’. 
5.4.1  The Social Organization of Denial 
In Norgaard’s (2011) ethnographic study of climate change denial in a small Norwe-
gian town, she employs the notion of the ‘social organization of denial’ (Zerubavel, 
2006) as a broad rubric for bringing together a number of sociological concepts into a 
comprehensive explanation of how the highly informed and well-intentioned inhabit-
ants of the town are able to “collectively hold information about [climate change] at 
arm’s length by participating in cultural norms of attention, emotion, and conversa-
tion and by using a series of cultural narratives to deflect disturbing information and 
normalize a particular version of reality in which ‘everything is fine’” (207). Norgaard 
found that even though individual members of the Norwegian community she was 
researching, when encountered in one-to-one conversations, might agree that the 
official science on climate change is largely convincing and then concede that climate 
change must be confronted as a global threat, the community as a collective never-
theless manages to avoid entirely the topic of climate change in its public discourse. 
Norgaard describes this behaviour as ‘implicatory denial’ (Cohen, 2001), a type of 
denial where scientific information is not disputed, and yet its ethical, political, and 
life-style implications are ignored as if non-existent.  
Norgaard shows how the public silence maintained by the town’s inhabitants 
regarding climate change has been achieved through a “social shaping of [their] 
awareness, memories, and thought patterns.” Employing the metaphor of a ‘cultural 
tool-kit’ (Swidler, 1986), Norgaard explains how a cultural community can develop, 
over time, a distinctive repertoire of collectively available discursive resources – 
“symbols, stories, rituals, and worldviews” (Swidler, 1986, 273) – that provide the 
community with strategies for enabling avoidance and inaction in the face of appar-
ently intractable problems such as climate change. In elaborating on the metaphor 
of the tool kit, Norgaard draws on the fields of Sociology and Social Psychology for 
the concepts of ‘cognitive tradition’, ‘thought community’, ‘emotion management’, 
‘selective perception’, and ‘cultural narrative’ to help explain how “the public non-
response to [climate change] is produced through cultural practices of everyday life” 
(207, italics in the original). In her account, Norgaard characterizes the avoidance of 
climate change as an acceptable topic within the public discourse of the town as an 
ongoing social practice allowing the community to maintain social stability and posi-
tive self-representation, while ignoring the sizeable contribution that the production 
and sale of oil makes to Norway’s economy and to the standard of living of its citizens. 
Two other concepts developed by other contributors to the social-science literature 
complement Norgaard’s model of socially organized denial: ‘cultural cognition’ and 
‘vernaculars of meaning’.  
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5.4.2  Cultural Cognition
The concept of ‘cultural cognition’ originates with Dan Kahan (as cited in Huynh, 
2011, n.p.n.), a scholar of Law and Psychology, who describes it succinctly as “the 
tendency of people to fit their perceptions of risk and related facts to their group com-
mitments”. The concept is anchored in two assertions. The first is that individuals 
self-identifying as members of a cultural community tend to notice and pay greater 
attention to scientific information encountered in their daily lives when that informa-
tion resonates with the community’s shared values, rather than challenging those 
values, particularly in the case of polarizing social issues such as climate change. A 
related assertion is that when judging the credibility of scientific facts and claims, 
people identifying themselves as members of a cultural community tend to either 
resist or accept this scientific information according to the community’s cultural 
orientation, and they can become increasingly entrenched over time in positions 
that reinforce their affinity and identification with the community and its ideology. 
Following from these two assertions is Kahan’s general claim that people’s ways of 
thinking are shaped by their engagement with cultural communities, with individuals 
performing ideologically-shaped cognitive acts of ‘motivated reasoning’, ‘motivated 
numeracy’, ‘bounded rationality’, and ‘solution aversion’, acts that allow them to 
claim a logic for their views while at the same time reinforcing their collective cultural 
identity. As Klein (2014), reporting on Kahan’s research, observes, “our reasoning 
becomes rationalizing when we’re dealing with questions where the answers could 
threaten our tribe – or at least our social standing in our tribe” (n.p.n.). As Naomi 
Kahan (2012) himself puts it, 
People with different values draw different inferences from the same evidence. Present them 
with a PhD scientist who is a member of the US National Academy of Sciences, for example, and 
they will disagree on whether he really is an ‘expert’, depending on whether his view matches 
the dominant view of their cultural group. … People whose beliefs are at odds with those of the 
people with whom they share their basic cultural commitments risk being labelled as weird and 
obnoxious in the eyes of those on whom they depend for social and financial support (n.p.n).
What this means for the public debate over global climate change is that people often 
tend to adjust their interpretations of scientific claims and related evidence associ-
ated with climate change to accord with the shared values and outlook of a cultural 
community with which they closely identify. As Klein (2014) comments, “More infor-
mation, in this context [of climate change] doesn’t help [deniers] discover the best 
evidence. Instead, it sends them searching for evidence that seems to prove them 
right. And in the age of the Internet, such evidence is never very far away” (n.p.n.).  
5.4.3  Vernaculars of Meaning 
A second concept that we see as complementing Norgaard’s theory of socially orga-
nized denial comes from the ethnographic work of Journalism researcher Candis Cal-
lison. Drawing on her multi-sited ethnography of five different North American social 
groups, all faced with the need to contend with climate change, Callison (2014) argues 
that for scientific facts about climate change to matter – that is, to take on meaning 
and salience – within a cultural community, the facts must be ‘translated’ into the 
‘vernacular’ of the community. Callison defines a ‘vernacular’ as “the interpretive 
frameworks by which a term comes to gain meaning within a group and the work 
of translation that such a term must undergo in order to integrate it into a group’s 
worldview, ideals, goals, perceptions, and motivations to act” (5). She describes the 
“communal life of facts” (n.p.n.) that can unfold within a cultural community when it 
is faced with new scientific information, a process in which scientific facts and claims 
are accorded meanings and significances adapted to the ethos and discourse of the 
community.  
5.5  The Case Study 
This section of the chapter describes a study guided by the following research ques-
tion: What discourse genres and rhetorical strategies do denialist cultural commu-
nities employ in taking up meanings from texts conveying aspects of the ‘official 
science’ on climate change and recontextualizing these meanings to create antitheti-
cal meanings reflecting the communities’ ideologies? We begin by describing our 
research method and then proceed to the findings of our study.
5.5.1  Method 
As a first step towards answering the above research question, we examined the web-
sites of a dozen organizations known to be closely associated with the official science 
of climate change, including the IPCC4; a number of national academies of science5; 
and several governmental environmental agencies6. We perused each website as 
well as any linked e-documents. In examining the websites, we looked for compo-
nent texts and linked e-documents that containing facts and claims that we believe 
represent the current state-of-knowledge in mainstream climate change science. The 
4  http://www.ipcc.ch
5  E.g., the US NAS: http://www.nasonline.org
6  E.g., the UK Met Office: https://www.metoffice.gov.uk
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e-documents linked to the websites of these organizations included press releases, 
executive summaries from scientific reports, opinion pieces, and posters – all written 
for a non-specialist audience. We used these various sources to construct what we 
have been referring to as the ‘official science’ on climate change.
We also collected data from six denialist cultural communities, chosen to provide 
a cross-section of missions, that, as one part of their mandate, clearly reject and advo-
cate against the official science on climate change. These denialist groups included 
the Heartland Institute; the Cornwall Alliance; the Tea Party; the Committee for a 
Constructive Tomorrow; the Friends of Science; and Climate Change Dispatch7. In 
examining the discourse of these groups, we focused on website texts, blog posts, 
podcasts, Facebook pages, Twitter messages, e-newsletters, and linked e-documents 
that could be seen as contributing to a narrative of climate change denial. 
From these six denialist cultural communities, we selected three communities for 
closer study, each with a distinctive mission and ideology as well as its own particular 
‘vernacular of meaning’ (Callison, 2014): The Heartland Institute, the Cornwall Alli-
ance, and the Tea Party. We describe these groups below, in places quoting their own 
words.
 – Cornwall Alliance – A religious group identifying itself as a “coalition of theo-
logians, pastors, ministry leaders, scientists, economists, policy experts, and 
committed laymen [with an] evangelical voice promoting environmental steward-
ship and economic development built on Biblical principles” (Cornwall Alliance, 
2018a). The group’s mission: “We seek to magnify the glory of God in creation, 
the wisdom of His truth in environmental stewardship, the kindness of His mercy 
in lifting the needy out of poverty, and the wonders of His grace in the gospel of 
Jesus Christ” (Cornwall Alliance, 2018b). Its position on climate change: a state-
ment from the organization’s website declares that, “We believe Earth and its eco-
systems – created by God’s intelligent design and infinite power and sustained by 
His faithful providence – are robust, resilient, self-regulating, and self-correcting, 
admirably suited for human flourishing, and displaying His glory. Earth’s climate 
system is no exception. Recent global warming is one of many natural cycles of 
warming and cooling in geologic history” (Cornwall Alliance, 2009). The Corn-
wall Alliance’s vernacular could be described as religious and evangelical.
 – Heartland Institute – A conservative think-tank describing itself as “one of 
the world’s leading free-market think tanks [and] a national nonprofit research 
and education organization” (Heartland Institute, 2018a). Its mission is “to dis-
cover, develop, and promote free-market solutions to social and economic prob-
lems” (Heartland Institute, 2018a). Its position on climate change: according to 
an endorsement blurb on the Heartland’s website, “Heartland has always been 
7  www.heartland.org; www.cornwallalliance.org; www.teaparty.org; www.cfact.org; www.friendsof-
science.org; www.climatechangedispatch.com.
public about its ultimate goals – to keep global warming alarmists from winning 
the public debate” (Bastasch, 2017). The Heartland Institute’s vernacular could 
be described as quasi-scientific and technocratic. 
 – Tea Party – A conservative political advocacy group characterizing itself as a 
“grassroots movement calling awareness to any issue which challenges the secu-
rity, sovereignty, or domestic tranquility of our beloved nation, the United States 
of America” (Tea Party, 2018). The group’s mission is to contribute to “a nation 
where personal freedom is cherished and where all Americans are treated equally, 
assuring our ability to pursue the American Dream [which means] the freedom 
[to] work hard [and] to keep the fruits of your labor to use as you see fit” (Tea 
Party Patriots, 2018). Its position on climate change (as reflected in a news story 
linked to the Cornwall Alliance website): “The Obama administration is filing its 
plan to cut greenhouse gas emissions with the United Nations Tuesday. [Accord-
ing to Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe,] 'The Obama administration’s pledge to 
the United Nations today will not see the light of day with the 114th Congress. This 
pledge [would allow] China to continue to expand its energy infrastructure and 
emissions through 2030 while American taxpayers and businesses foot the bill 
of [Obama’s] extremist global warming agenda” (Tea Party Patriots, 2015). The 
vernacular of the Tea Party could be described as political and partisan, both in 
its domestic and international concerns.
Examining the digital genres of website texts, blog posts, podcasts, e-newsletters, 
Facebook pages, Twitter messages, and linked e-documents that we had collected 
from these three denialist cultural communities, we identified some 200 instances 
of uptake and recontextualization in the discourse, where one or more aspects of the 
official story on climate change were taken up by a cultural community, discursively 
transformed, and and rendered less threatening to the community's ideology. 
5.6  Findings
In this section we pursue our primary research question: what discourse genres and 
rhetorical strategies do denialist cultural communities employ in taking up meanings 
from texts conveying aspects of the ‘official science’ on climate change and recon-
textualizing these meanings to create different and typically antithetical meanings 
reflecting the communities’ ideologies?
In analyzing our data, we have come to view ‘uptake’ and ‘recontextualization’ – 
two closely-related concepts, obviously – as dual facets of a single semiotic process, 
a process involving a rhetorical act performed by a social actor as part of a discursive 
activity. As we see it, this semiotic process unfolds as follows: a social actor expresses 
certain meanings in a text-in-context in a given genre, a text that is subsequently 
selected, or ‘taken up’, by another social actor that recontextualizes – that is, trans-
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forms and repurposes – meanings from the original text in a new text, which is either 
in the same genre or in a different genre, creating new meanings intended to evoke 
a particular way of thinking and/or acting on the part of its audience, a new or rein-
forced “disposition of subjects,” to quote Emmons (2009). Seen this way, the uptake 
of intended meanings from the original text is a rhetorical act of intention and selec-
tion, while recontextualization is the discursive activity of transforming and repur-
posing the meanings of the original text in a new text conveying different meanings 
appropriate for the new context. 
We also found that the discursive activity of recontextualization performed by 
denialist cultural communities entails two parts: first, a ‘translation’ of the original 
scientific and technocratic discourse of the IPCC, a national academy of science, or 
a government environmental agency into the vernacular of the cultural community; 
and second, at the same time, the meanings of one or more aspects of the official 
science on climate change contained in the original text are transformed and re-pur-
posed, resulting in the subversion of the original meanings. 
As we discuss below, the semiotic process of uptake and recontextualization of 
aspects of the official climate science performed by the three denialist cultural com-
munities selected for close attention – the Heartland Institute, Cornwall Alliance, and 
Tea Party – is mediated by the digital genres of websites, podcasts, e-newsletters, 
Facebook pages, Twitter messages, and linked e-documents. We will see how each 
of the three denialist cultural communities employs digital genres, along with a rep-
ertoire of rhetorical strategies, in taking up and recontextualizing the discourse of 
official climate science to produce texts with different meanings reflecting the group’s 
own particular ideology and vernacular.
5.6.1  Recontextualizing the Official Science of Climate Change 
We found that the six denialist cultural communities whose discourse we examined 
are all extremely proficient in performing the semiotic process of uptake and recon-
textualization. They employ a variety of rhetorical strategies to transform and repur-
pose meanings related to the widely agreed upon official science on climate change in 
a manner that resonates with their own ideology and vernacular. We identified eleven 
such rhetorical strategies: 
1. Refuting a specific scientific claim directly, while often voicing a counter-claim. 
2. Attacking the primary tools of climate science – global climate models. 
3. Characterizing a claim advanced by the official science as only a theory, not 
certain knowledge. 
4. Making an attack on science as an institution slanted by a liberal ideology, one 
that has frequently led society in the wrong direction. 
5. Condemning the IPCC for its motives, competence, and/or ideology. 
6. Attacking individual scientists for their competence, motives, vulnerability to 
funding pressures, and/or ideological orientation. 
7. Contesting the claim that 97% of world’s climate scientists support the official 
science on climate change (Cook et al., 2013). 
8. Conceding a partial claim related to climate science while ignoring a larger anti-
thetical claim. 
9. Attempting to undermine the official science by linking it negatively to politics, 
economics, and/or religion, while often emphasizing the perceived negative eco-
nomic and lifestyle consequences of reducing the use of fossil fuels. 
10. Bringing in alternative science from another discipline to undermine the cred-
ibility of atmospheric physics, atmospheric chemistry, glaciology, oceanography, 
and/or physical geography, e.g., astrophysics and its view that solar activity is the 
primary driver of global warming, not carbon dioxide. 
11. Misrepresenting the nature and role of ‘uncertainty’ in science, and using this 
misrepresentation of uncertainty to undercut the credibility of climate science. 
We also discovered that these eleven rhetorical strategies collectively employ six of 
the ten rhetorical representations of science mentioned earlier in the chapter (Smart, 
2011): (1) science as a unified, a-temporal, location-less social institution – as in 
“Science tells us that…”; (2) as an epistemic activity involving a wide range of disci-
plinary experts, working in different local sites, who employ various social, technical, 
conceptual, and textual practices in producing specialized forms of knowledge; (3) 
as an under-controlled activity that has repeatedly created major risks for the planet 
and for humankind; (4) as an institution personified in an individual scientist; (5) as 
an institution embodied in a group of experts (an association, society, or other orga-
nization); and (6) as a body of evidence-supported theories about the natural world 
that are human-constructed, provisional, and consensus-seeking. Drawing on these 
widely recognized representations of science, denialist cultural communities are able 
to invest their discourse with rhetorical force.
Given space constraints, and employing a selection of convenience, we will focus 
the analysis that follows on the issue of how the first three rhetorical strategies in the 
list above have been used by the Cornwall Alliance, the Heartland Institute, and the 
Tea Party in taking up and recontextualizing – that is, misrepresenting, countering, 
subverting – aspects of the official climate science. For each of the three rhetorical 
strategies considered, we present excerpts from the digital genres of website texts, 
blogs, podcasts, e-newsletters, Facebook pages, Twitter messages, and linked e-doc-
uments used by the Cornwall Alliance, the Heartland Institute, and the Tea Party 
in order to illustrate how meanings from texts conveying some aspect of the official 
science on climate change have been recontextualized to create different meanings 
that accord with a community’s ideology and vernacular.
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5.6.2  Rhetorical Strategy 1: Refuting a Specific Scientific Claim Directly, While 
Often Voicing a Counter-Claim
The first rhetorical strategy to consider occurs when a denialist cultural community, 
using its own particular vernacular, refutes a scientific claim associated with the 
official science on climate change, while typically including a counter-claim, also 
expressed in its own vernacular. Below we see an example of this strategy employed 
in the discourse of each of the three cultural communities. 
5.6.2.1  Cornwall Alliance
Do Climate Alarmists Take God’s Name in Vain?
“You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain, for the Lord will not hold him guiltless 
who takes his name in vain.” – The Third Commandment 
Here God forbids careless or irreverent use of His name. We should show reverence to God in 
what we say and do not only regarding His name but also regarding His titles, attributes, rules, 
works, and Word. …How does this Commandment relate to environmental stewardship? …When 
[someone] insults a building, he insults its designer or builder… Environmentalists frequently 
speak of the earth and its ecosystems as extremely fragile, prone to catastrophic collapse in res-
ponse to human actions. …The fear, for instance, that our increasing carbon dioxide’s concent-
ration in the atmosphere… will cause catastrophic global warming suggests that earth’s climate 
system is poorly designed, like a building that would collapse if you merely leaned against one 
of its walls. That view seems to insult the climate system’s Designer (Cornwall Alliance, 2017a).
5.6.2.2  Heartland Institute 
Climate change has been occurring for hundreds of millions of years. There is no hard evidence 
carbon-dioxide emissions are causing significant climate change, or are a threat to our nation. 
And what little warming we are experiencing is within the range of natural variability. There is 
no clear evidence to date of any change in climate outside the bounds of natural variability over 
the past millennium (Heartland Institute, 2017a).
5.6.2.3  Tea Party 
President Obama and the American Progressives have been willing conspirators in this attack on 
American sovereignty. They have negotiated treaties and signed accords which are designed to 
impoverish the US and transfer that wealth to the UN… They have brainwashed generations to 
live in fear of man-made global warming though none has taken place since before most of them 
were born… Now we are living in the post-wave election world of 2016. President-elect Trump has 
promised to reverse the course. He has labeled man-made global warming for the scam it is and 
promised to free America from the mass of threads with which the Lilliputians have ensnared us 
(Owens, 2016).
5.6.3  Rhetorical Strategy 2: Attacking the Primary Research Tools of Climate 
Science – Global Climate Models
The second rhetorical strategy employed by denialist cultural communities is to 
attack the primary tool that climate scientists use in their research: the computer-run 
global climate model. Again, we will present an example taken from the discourse of 
each of the three cultural communities.
5.6.3.1  Cornwall Alliance 
As people of Biblical faith, then, we have a commitment not only to truth, but also to the practice 
of science as one path to truth. Today, when scientists run complex climate models on powerful 
computers to simulate immeasurably more complex natural systems like the earth’s climate, we 
must not forget our commitment to truth or that our models can become “seductive simulations.” 
[Climate] models are not reality but must be tested by it. If their output disagrees with observa-
tion, the models, not nature, must be corrected. The scientific method demands that theories be 
tested by empirical observation. By that test, models are wrong. They therefore provide no ratio-
nal basis to forecast dangerous human-induced global warming, and therefore no rational basis 
for efforts to reduce warming by restricting the use of fossil fuels or any other means (Cornwall 
Alliance, 2015).
5.6.3.2  Heartland Institute 
First, the complex climate models referenced in the literature… grossly overstate the amount of 
warming we have actually experienced as greenhouse gas emissions have risen. Actual measu-
rements indicate Earth has warmed about one degree Fahrenheit over the past 150 years, but 
according to the models Earth should have experienced at least twice that much warming based 
on carbon dioxide emissions and feedbacks. The results of the global climate models (GCMs) 
relied on by IPCC are only as reliable as the data and theories “fed” into them. Most climate 
scientists agree those data are seriously deficient and IPCC’s estimate for climate sensitivity to 
CO2 is too high. We estimate a doubling of CO2 from pre-industrial levels (from 280 to 560 ppm) 
would likely produce a temperature forcing of 3.7 Wm-2 in the lower atmosphere, for about ~1°C 
of prima facie warming (Heartland Institute, 2017b).
5.6.3.3  Tea Party 
The [climate scientists] who conjured up the computer models featured in the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports also did quite well for themselves, along with all 
the others who climbed on the gravy train of global warming grants… In 2009, the release of a 
huge cache of emails between the IPCC global warming perpetrators instantly became known as 
“Climategate” as the world learned that it was all a scam, a hoax, a fraud based on deliberately 
falsified computer models, and force fed to the public (Caruba, 2012).
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5.6.4  Rhetorical Strategy 3: Characterizing a Claim Advanced by the Official Science 
as Only a Theory, not Proven Knowledge
The third rhetorical strategy to be illustrated is to dismiss major claims inherent in 
the official science on climate change as being only a theory, and therefore not to 
be accepted as reality. (The bold print in the excerpts below has been added by the 
authors.)
5.6.4.1  Cornwall Alliance 
The Bible doesn’t reveal, explicitly or implicitly, whether dangerous manmade global warming is 
real [and] no historic Christian creed or confession does so, either… What we’re seeing here… is 
the substitution of environmentalist religion for historic, Biblical Christianity. For these people, 
commitment to a particular scientific theory about how much warming comes from CO2 
added to the atmosphere, and what the results will be for ecosystems and human economies, 
is more central to the Christian faith than belief in Christ’s resurrection – apart from which, the 
Apostle Paul says, our faith is in vain: Thanks be to God, there are Christian thinkers who not 
only affirm the resurrection of Christ but also think a whole lot more soundly about climate 
change (Cornwall Alliance, 2017b).
5.6.4.2  Heartland Institute 
The papers collected in this work analyze scientific data concerning patterns of past climate 
changes, influences in changes in ocean temperatures, the effect of solar variation on global 
climate, and the effect of carbon dioxide on global climate. The book clearly presents an over-
whelming amount of evidence that refutes arguments made by those promoting the theory of 
catastrophic anthropogenic global warming (Heartland Institute, 2017c).
5.6.4.3  Tea Party 
The current bad science is all based on a theory that the increase in the amount of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere from the exhaust of the burning of fossil fuels leads to a dramatic 
increase in “the greenhouse effect” causing temperatures to skyrocket uncontrollably. This 
theory has failed to verify and is obviously dead wrong. But the politically funded and agenda 
driven scientists who have built their careers on this theory and live well on the 2.6 billion dollars 
of year of Federal grants for global warming/climate change research cling to this theory and 
bend the data spread to support the glorified claims in their reports and papers (Gainesville Tea 
Party, 2018).
At this point in our study we need to ask how successful the Heartland Institute, the 
Cornwall Alliance, and the Tea Party have been in their efforts to recontextualize the 
official science of climate change in order to produce meanings that accord with their 
own vernaculars and ideologies. To answer this question properly, however, we would 
need to know how these discourses have been taken up by their audiences, presum-
ably readers who self-identify as community members, research that is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, given that each of the three denialist cultural 
communities we have studied closely has been in existence for a number of years 
and maintains an active presence on the Web, one can reasonably assume that each 
community has succeeded in accomplishing, through the collective practices of its 
members, the ‘social organization of denial’, along with its constituent cultural cog-
nition, avoidance practices, and distinctive vernacular.8 Doing so has allowed each 
of the three cultural communities to, in Norgaard’s words, “collectively hold infor-
mation about [climate change] at arm’s length by participating in cultural norms of 
attention, emotion, and conversation and by using a series of cultural narratives to 
deflect disturbing information and normalize a particular version of reality in which 
‘everything is fine’” (207).
5.7  Conclusion 
Our study has examined a range of genres and rhetorical strategies employed by three 
denialist cultural communities in taking up and recontextualizing the discourse of the 
official science on climate change in an effort to challenge and subvert this science. 
We have framed the use of these strategies within cultural communities as part of a 
larger practice of socially organized denial vis-à-vis the realities of climate change, 
with cultural cognition, avoidance practices, and discursive vernaculars of meaning 
viewed as significant factors in this collective denial. At the same time, we have seen 
how a digital genre set comprising website texts, blogs, podcasts, e-newsletters, 
Facebook pages, and Twitter messages serves as a, discursive vehicle for a semiotic 
process of uptake and recontextualization intended to undermine the official science 
on climate change. 
A final word: In her contribution to this volume, Amy Devitt advocates employing 
genre in the debate over climate change with a critical sense of genre’s capacity for 
constructive social action as well as an awareness of the ideologies inherent in genre. 
Of the four genre-related principles that Devitt sees as having the potential to guide us 
in the skillful use of genres for achieving “transformative social action” vis-à-vis the 
realities of climate change, we see the principle of “generic resistance” – ”resist[ing] 
genres that reinforce undesired perspectives” – as most relevant for prompting further 
8  The founding dates for the Heartland Institute, Cornwall Alliance, and Tea Party are 1984, 2005, 
and 2010, respectively.
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investigation of the discursive tactics of denialist cultural communities, with the aim 
of evoking an effective public response. Let generic resistance begin. 
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6  “THINK BIG and then do absolutely NÜSCHTE”. 
News Satire and the Climate Debate
Abstract: The chapter discusses how ACC is represented in news satire, and how 
the genre may affect climate change perception. News satire is first a humor genre, 
primarily intended to make people laugh, and any impact news satire may have on 
the ACC debate is dependent on this laughter. Based on an examination of a wide 
selection of news satire sites and video channels, the chapter identifies and discusses 
the most common types and targets of news satire on ACC. In general, climate deni-
alism  and public inaction relative to climate change are the primary targets. News 
stories satirically representing public figures, particularly politicians, as passive and 
in denial of climate change are also relatively common. Towards the end, the chapter 
moves to discuss the impact of news satire on climate change perception. News satire 
often presents a grim outlook on the future of our planet leaving little space for hope. 
At the same time, however, news satire allows for a perhaps more bearable emotional 
response to such hopelessness by inviting recipients to laugh at the ACC denier – a 
ridiculous figure regularly included in the news stories. News satire moreover tran-
scends false balance issues in mainstream media and consistently confirms the reality 
and severity of ACC, thereby highlighting the importance of climate action. 
6.1  Introduction
The purpose of the present chapter is to present and analyze the treatment of anthro-
pogenic climate change (ACC) in news satire. As an arena rife with failings, selfishness, 
self-contradiction, human shortcomings, and ridiculousness, the climate debate is an 
open invitation to satire, and news satire makes the most of it. The chapter provides 
a brief general introduction to news satire as a genre and describes its coverage of 
ACC. On this background, the chapter analyzes how news satire on ACC works as an 
unusual, but potentially effective, genre for climate communication.
The relationship between humor and genre is underexplored in existing genre 
research with its consistent focus on the function and workings of genre (Devitt, 2009; 
Auken, 2015; Miller, Devitt & Gallagher, 2018). Even though they are a crucial factor 
in many forms of human communication, the functional aspect of the humor genres 
are harder to come by, as they are challenging, albeit not impossible, to describe as 
social actions in the Rhetorical Genre Studies tradition (Miller, 1984; and numerous 
other studies). However, the effects of humor have been examined in other parts of 
research, which are only partially represented here, so there are rich opportunities for 
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further studies. This chapter and the one that follows are in this sense only a begin-
ning.
6.2  Convictions Blowing in the Wind
On September 8th 2017, after hurricane Irma had devastated several Caribbean islands, 
and two days before it took land in southwest Florida, the satiric news service The 
Onion published a story with the headline “Climate Change Denier Battens Down 
Worldview To Weather Hurricane Irma”.1 In it, a person described as “local climate 
change denier Michael Dunn” spends the day before the storm trying to bolster his 
view “that climate change is a government conspiracy” by stockpiling “pseudo-scien-
tific reports from the internet”. However, he still fears the effect of the storm: “All I can 
do now is ride it out and hope that I’ve done enough to protect my ideology from being 
completely leveled by this storm. I hate to say it, but I’m preparing for the worst.”
The story conflates two different, but related fields. The preparations made by 
locals in the storm-stricken area to protect their possessions from the oncoming hur-
ricane, and the problems posed to the denial of ACC by the increased occurrence of 
extreme weather events like hurricane Irma. By picturing climate denial as some-
thing that can be blown away by hurricane Irma, in the same way as physical objects 
can, it enters into a crucial question posed by the increased proliferation of extreme 
weather events. Namely, whether and to what degree they can be said to result from 
ACC (Anderson & Huntington 2017, Otto, Skeie, Fuglestvedt, Berntsen, & Allen 2017, 
Moser 2016), and – by consequence – whether such occurrences provide evidence for 
the reality of ACC.
The story does not directly pick up this question, but it takes a stand in the discus-
sion through the conflation of the two spheres, by seeing the hurricane as evidence 
potentially strong enough to destroy the convictions of a hardened climate change 
denier like Michael Dunn. Paradoxically, the story’s protagonist himself seems quite 
aware of the unsustainability of his convictions. He fears the hurricane as “the big one 
that completely destroys my position”, hopes that he has done enough preparation 
against the storm to protect his ideology, but he is even preparing for “the worst”, i.e. 
to have his ideology smashed by the oncoming hurricane. He is, thus, not a realisti-
cally rendered character, but a parody of a climate denier, displaying his own delu-
sions with a surprising level of candor and clarity.
1  Seen April 13th, 2018.
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6.3  News Satire
The last two decades have seen a steep rise in a genre of political humor2 that both 
mimics, uses, and pokes fun at the genres in which the media represents current 
events.3 Broadly speaking, the genre takes two forms. News satire is not a new phe-
nomenon; thus in the 1840s Punch in the United Kingdom and Corsaren in Denmark 
both published various forms of news satire. However, in their contemporary shape, 
the oldest is the fictionalized news reporting first made prominent by The Onion from 
1988 and onward which in its basic form mimics newspaper reporting, but reports 
events that have not taken place, or have at least taken place in widely different ways 
from what is reported. The Onion continues to represent the gold standard for the 
genre, but excellent satire news services have emerged in its wake – in many coun-
tries and in many languages; some will be quoted here, but many more exist. The 
second, and probably most well-known, are the satiric newscasts made prominent by 
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report and continued by Stewart’s 
immediate heir Trevor Noah on The Daily Show with Trevor Noah and by former The 
Daily Show-alumni in This Week Tonight with John Oliver and Full Frontal with Saman-
tha Bee. The heritage from Jon Stewart can also be found in the German version, 
heute-show. The TV shows mainly report actual news stories and the satire is the way 
the show’s news anchor or correspondents comment upon it. In contrast, the vast 
majority of the stories in The Onion and its competitors are invented, and their com-
mentary on current events is much more indirect. Even when they shift media and 
enter TV/video news, like, for instance, The Onion, The Beaverton and Der Postillion 
have done, they still mostly report “news” that has not taken place.4 By consequence, 
most research into news satire has concentrated on one or the other, with vastly more 
research into the TV shows (Berkowitz & Schwartz, 2015).5 
It could feasibly be argued that we are dealing with two distinct genres. Thus, 
Tandoc jr., Lim, & Ling (2017), for example, distinguish between “News Satire” in the 
vein of Jon Stewart, and “News Parody” for the tradition from The Onion. However, the 
2  Political humor is a pervasive and many-sided phenomenon, and the research into it is extensive 
indeed. For an introduction and further references, see Møller (2018, 37–39) with numerous further 
references.
3  News satire is not treated in Reiff & Bawarshi (2016); nor in Miller & Kelly (2017). However, the 
genre, emerging in force in new media environments and acting in the public sphere with little in the 
way of an institutional context, would have fitted nicely into both. 
4  Despite the fictive character of the news reported, the formal presentation of said news mimics the 
news presentation of mainstream media much more closely, thus establishing a strong clash between 
the serious presentation and the outrageous content. (See Waisanen, 2011).
5  Something is invariably missed in a literature search, but some trends are fairly easy to spot. 
Whereas research in the TV shows is prolific and easy to find, it takes some work to dig up even the 
limited number of studies on the news satire sites represented in the present article.
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two also share central features, as they both unite parody and satire of news services 
as an approach to current events. This reflects the fact that they previously have had 
a joint genre label, “fake news”. (See, for instance, Berkowitz & Schwarz, 2016; Reilly 
2012, Amarasingam 2011, and Kaye 2010).6 Of course, with the American election of 
2016, and the rise of Trump, the genre label “fake news” has acquired a new and 
much more ominous role in contemporary politics.
However that may be, in the current context, it makes sense to treat the two as 
sides, or sub-genres, of the same genre. Readers are invited to make their own assess-
ments as to the broader applicability or validity of this. Incidentally, BBC’s The Mash 
Report combines satiric commentary in the vein of Stewart and Colbert with fully 
invented news stories in the tradition of The Onion. 
6.4  News Satire as Parody and Satire
The genre label (Nyboe, 2017) “News satire” consists of two very different genres, 
“news” and “satire”. This label reflects the self-representation of the news satire 
outlets themselves where variations on the genre label dominate. Thus, Last Week 
Tonight with John Oliver’s self-presentation makes the satiric intent explicit: “Breaking 
news, on a weekly basis. Comedian John Oliver satirically covers the week in news, 
politics and current events in this Emmy-winning variety series”.7 Along the same 
lines, The Mideast Beast carries the tagline “Because all news is satirical”,8 The Bea-
verton states in its legal disclaimer that “The Beaverton is a news satire and parody 
publication”,9 and The Shovel is equally clear at the bottom of its front page: “The 
Shovel is Australia’s satire news site”.10  
However, another genre is as important, namely, the “parody” represented in The 
Beaverton’s disclaimer alongside satire. As a genre, news satire blends parody and 
satire.11 The blending is, in fact, so close that it is very often impossible to establish 
the boundary between the two genres in news satire. The mixture of parody and satire 
is not unique to the genre, but is relatively common, historically speaking all the way 
6  To confuse matters further, Acter speaks of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart as “news parody” 
(2008, 278). The team running heute-show’s twitter-profile confirms that the “Nachrictensatire” is one 
of the genre labels the show’s anchor uses to characterize the show. (https://twitter.com/heuteshow/
status/1006092722267152384). Seen June 11th, 2018.
7  Seen January 8th, 2019.
8  Seen January 7th, 2019.
9  Seen January 8th, 2019.
10  Seen January 8th, 2019.
11  The double genre character is also visible in the legal disclaimer of The Duffel Blog: “Duffel Blog is 
a parody of a news organization, and all content it publishes is satirical in nature. https://www.duf-
felblog.com/about/disclaimer/. Seen on January 8th, 2019.
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back to antiquity; a well-known example could be Theofrastos’ Characters which sati-
rizes various forms of human folly through biting parodic renderings of a number of 
personality types.12 Therefore, the interesting thing about news satire is not that the 
genres blend but how.
Parody works by making elements of the parodied  intermingle with incongru-
ent new elements leading to a clash within the parodic work. It is, thus, a “double-
voiced discourse and, as such, addresses a sophisticated reader or viewer expected 
to decode multiple texts in dialogic relation” (Druick, 2009, 301). The fact that the 
news genre has become the object of parody is not surprising given that, according to 
Mikhail Bakhtin, “there never was a single strictly straightforward genre […] that did 
not have its own parodying and travestying double, its own comic-ironic contrepar-
tie” (Bakhtin, 1981, 53). In an already classic description, Linda Hutcheon notes that 
parody is “a form of imitation, but imitation characterized by ironic inversion, not 
always at the expense of the parodied text. […] parody is, in another formulation, rep-
etition with critical distance, which marks difference rather than similarity” (Hutch-
eon, 1985, 6). News satire works this formula by establishing a clash of elements. It 
repeats the visual layout, the choice of subject matter, the rhetoric, the language, and 
the structure of a variety of different news outlets (repetition), but at the same time 
undercuts these elements by adding less serious, silly, or just plain odd elements 
brought in by the news satirists themselves (difference).13 For instance, shifts in soci-
olects or syntax and substitution of persons or subjects are common parody signals 
often found in news satire (see for instance, Rose, 1993, 37; Hariman 2008, 250).
Satire is as complex as parody. It uses humor to taunt and criticize failings, self-
ishness, human shortcomings, and ridiculousness in the surrounding society. Satire 
criticizes through humor. In fact, in the words of Ian Reilly, “criticism forms, in large 
part, the kernel of satire’s broader project” (Reilly, 2010, 34). Historically, it has been 
used to expose moral vices (greed, hypocrisy, corruption) and undermine those in 
power, thereby destabilizing social order (Condren, 2014, 1069). Through humor, it 
creates a community of those laughing against those laughed at. Interestingly, the 
two groups can be overlapping. For instance, you can satirize weaknesses of human 
nature to elicit laughter from humans sharing said nature. Along the same lines, satire 
is often sharply critical of its target and commonly is associated with aggression, as 
Northrop Frye’s widely cited definition of satire as “militant irony” also highlights 
(Frye, 1973, 223).14 However, it does not need to be aggressive. It can be quite mild, and 
may embrace its target while poking fun at it. 
12  See also Hutcheon (1985, 43–68).
13  For more see Acter (2008).
14  See also Berger (1997).
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News satire expounds the full range of options in satire, from lightly teasing 
pieces to full-on attacks.15 Moreover, it appears in all the different genres of the ordi-
nary news stream, reports, interviews, reviews, photo reporting, commentary, back-
ground reporting among others, and it mimics written news, radio news, and televi-
sion newscasts.
Whereas the parodic gist in news satire is usually, though not always, directed at 
the supposedly serious news services, its satire is broader. Not only can news satire 
stories target anything covered by the news media, being fictional, they can even pick 
up topics beyond those accessible to other media. Thus, there are wide limits to what 
can be reflected in the skewed mirror of news satire. Nothing is beneath the interest of 
news satire and nothing is above it. Even if something is too sacrosanct in culture to 
criticize, news satire finds a way to bite. For example, at the death of Nelson Mandela, 
The Onion published a story titled “Nelson Mandela Becomes First Politician To Be 
Missed”.16 It adhered completely to the “de mortuis nil nisi bene”-rule of the obituary, 
and yet found an angle for crass satire, which even highlighted the accomplishment 
of the deceased.
It follows from what has been said above that even though news satire skewers 
the news, and often either tells invented stories or inserts invented information into 
otherwise real stories, the genre is unlike what is now known as “fake news”, as it 
does not seek to spread misinformation (Søe, 2017). Not only does the genre employ 
numerous and heavily signaled ironic moves (Booth, 1974; Hutcheon, 1994) to ensure 
that the recipient understands the irony, it misses its first and fundamental purpose, 
laughter, when this does not happen. For the very same reason, another kind of 
hilarity ensures when people still pick up the satire news stories as factual reporting 
because they are not being cheated, as those who fall for fake news, they actually 
and actively cheat themselves as evidenced by, for instance, the notorious exchange 
between The Onion and The People’s Daily (Deen, 2015).
The techniques and the rhetorical practice associated with news satire are fre-
quently expanded beyond their original genre contexts into other genres. Examples of 
this could be The Daily Show’s twin coffee table books America (The Book) and Earth 
(The Book) (Stewart 2006, 2010). The factual character of the encyclopedia seems to 
make it an attractive target genre. Probably the most common genre in this field is 
the parodic encyclopedia; the largest online version, UnCyclopedia links to numer-
ous other parodic encyclopedias in many languages, some of them stylistically loose, 
15  At the mild end you find many, though definitely not all, the micro news stories, like “Grammar 
Nazi’s Day Ruined after Seeing Spalling Mistake”. At the more aggressive something like “Asshole 
Awarded For Asshole Behavior By Business Community Leaders”, in which an award ceremony in 
the business world is described in a language switching repeatedly between established journalistic 
expressions and explicit takedowns similar to the “asshole”.
16  Seen August 29th, 2018.
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as is often the case with amateur work in news satire. The Onion, too, kicks in with 
The Onion Book of Known Knowledge (Harris, Reiss, Roeder, & Tracy, 2012) which also 
recalls the coffee table book. A further target is clickbait culture, most prominently 
through the site Clickhole which preys upon the forms, the rhetoric, and the ideology 
expressed in the genres of clickbait-sites like Buzzfeed, Distratify and Upworthy. 
6.5  News Satire as News
As a form of news, albeit a non-standard one, news satire has an extensive and multi-
faceted relationship to the news reflected in the surrounding, and nominally more 
serious, media landscape. News satire largely responds to the same political, social, 
cultural, and economic events as other news genres. These events may be re-framed, 
re-interpreted, juxtaposed, twisted, or skewed in the course of their representation 
in news satire. However, the connection back to the original events, or to the repre-
sentation of said events in the media landscape, must be recognizable, or the satiric 
effect is lost. This is true even in the cases where a story is fully made up, and is not 
related to any particular media story, as is the case with many micro-news stories in 
the local-news sections of news satire sites. These stories deploy all the usual tech-
niques of journalism to describe events that are clearly too small to justify journalistic 
treatment, thus highlighting the artificiality of the journalistic genres while extract-
ing mirth from the everyday situations described.
There is not always one clearly defined event behind a satiric news story. Other 
sides of the news can be targeted. Indeed, the target may be the media genres them-
selves, the reportage, the op-ed, the news telegram, the business special, or the life-
style article. In addition, the inspiration may be other phenomena not immediately 
related to current events that are reframed within news satire; twisted into the often 
deliberately ill-fitting form of a news story. These topics range from theology, “Aging 
God fitted for Omni-Focals”17 (The Onion), over historical events, “The Christmas 
Tree is a Grave Blow to Danishness (from the archive, year 1808)” (“Juletræet er et 
voldsomt Anslag mod Danskheden (fra arkivet, år 1808)”) (RokokoPosten),18 to serial 
jokes, “‘I should have never crossed that fucking road’ admits chicken” (Waterford 
Whispers News).19 The genre treats these topics according to the normal approach of 
news. Thus, the chicken from the serial joke gets its life story told by an impressed 
journalist who is clearly in awe and moved by being in the presence of this important 
cultural figure. In cases such as these the inspiration is not an immediate news event, 
but it is the existence of the news media genres themselves that allows news satire 
17  Seen August 29th, 2018. 
18  Seen August 29th, 2018.
19  Seen August 29th, 2018.
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to treat a genre-foreign story, as if it was a genre commonplace. Through their genre 
practices, they offer up not just news, but a number of genre templates for telling a 
story. What news satire does in these cases is to take up the template (repetition), but 
apply it to a material that is usually seen as foreign (difference) to the template.
6.6  News Satire on ACC
News satire is primarily a form of humor. Therefore, satire stories, whatever moral 
role they might get to play, are humor pieces, and the genre’s first purpose is laugh-
ter (Wiesman, 2011). Quite likely, the satirists and their audiences meet in this. The 
entertainment value seems to be one of the primary motivations for engaging with 
news satire (Young, 2013). There is a deeper point to this, but the obvious conse-
quence is that not all stories involving ACC push a clear political agenda. Thus, The 
Babylon Bee, which mainly concerns itself with American church life, ran the story 
“Chief Cause Of Climate Change Revealed To Be Fire Metaphors In Worship Songs”,20 
using ACC as a means to poke fun at another, less dramatic issue, the imagery in 
church singing. Along similar lines, Waterford Whispers News has the story “Rain 
Stops In Galway For Record 17 Minutes”21 where the target of the joke is the dreary 
Irish weather, climate change is used for emphasis rather than being at the center 
of the story. The article concludes its description of the weather anomaly by stating 
that “there was some concern from meteorologists that the dry spell could be a sign 
of climate change, stating that dry weather in Galway could be more worrying than 
polar ice caps melting”.
So not all news satire on ACC conveys a clear political message. Take, for instance, 
the Clickhole article “Environmental Win! This Couple Is Infertile”.22 The story argues 
that a couple’s infertility is a climate victory, as it saves the world from “as many as 
three carbon-emitting children” that the couple initially had planned to have. Infer-
tility is not the butt of the joke, however, and neither is climate change. The article, 
instead, takes aim – satirically and parodically – at another common news genre, the 
inspirational human interest story. This is underlined by the extensive use of excla-
mation points and exaggerated enthusiasm in the article, as if it was somehow telling 
a story worth celebrating. Another example is a story by The Beaverton titled “Local 
man unable to resist pointing out how beautiful day actually is a sign of climate 
20  Seen December 13th, 2017.
21  Seen March 24th, 2018. A parallel story is found in The Daily Squat: “‘We don’t know how North-
erners will react to sunlight if global warming isn’t halted’, warns climate expert”. http://www.dai-
lysquat.com/dont-know-northerners-will-react-sunlight-global-warming-isnt-halted-warns-climate-
expert/. Seen March 28th, 2018. 
22  Seen August 29th, 2018.
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apocalypse”.23 It randomly describes a day at some office, where “local man Geoffrey 
McLeod” simply cannot let his co-workers enjoy the nice weather, but must give voice 
to the dire predictions for the climate. Like in a typical news story, McLeod is given 
the chance to comment on his pessimistic remarks: “‘I tried, I really tried to hold it 
in,’ said McLeod. ‘But I had to do my part for the environment by not letting people 
enjoy even a few brief moments of happiness’”. But even when used in this spurious 
manner, ACC throws a shade over the silliness, as the tragedy of infertility is described 
as a form of triumph, and the all too familiar shade of doubt as to the possible ACC-
origin of nice weather is given shape in the ever so slightly neurotic figure of Geoffrey 
McLeod.24
6.7  The Material
News satire is a notoriously volatile field. The Onion has been around for decades, and 
with the fairly successful transition of The Daily Show from Jon Stewart to Trevor Noah 
the show has entered its third decade in good shape. Beyond that, the landscape 
changes swiftly, and few news services last for many years. Moreover, many official 
news media dabble in satire on a regular basis, and satire programs on TV frequently 
feature elements of news satire. Also, news satire plays out in many countries and in 
many languages, and even discovering any given satire news service is not a given, if 
you don’t partake in its cultural circle. An obvious example to the present authors is 
the Danish news satire service RokokoPosten. Siden 1732 (The Rococo Post. Since 1732 
(actual founding year: 2010)) that has been well-nigh legendary in the Danish media 
landscape almost since its foundation in 2010, but at the present point in time not 
even registered on the Wikipedia-list of “satirical news websites”,25 much less found 
notable enough for a specific entry. Thus, a full tracking of news satire’s representa-
tion of ACC is beyond the reach of the present chapter. 
Instead, we have searched 28 different news satire sites for the phrases “climate 
change” and “global warming”. We have also reviewed the coverage of ACC on 6–7 
news satire TV-shows.26 The list of reviewed satire news services are listed separately 
in the chapter’s bibliography; individual stories are referenced in the footnotes. The 
number of items available varies strongly from news service to news service. Thus, 
The Onion and The Daily Mash feature page after page of related stories, whereas 
23  Seen August 29th, 2018.
24  McLeod and his attitude may even be a broadly recognizable figure, see Kirilenko, Molodotsova 
& Stepchenkova (2015).
25  Seen March 2nd, 2018. 
26  The variation depends on whether you consider The Daily Show as one or two shows in the tenure 
of Jon Stewart and Trevor Noah.
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others have few if any. Many factors influence this difference: the age and size of 
any given satire news service is central; an older, larger site will have more stories 
about ACC as a simple function of having more stories in the first place. In addition, 
a number of services are subject-specific, and only address ACC intermittently when 
it touches upon this subject. Thus, climate change plays a role on the catholic news 
satire site Eye of the Tiber, in several stories connected to the papal encyclical on 
climate change, but is barely mentioned otherwise. 
The overall number of stories on climate change is equally hard to measure, as it 
would require a precise demarcation of what constitutes a story “on” climate change 
vis-à-vis a story that merely “refers to” climate change. Though there are many clear 
examples of one or the other, and both are interesting, such a line is impossible to 
draw. However you measure it, the ensuing material encompasses several hundred 
stories of which only a minor portion can be represented here.
6.8  Ridiculing Denialism
The most important target of news satire in relation to ACC is undoubtedly, and by a 
wide margin, climate denialism. Thus, the opening example of this chapter featuring 
“local climate change denier Michael Dunn” to a large extent encapsulates the stance 
of news satire vis-à-vis ACC. 
The excessive emphasis awarded the opinion of climate change deniers is followed 
through to a reductio ad absurdum in an article in The Beaverton titled “Climate sci-
entists seeking opinion of stupid idiot to complete study”.27 In it, Dr. Naomi Prashad, 
the spokesperson of a group of climate researchers, explains why the inclusion of the 
opinions of “a total brow-furrowing goddamn dolt” would help the researchers final-
ize their studies. 
‘It’s just very useful, to be forced to address the most ignorant views from ninnies who have done 
no work of their own,’ Prashad noted. ‘Look at the breakthroughs NASA is experiencing right 
now: gravitational waves, new solar systems – and they’ve had to spend a ton of time acknow-
ledging flat-earthers. I don’t think it’s a coincidence.’
As is obvious, the Beaverton story repeatedly undercuts its presumed surface meaning 
by adding a series of derogatory descriptions to the climate denier sought for. The 
comical paradox being, of course, that the article treats the inclusion of obviously ill-
founded opinions as a prerequisite for scientific quality. This paradox is highlighted 
in the ironic claim that the denialist opinions could be as important for breakthroughs 
in climate science, as the acknowledgment of flat-earthers has been for NASA. 
27  Seen August 29th, 2018.
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The irony, of course, rests in the fact that not only has there never been a positive 
influence on NASAs work from having to debate flat-earthers; NASA has never been 
required to work extensively and repeatedly through arguments from flat-earthers as 
that would evidently be a waste of time. By consequence, the requirement that climate 
scientists are constantly asked to justify their work against scientifically unqualified 
climate deniers is reduced to the scientific absurdity it always was. 
A parallel approach is found in Last Week Tonight with John Oliver’s now right-
fully famous segment “A Statistically Representative Climate Change Debate”.28 In the 
latter, a TV debate on the reality of ACC is set up to match the actual division among 
the scientists, thus including three “sceptics” and a veritable flood of proponents rep-
resenting the alleged 97% of climate scientist that hold ACC to be real (for the number 
itself, see Cook, et al., 2016).29 The result, of course, is a complete flooding of the 
skeptics – demonstrating visually how overwhelming the scientific consensus actu-
ally is.30
Similar positions against the ridiculousness of climate change denialism can 
be found in stories like “Science Is A Hoax, Man Types On Small Electronic Device 
That Can Do Everything”31 (The Shovel), “Climate change skeptic is fine with all other 
science”32 (The Daily Mash), or “Climate skeptics: The weather has a leftist bias” (“Kli-
maskeptikere: Vejret har venstreorienteret slagside”)33 (RokokoPosten).
A particular target in this category is the person who conflates weather and 
climate and claims that local cold weather events contradict the existence of ACC. 
This leads to stories like “Polar Vortex Causes Hundreds of Injuries as People Making 
Snide Remarks About Climate Change Are Punched in Face”34 (The Borowitz Report) 
or “Man feeling a bit chilly declares it to be proof that global warming is hoax”35 
(NewsThump). 
28  Seen March 1st, 2018. See also Brewer & McKnight (2017).
29  The 97% figure, which seem to be one of the more successful pieces of ACC-information in 
play, is used to effect again by Rachel Parris in The Mash Report: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=GN8dLESkzWQ&t=4s
30  There are probably less than 97 people present, they do not fit in the picture frame which is set for 
a “normal” TV debate, but the impression is overwhelming, nonetheless. 
31  Seen March 1st, 2018.
32  Seen March 1st, 2018.
33  Seen March 2nd, 2018.
34  Seen March 1st, 2018.
35  Seen March 1st, 2018.
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6.9  The Passive Politicians
Another frequent target is the lack of public action towards climate change. This is 
seen in a segment from heute-show, the German version of The Daily Show, made for 
the November 2017 UN Climate Change Conference in Bonn. “Reporting” from what 
is allegedly the German info-booth at the conference, one of the show’s senior cor-
respondents, Tina Hausten, attempts to answer a question from the show’s anchor, 
Oliver Welke, about what the world should learn from Germany when it comes to 
climate change. Hausten does this by presenting a poster with Germany’s supposed 
motto for the conference: “THINK BIG and then do absolutely NÜSCHTE”. The double 
shift in language is telling. First, it moves to English to mark the hip, international 
ambience of the conference, then, at the point of bathos, it reverts to German with 
the slangish “NÜSCHTE” which translates approximately as “nada” or “zilch”. The 
segment then proceeds, with Hausten in a consistently ironic stance, moving through 
a brief, yet brutally effective presentation of the lack of coherent action in German 
climate politics, to the therefore inevitable climate breakdown and ending up in 
advice to her daughters to just have fun and consume away while there is still time. 
Following through to a reductio ad absurdum, at the end of the segment the info-
booth is filled with people dancing and celebrating – completely consistent with Heu-
sen’s surface message, and utterly at odds with the grave threat posed by the shifting 
climate also laid bare in her presentation.
Along the same lines, many satiric news stories specifically target the politician 
as passive or as a climate change denier. Such news stories typically revolve around 
politicians trying to pass legislation outlawing climate change without resolving the 
underlying issue. The Shovel, for instance, reports: “White House Cancels Climate 
Change”,36 and similarly, in another story, that Australia and other countries plan to 
“withdraw from climate change”.37 Since future predictions for the climate are grim, 
a government spokesperson in the article concludes, “climate change is definitely not 
something we want to be a part of”.38 In the same vein, the claim by Donald Trump 
that climate change was a Chinese hoax to damage the US thus spawned two paral-
lel stories at The Rochdale Herald: “Climate Change still insisting Donald Trump is a 
Chinese Conspiracy”39 and “Donald Trump is a hoax, says Global Warming”.40
Stories like these depict the politician as someone, who willfully believes that 
climate change is a matter of choice. As such, they serve to amplify that politicians 
36  Seen December 1st, 2017.
37  Seen December 1st, 2017.
38  See also: https://www.thebeaverton.com/2017/06/trump-pulls-climate-change-agreement-hopes-
climate-will-cave-give-better-deal/. Seen December 1st, 2017.
39  Seen March 14th, 2018.
40  Seen March 14th, 2018.
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would rather withdraw from or cancel their involvement in climate change in order to 
avoid dealing with its consequences. 
Thus, news satire may also qualify as political humor as it serves a critical func-
tion: By targeting political inaction and evasion of responsibility when it comes to 
climate change, such stories simultaneously ridicule and undermine political author-
ity and expose “discrepancies between how things are and how things should be” 
(Møller, 2018, 38). This is all summarized in The Onion Book of Known Knowledge’s 
entry on “Pollution”: “release of dangerous contaminants into the environment that 
can wait until later to be rectified, unlike steroid abuse in sports, bullying, Internet 
piracy, and $2 bank fees.” (Harris, Reiss, Roeder, & Tracy, 2012, 153)
A particularly bleak version of this criticism comes from the otherwise fairly 
polite Danish site RokokoPosten; a 2015 story has the headline “World leaders: now we 
really have to do something about those climate changes” (From the future archive, 
2053)” (“Verdensledere: Nu skal vi altså virkelig gøre noget ved de klimaforandringer 
(fra fremtidsarkivet, 2053)”).41 In this story from the future, nothing consequential 
has happened in the political reaction to ACC, numerous species have died out, 
others, including quite common ones like house sparrows and badgers, are on the 
brink of extinction. Half of Africa is uninhabitable, and New Zealand flooded. In the 
face of this, the politicians are finally moving into action; or so they say. The level of 
action actually proposed, however, is abysmally insufficient; the US moves to reduce 
its emissions by 0.03% and “try to make the state of Maine almost completely C02 
neutral”, and Mongolia promises to get 14% of its energy from renewable sources. So, 
the story basically takes a pessimistic view of current political discourse concerning 
ACC and projects it forty years into the future, thus making the dissonance between 
the gravity of the situation and the lack of political action even more evident.
6.10  A Grim Outlook and a Laugh
A lot of news satire on ACC is definitely bleak in outlook. We have already seen an 
example of a very grim approach in the segment from heute-show. Nevertheless, the 
implications of the heute-show story still were that something could actually be done, 
and that the fault was with political inaction. However, stories taking the inevitabil-
ity of climate disaster as their starting point are fairly prolific and can be found in a 
variety of contexts. A parallel take can be found in the Rochdale Herald story “Break-
41  Seen August 29th, 2018. 
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ing: Climate Change Inevitable Declare Scientists”42 containing this harsh statement 
among others, supposedly from a climate researcher called Simon Winter:
You can switch your lights off all you want, stop using air freshener and deodorant or buy an 
electric car. It doesn’t matter because China are burning more coal than we did during the entire 
industrial revolution every day and cows are farting out holes in the ozone layer bigger than 
Africa every 30 minutes. Basically we’re fucked.
The quote presents the hopelessness and futility of action without any hope, and 
without much in the way of redeeming humor. In particular, the quote targets minus-
cule action taken on an individual level as useless compared to the global develop-
ments. The same target can be found in other stories like “Climate Experts Say Only 
Hope For Saving Planet Lies With People Who Save Napkins From Takeout Order”43 
(The Onion) and “Woman successfully offsets huge carbon footprint by sharing 
climate change article on Facebook” 44 (NewsThump) both of which mock ineffectual 
climate activism.
These kinds of stories are what might be called big-picture stories. They rarely 
target actual events, the way heute-show targeted the UN climate summit or Last Week 
Tonight with John Oliver targets Donald Trump’s announcement that the US would 
leave the Paris treaty. Instead, they address the big-picture news of the deterioration 
of the ecosystem and the long-standing political passivity connected to it. Moreover, 
they make the fears harbored by many people involved in the climate debate, includ-
ing their feelings of personal responsibility, or – the other way around – their feeling 
of powerlessness to change anything. They follow the grim prediction of climate 
research through to their bleakest possible conclusion – and sometimes twist them 
and turn them for comical effect. This is true also when news satirist move into other 
genres, thus the entry on “Global Warming” in The Onion Book of Known Knowledge 
describes it as a global threat to civilization that becomes irreversible during the 
time it takes the reader to read the entry itself. The rendering of what an ocean is, is 
similarly dark: “continually rising body of water that in 250 years will be a vast eco-
system consisting of fish, algae, abandoned buildings, and 10 billion dead bodies” 
(144). Similarly, The Onion’s atlas, Our Dumb World, repeatedly refers to the effect of 
ACC, thus the Maldives are described as so low-lying as to be “gravely threatened by 
melting polar ice caps, light rain, and kids doing cannonballs off the coast of India” 
(198). Also, the description of the South Pole as a hellish ice-scape concludes: “Most 
agree that Antarctica will soon become a popular vacation spot for tourists looking 
to escape the 140-degree temperatures and massive flooding of the rest of the world” 
(Dikkers, DiCenzo, Guterman, & Randazzo, 2007, 238). 
42  Seen April 4th, 2018.
43  Seen April 9th, 2018. 
44  Seen April 9th, 2018.
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6.11  News Satire for Political Action
The genre use in news satire’s treatment of ACC is fairly classical by the genre’s own 
norms and practices. It is probably not feasible to claim ACC news satire as a distinct 
genre compared to news satire in general in the way, for instance, Cli-Fi is identifi-
able as a distinct genre of fiction. There are no particular techniques used and no 
rhetorical purposes distinct from the overall purposes of news satire, in themselves 
complex. However, two trends do stand out – they are not enough to make a distinct 
genre but noticeable nonetheless. First, news satire’s take on ACC is remarkably con-
sistent. Whereas it usually takes on all possible sides in any given debate, in this one 
it is well-nigh unidirectional;45 it consistently confirms the reality and severity of ACC 
and ridicules denialism.46 Second, the apocalyptic language recurrently present in 
the coverage of ACC is an otherwise rare phenomenon in news satire – except in a few 
stories dealing with theological subjects, like The Beaverton’s “Antichrist able to hire 
five horsewomen of the apocalypse for the cost of four horsemen”.47 Thus, with these 
exemptions in mind, the way news satire as a genre handles ACC, and tries to act 
through its utterances, may feasibly be expected to be a parallel to the way it works 
in other instances.
It is known that news satire can affect the perception of ACC in their addressees. 
Several studies have investigated the impact of news satire on the public’s percep-
tion of ACC. A number of studies conclude that satirical TV news programs such as 
The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and Last Week Tonight affirm the reality of ACC 
(Feldman, Leiserowitz, & Maibach, 2011; Feldman 2013; Brewer & McKnight 2015, 
2017) and, as a result, may shape audience perception of global warming (Feldman 
2013; Brewer & McKnight 2015, 2017). Less is known about the impact of news satire 
sites like The Onion. Several possible impact indicators are possible for news satire 
45  Something is inevitably missed in a search like this, but all we have found is a handful amateur 
stories on Newsbiscuit, some fairly vague stories on dedicated conservative sites and a single more 
professionally done story on Call the Cops. The latter story can be found here: http://www.callthe-
cops.net/arrest-warrant-issued-al-gore-theft-nobel-prize/. Seen March 6th, 2018. A possible, though 
not definite, addition is this story from Waterford Whispers News: https://waterfordwhispersnews.
com/2016/05/10/dublin-man-beaten-to-death-for-querying-climate-change/. Seen March 6th, 2018. 
Another possible candidate could be this story from the pan-arabia enquirer: http://www.panarabiae-
nquirer.com/wordpress/ive-flown-half-way-around-world-clear-message-reduce-carbon-emissions/. 
Seen July 16th, 2018. 
46  This claim contradicts Feldman (2013) who sees a fairly large percentage of statements about ACC 
on The Daily Show With John Stewart and The Colbert Report as either dismissive of or at least chal-
lenging the severity of ACC. The examples of this given by Feldman, however, are all clearly ironic and 
not to be taken at face value. This irony is not incidental, but defining for the discourse in both shows 
and in news satire generally. They are, thus, not dismissive of the severity of ACC, but highlights it 
through irony.
47  Seen on May 24th, 2018.
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services; one such could be their general reach as shown by their respective represen-
tations on social media. Looking at leading sites The Onion has 11 million followers on 
Twitter, The Daily Show with Trevor Noah has 7,73 million, The Daily Mash has 143,000, 
and Der Postillion has 764,000. This puts them on par with leading politicians in their 
respective countries. By comparison prominent US politicians like VP Mike Pence or 
Senator Elisabeth Warren have 6,9 and 4,73 million followers, respectively. In the UK, 
first-line politicians have a significantly larger number of twitter followers than The 
Daily Mash, for instance Boris Johnson at 507,000 followers and Jeremy Corbyn at 1,9 
million. The Daily Mash, however, does surpass other prominent politician like Keir 
Stamer (128,000) or Anna Soubry (118,000).48 These figures have little to say about the 
impact of individual stories, but they do indicate that there is a social and political 
arena available for these stories to influence.
How does news satire act in this arena? Current research indicates that to break 
down ideological barriers effectively climate communication must be “Thoughtful, 
respectful, and deliberative” (Moser 2016, 352; see also Moser & Berzonsky, 2015). 
Yet, as is evident from the examples given, seen from one perspective news satire on 
climate change frequently appears to be anything but. It is rarely thoughtful. It does 
acknowledge the basic results of ACC science that climate change is real, serious, 
and connected to human activity. Beyond that, however, it does not stick to the facts, 
but invents information freely and runs with any odd idea that can draw a laugh; 
“objectivity of information presentation is not of primary concern (or even a matter of 
concern at all)” (Landreville, 2015, 562). 
News satire is recurrently disrespectful. Even if this is unsurprising, given that 
both of the basic genres involved, parody and satire, are generally disrespectful, the 
approach to climate change is distinctly aggressive even by that standard. News satire 
is known to break norms of rhetorical objectivity entrenched in journalism; it argues 
with a chain saw. It routinely resorts to name-calling, often in very creative ways, but 
name-calling nonetheless, and it is merciless in its treatment of its targets. Thus, in 
one section Full Frontal with Samantha Bee sets up a Hell House to convert a group 
of hardline climate denialists, but only manages to convince one person, and only 
because that person is flabbergasted by the utter stupidity of the people with whom 
she has been on the Hell House tour. News satire, thus, does not strive for a balanced 
coverage, but for maximum effect, frequently by disrespecting its targets as much as 
at all possible. 
News satire does not appear deliberative. It skips arguments and jumps to conclu-
sions, it does not address the arguments of its targets with sympathy and recognition, 
it does not engage in a back-and-forth to arrive at points of joint understanding, and it 
does not lay out its own theoretical and ideological underpinnings for common scru-
tiny. In its projections of the future effects of current actions, it repeatedly states the 
48  All numbers checked on January 9, 2019.
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worst possible outcome; and it frequently seems to discourage as meaningless any 
kind of action to mitigate the looming disaster. Thus, taken on the surface meaning 
alone satire news stories like these are not conducive to any kind of deliberative 
action, merely to fear, or even panic.
However, when seen from another angle, central features of news satire work 
clearly to inform and to encourage action in relation to ACC. We leave aside the oft-
discussed relationship between storytelling and climate engagement (Moser, 2016 
with further reference). The question is highly relevant and deserving of further inves-
tigation, but beyond what can be reasonably covered in a chapter like the present. 
Instead, we will highlight some of the other features where the genre engages in 
meaningful climate communication. Again, laughter is key. Even if the humor appears 
grim and aggressive, an obvious respect for the reader or viewer is present at a genre 
level in news satire, and this may prove to be an important part of its communica-
tive strength. As previously stated, the first purpose of news satire as a humor genre 
is laughter. However, the laughter in news satire presupposes knowledge of current 
events, an ability to make complex moves in genre interpretation (Auken, 2015), and 
an advanced ability to decode parody and irony. In this sense, the hilarity following 
when a news satire story is taken at face value springs from the surprise of seeing 
somebody proving themselves unworthy of that respect. Therefore, news satire in its 
most fundamental genre features respects the independent intelligence of its intended 
receiver, and thus news satire on ACC communicates the fundamentals of science and 
the exigent character of the problem while encouraging the receiver to apply her own 
wit to decipher the message. It engages the viewer actively as an interpreter. 
Thus, news satire’s recurrent apocalyptic bleakness takes up the fear, dread, and 
ensuing apathy, in the meeting with the threat of ACC and turns them into laughter. 
This laughter may be dark to the extreme, but it still offers a different, and more bear-
able, emotional response to the gravity of the climate threat, and a way to talk about 
it without succumbing to despair, because the presentation of it is mixed with wit, 
irony, artistry, and laughter. 
The free relation to facts notwithstanding, news satire represents the scientific 
consensus about ACC better than does much supposed journalism, since it has the 
basics right: the scientific consensus on the reality and severity of ACC and the grave 
and dangerous, yet utterly spurious, nature of climate denialism. By consequence, 
news satire avoids the false balance issues (Antilla, 2005; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004, 
2007; Schmidt, Ivanova & Schäfer, 2013; see also Benestad, Nuccitelli, Lewandowsky, 
Hayhoe, Hygen, Dorland, & Cook, 2017) that have recurrently muddled valid infor-
mation about ACC with disinformation by giving recurrent equal coverage to scien-
tifically speaking marginal views. Moreover, news satire denies the denialists the air 
of swagger, boldness, or interesting bad-boy notoriety, sometimes afforded them in 
mainstream news coverage (Boykoff, 2013). This is true both when news satire targets 
named politicians, and when it invents figures for a given story. The ACC denier is, 
almost invariably, a ridiculous and delusional figure.
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In several critical ways this is, in fact, respectful, thoughtful, and deliberative. As 
previously stated, satire as a genre divides people into two categories, those laughing 
and those laughed at. The requirement in news satire to be among the laughers is the 
basic acceptance of climate science and a critical stance towards ineffectual politi-
cians and phony forms of action. This stance is itself a constructive starting point for 
a sensible approach to climate action.49





























49  The authors wish to thank Amy Devitt for her insights at a crucial point in the process. Thanks are 
also due to Maria Damkjær and Gísli Magnusson.
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6.13  TV-shows
Full Frontal with Samantha Bee
Heute-show
Last Week Tonight With John Oliver
The Colbert Report
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart
The Daily Show with Trevor Noah
The Mash Report
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7  “This will all be yours – and under water”: 
Climate Change Depictions in Editorial Cartoons
Abstract: This chapter examines how climate change as both a series of physical pro-
cesses and a political debate is satirically depicted in editorial cartoons. We contend 
that climate change poses a challenge for satire due to the complexities of the issue. 
The chapter focuses on different ways in which editorial cartoons as a genre may 
present different exigencies and policy positions by means of humor that skewers its 
satirical target. In the chapter we present a range of argumentative themes such as 
“Consequences”, “Capitalism”, “Ridiculing the Deniers” and “Against Climate Activ-
ism” that are prevalent in American editorial cartoons. These themes are based on the 
study of a large body of such cartoons. The analyses of the chapter work from a genre 
angle in order to detail the social motives and formal intricacies of editorial cartoons 
in relation to the topic of climate change. This in turn leads to an argument that edito-
rial cartoons, dealing with the topic of climate change, navigate between specific and 
more general contexts. Although the interventional or activist potential of editorial 
cartoons can be called into question, they may be able to promote explicit human 
angles on the all too often invisible processes of climate change.  
7.1  Introduction
As general anticipation for the COP15 climate summit in Copenhagen ramped up 
during the last months of 2009, so did attention from political satirists. It was within 
this context that USA Today posted a now famous cartoon by Joel Pett, in which the 
summit is interrupted by a heckling politician exclaiming, “what if this is a hoax and 
we create a better world for nothing?” (Pett, 2009). Whilst timely in its humor, skew-
ering one of the top news items of the day with satirical precision, Pett’s cartoon also 
gained an afterlife that went far beyond the specific context of COP15. The cartoon 
was widely shared online. Furthermore, the joke about creating a better world for 
nothing proved its mettle over time, and began to appear in wholly new contexts and 
configurations – signed copies at the EPA, on protest signs, and even as a mural on a 
garage (Pett, 2012). This tension between original and subsequent contextual usage 
is made possible by the satirical depiction of the fractious and polarized debate over 
climate change – one that is often put into the purview of “serious” genres with sci-
entific or policy credentials (Nielsen, 2017; Spoel, Goforth, Cheu & Pearson, 2008; 
Stahl, 2011). However, Pett’s cartoon seems to have struck a chord beyond the initial 
chuckle and, indeed, illustrates a more general public notion of politicians dragging 
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their feet on the matter of climate change. Although it gained an unexpected fame, 
Pett’s cartoon is also an example of a typical American editorial cartoon.
In this chapter, we focus on how climate change as a phenomenon and as a 
political debate is depicted in American editorial cartoons. While political satire 
may present humorous interpretations of various political and social issues, climate 
change is challenging to satire, because it is both complex (at times highly technical) 
and exigent. As the example with Pett illustrates, editorial cartoons may negotiate 
tension between specific and general contexts, rely on the polarization of the overall 
debate, and promote explicit human angles. Our enquiry seeks to understand how 
this established satirical genre deals with a specific complex issue. Based on a col-
lected corpus we present analyses of a range of argumentative themes employed in 
editorial cartoons that depict climate change. These analyses will be based on a prior 
established genre-overview, detailing the social motives and formal intricacies of edi-
torial cartoons.
7.2  Satirical Cartoons – a Potent Genre
As mentioned, the enquiry of this chapter focuses on how climate change is repre-
sented within the specific genre of editorial cartoons rather than a generic descrip-
tion of editorial cartoons as a genre. However, we note that different scholars have 
regarded satirical cartoons as a genre (Bal, Pitt, Berthon & DesAutels, 2009; Baumgart-
ner, 2008; Geipel, 1972; Harrison, 1981; Kjeldsen, 2015). While designating something 
a genre, does not necessarily make it so – as Carolyn Miller has illustrated – it does 
lend credence to the pursuit of enquiry into climate change representation through 
a genre lens and by extension a genre description of editorial cartoons (Miller, 1984, 
163). Indeed, when looking at the history of editorial cartoons, scholars have noted 
several antecedent genres (Jamieson, 1975). Such antecedents not only provide a 
sense of the historical developments or evolution of a genre, but also highlight inher-
ited constraints that may still have contemporary relevance. Thus, the word cartoon 
derives from the late 16th century Italian word cartone (from the Latin word carta), 
which used to describe an artist’s simple first sketch of a work. While no longer con-
fined to the space of the artist’s atelier, cartoons are still generally perceived as for-
mally simple drawings (Lamb, 2004). Although drawn caricatures have been used 
throughout history, contemporary forms of satirical (editorial) cartoons as a “self-
enriching genre” mainly grew out of an Anglophone context in 18th and 19th century 
Britain and America respectively (Geipel, 1972, 11; Harrisson, 1981, 72). Cartoonists 
such as William Hogarth and Thomas Nast were notable in their time for using car-
toons rather than words to launch quite successful campaigns against both corrupt 
politicians and mindless good taste. With this history in mind, it is important at this 
point to note that editorial cartoon distinguishes itself from news satire (as seen in 
the previous chapter). Editorial cartoons have both different generic antecedents and 
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work through a different media and formal expression. The difference is also one of 
material context. Editorial cartoons are historically part of a larger news publication 
(i.e. the editorial pages of a paper), and thus physically border on non-satirical news 
genres such as editorials or op-eds. However, the cartoon does not itself try to emulate 
or pass itself off as a mock-up of any such genre, rather it is contingent on its material 
and discursive delineation on the page. The contemporary perspective of this chapter 
means that we shall not expound the history of cartoons further (for more on this see 
for example Geipel, 1972; Keane, 2008; Lamb, 2004). However, we note that the ante-
cedent forms, from which contemporary editorial cartoons emerged, imbue the genre 
with certain motives and attitudes. Miller’s original conception of genre not only rests 
on notions of function and context, but also on motive (1984, 152) – a term she borrows 
from Kenneth Burke. To Burke any set of symbolic actions rest on specific motives 
that are then tied to underlying attitudes toward the larger world (Burke, 1969, 20). 
Within this context, editorial cartoons are an example of how genre becomes a site of 
negotiation between private and public motives or attitudes. This can be seen by the 
relative autonomy of the individual cartoonist with regard to choices of subject matter 
and visual style compared to certain generic constraints, regarding the overall expres-
sions of social attitudes that mark the genre (Jamieson, 1975; Plug, 2013). Several 
scholars note the absurdity and caustic tone often associated with satirical cartoons. 
Indeed, one should not forget nor underestimate the “punch” in punchline, when 
dealing with editorial cartoons. The humor of satirical depiction is not only directed 
at a specified target, but also expresses specific attitudes towards said target. Geipel 
notes that an editorial cartoon acts as “a potent weapon of ridicule, ideal for deflating 
the pompous and the overbearing, exposing injustice and deriding hypocrisy” (1972, 
10). Despite their seemingly innocent humor, editorial cartoons thus exhibit attitudes 
of suspicion and social indignation both towards the satirical target and the larger 
social system. There seems to be an overall agreement between scholars that editorial 
cartoons are marked by an underlying motive of challenging the status quo (Lamb, 
2004, 41; Walker, 2003, 10; Barshay, 1977, 57). Indeed, social critique and attacks on 
established political figures, tribes or discourses may take precedence over witticism 
as a defining characteristic of the genre.
The tendency in editorial cartoons of mixing humorous caricature with caustic 
satire of power and hypocrisy illustrates how humor can perform a social regulatory 
function. According to Billig (2005) “Everyday codes of behaviour are protected by the 
practice of embarrassment. If one infringes expected codes of interaction, particu-
larly if one does so unwittingly, one might expect to be embarrassed” (201). Editorial 
cartoons as well as other types of satire (for example news satire) fulfill exactly this 
social action of pointing out transgressions against codes of conduct and by expos-
ing the hypocrisy of named persons or groups in power. Inducing laughter is thus not 
an innocent goal, but a key rhetorical strategy. This can be seen in the reliance on 
caricature as a mode of expression, as it relates the physical features of the satirical 
target to the nature of their transgression. Drawing George W. Bush as a big-eared 
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school boy, which many cartoonists were wont to do, was as much a comment on his 
perceived ineptness as on his appearance. The limits of acceptability of such prac-
tices are dictated by the social context – satire may therefore struggle against either 
long or short term “humor regimes” that implicitly regulate who can joke about what 
(Kuipers, 2011). For example, some cartoonists deliberately chose not to make fun 
of George W. Bush during the time immediately after 9/11, and those that did were 
heavily criticized (Lamb, 2004).
Like any other genre, cartoons are context-dependent in the sense that they use 
a specific political context surrounding a person or issue as the basis for their depic-
tions. Their material is often drawn from current political news or by caricaturing the 
powerful individuals of their time, as “the political regime provides a media context” 
(Walker, 2003, 18). However, just as editorial cartoons make use of specific contexts 
in their depictions, they also rely on their readers’ implied genre knowledge. Indeed, 
satirizing of a person or issue often takes the form of referencing or spoofing another 
genre such as the State of the Union address, a press conference or a marriage cer-
emony. An example of this is the opening example of Pett’s cartoon about COP15. Few 
of us have ever been to a general assembly in the UN, but those of us, who follow the 
news, will have some sense of what it looks like, how it is conducted, and what is to 
be expected or accomplished. The satirized context of a UN general assembly in the 
cartoon thereby makes sense to readers, allowing them to get the joke. As readers 
we know such things, because the interpretive tactics associated with genre knowl-
edge are tacit and relational (Miller, 1984, 155; Auken, 2018, 20). Editorial cartoons are 
thus not isolated from other genres, but rather co-exist with them both discursively 
(through the depiction of other genres) and physically (on the editorial page of a 
newspaper). This, however, should not be seen as a classical uptake, but rather as an 
altogether looser intertextual relationship, illustrating how genres intermingle and 
influence each other (Freadman, 2002; Spinuzzi & Zachry, 2000; Swales, 1990, 47).
This intermingling also illustrates another point about contemporary satire – 
namely that it often plays on a notion of “getting it”. A joke is partly constructed as 
an appeal to a certain set of attitudes or a specific sense of humor. Getting the joke 
thereby presupposes a shared sense of community – or perhaps satirical collusion 
against those in power (Day, 2011, 148). However, this type of social function cannot 
come to bear without the specific satirical work being situated within a social or 
political context. Editorial cartoons therefore build on known issues and pre-existing 
images, for instance from popular culture, in their depiction of what or who is being 
satirized – examples of this range from imagery of The Terminator to the use of the 
famous drawing of the march of human evolution (Grofman, 1989; Baumgartner, 
2008).
The fact that editorial cartoons borrow images from popular culture is fitting, 
considering that the genre itself is a part of popular culture. According to Walker 
(2003), “editorial cartoons are encyclopedias of popular culture” (19). Walker further 
argues that “the humorous intervention of a political cartoon does ultimately contrib-
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ute to the accumulation of information and formulation of public opinion” (16). While 
the genre may serve important communal functions in this sense (Miller, 1994), one 
may question the assumption of the interventionist potential of editorial cartoons, 
as studies show that it is hard to measure if a particular cartoon made a difference 
in relation to a specific issue. While editorial cartoons may affect political attitudes, 
their broader influence on the direction of public opinion seems to be limited (Lamb, 
2004, 25; Baumgartner, 2008, 737). The reason for this may be that satirical cartoons 
are inherently polysemic. The importance of “getting it” rests not only on the social 
motive of the genre, but also on the fact that people may have different readings of a 
particular cartoon or not share its specific sense of humor – this would explain the 
continued potential for causing outrage (Powell, 1977; Walker, 2003; Lamb, 2004). 
Most satire, including editorial cartoons, fall under this category of everyday 
rhetoric that people encounter in situations that are not necessarily themselves 
politicized (for example when reading the paper, browsing the internet or relaxing 
in front of the TV). Despite an honest intention of going against the status quo, it 
would be a stretch to say that editorial cartoons have the power to actually change it. 
A reason for this is that while they may provide laughs and scoffs, they rarely present 
an alternative to the status quo – in fact, they are dependent on systems of media 
circulation that are very much part of it. This is not to say that the editorial cartoon as 
a genre is less rhetorical or important, far from it. According to Brummett (1991) this 
type of quotidian rhetoric, in reality, is vital for shaping and reaffirming our values 
and attitudes towards the social structures we encounter in our everyday lives (43). 
This function also relates to the polysemic nature of such rhetoric as it may invite dif-
ferent readings, trigger different values or be adopted in different ways by different 
people. Editorial cartoons are neither specific political interventions nor just enter-
tainment, but rather a way to socialize people, shaping political attitudes and beliefs 
(Baumgartner, 2008, 736).
Working with cartoons calls for an appreciation of their formal and artistic merits. 
It may be problematic to talk about a common style with regard to editorial cartoons, 
as drawings may range from sloppily to meticulously drawn, containing only few 
lines or a detailed illustration. However, certain shared strategies remain. Geipel, for 
instance, notes that cartoons exhibit “a deceptively naïve – sometimes even banal – 
exterior that is merely a camouflage for ideas and opinions that are not necessarily 
the least flippant” (1972, 10). While the underlying motives or intentions behind a 
cartoon may not be simple, it is a common trait (or even demand) of the genre that 
the depiction of the subject matter be relatively simplistic and straightforward. This 
simplicity acts as a strategic masking of motive. Editorial cartoons thus often rely on 
playfulness, references to popular imagery as well as deliberate displays of vulgarity, 
irony and sarcasm. They depict and reimagine imaginary scenes that both summarize 
and satirize a political figure or issue, and in doing so “their recontextualization of 
events evokes reference points in a way that a photo cannot” (Walker, 2003, 19).
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Indeed, the fact that these images are drawn or painted allows for a series of 
depiction strategies that are not available to other visual genres normally connected 
with journalistic and political contexts. As previously noted, one of the main devices 
of editorial cartoons is the use of caricature. Political cartoons exploit recognition of 
political brands (be they personal or party brands) by focusing on the most obvious 
and grotesque traits of their target. Barshay describes this operation as distortion 
through incongruity (1977, 58). The image presented through a political cartoon is not 
only distorted, but presents clear incongruities to reality as well as audience expecta-
tions. In other words, editorial cartoons employ different levels of hyperbole in order 
to create this distortion.
As part of a larger visual culture cartoons employ a range of classic rhetorical 
figures such as metaphor, analogy, synecdoche, allusion and puns (Grofman, 1989, 
170). These tropes play on a mix of text and image, as one often finds explanatory 
texts in editorial cartoons that spell out the intended meaning of a given visual 
metaphor. This form is important for utilized visual metaphors to establish a clear 
link between the satirical depiction and its subject. In order to “get it” readers must 
unpack a set of condensed meanings within a single image in the way intended by 
the cartoonist. Given questions of polysemy and media literacy in general this can 
become problematic. However, the use of common rhetorical tropes means that car-
toons can formally tap into culturally familiar imagery and may even come to shape it. 
An example of this is the often-used images of the GOP elephant and the Democratic 
donkey, both of which originally hail from an editorial cartoon (Geipel, 1972, 29). Such 
relations between the form and function are particularly interesting in the context of 
this volume, as they indicate how the complexities of climate change can be effec-
tively framed and condensed visually.
7.3  Categories of Climate Change Arguments in Editorial Cartoons
Launching an inquiry into how both the climate change debate and climate change 
itself is represented visually and argumentatively in editorial cartoons requires not 
only close analysis, but also a broader scrutiny of the genre itself. This means that 
while we will still be working with cartoons within an overall hermeneutic critical 
framework in later parts of this article, we initially began our inquiry by assembling a 
larger corpus of texts. In doing so, we decided to use Google algorithms to find Ameri-
can editorial cartoons that in some way depict climate change. This national focus 
allowed us to better direct the search for material. However, as American news and 
popular culture is broadly disseminated globally (no less so because of the internet), 
we consider the delimitation of nationality imposed on the material to still have rel-
evance to other national contexts.
In working with the Google algorithm, we used searches based on winners of the 
Pulitzer Prize for Editorial Cartooning from the last twenty years as a starting point. 
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Previous winners – such as Clay Bennett (2002), David Horsey (2003), Nick Ander-
son (2005), Mike Luckovich (2006), Michael Ramirez (2008), and Steve Zack (2013) 
– have made several cartoons about climate change. The Google algorithm provides 
suggestions for similar images based on linguistic, visual, and thematic parities. This 
means that the images collected through this function of searches stayed roughly 
within the parameters of our original inquiry. In addition to this we chose to supple-
ment the initial search with a purposefully broad search using only the words “edito-
rial cartoon” and “climate”. These searches combined created a corpus of well over 
four hundred editorial cartoons spanning a twenty-year period. After removing all 
cartoons from other English-speaking countries (mainly Australia and Canada), the 
final corpus consisted of 398 cartoons, all of which in some way depict either climate 
change itself or positions in the overall debate.
In the process of collecting material for the corpus, it was clear that there are 
several ways to sort and categorize the large number of cartoons. We chose to conduct 
this process inductively in order to ensure that pre-made categories would not influ-
ence the initial gathering and brief analytical work with the texts in the corpus. After 
the corpus was fully collected, we first sorted the collected cartoons in categories of 
visual themes such as caricatures of climate change deniers and cartoons containing 
polar bears. Based on Miller’s definition of genre and the genre description above we 
reworked these looser categories based on the notion that editorial cartoons contain 
visual argumentation. A new set of categories was constructed based on different 
arguments, relating to climate change, that were repeatedly presented in the texts of 
the corpus by means of the generic resources inherent to the genre.
Category: Number of items in 
corpus:
Argument:
Consequences 170 Presents the consequences of not acting to 
stop climate change
Capitalism 34 Criticizes the role of the capitalist system in 
relation to climate change
Ridiculing the Deniers 101 Ridicules the arguments of denial and the 
people who use them
Against  
Climate Activism 
30 Ridicules climate science, environmenta-
lists, and left-wing politicians
Context specific 58 Depicts climate change topics in relation to 
specific (short lived) political contexts
Other 5
Fig. 1: Categories of arguments in cartoons on climate change.
The categories (see figure 1) present broad but distinct arguments. Each category thus 
includes a variety in themes and expressions. However, every member of a category 
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contains the same specific argumentative function. These functions may relate to dif-
ferent means of satirical argumentation as governed by the overall social motive of 
the genre. Thus, we argue that there is a clear difference in the specific arguments 
put forth. However, these differences do not constitute subgenres, as they are unique 
to individual cartoons. The first category, “Consequences”, contains different depic-
tions of either short term or long-term climate futures. Often cartoons in this category 
will focus on how dire consequences such as drought, sea level rise, and hurricanes 
may affect people’s everyday lives. The second category, “Capitalism”, is focused on 
criticism of a larger capitalist system that fuels climate change. The cartoons in this 
category often feature caricatures that stand in for economic, corporate or other sys-
temic actors. Linking to this, the third category is named “Ridiculing the Deniers”. 
This category focusses on ridiculing the arguments of denial and those who propa-
gate them.
Not all editorial cartoons, however, champion climate action. A smaller group 
of cartoons in the corpus falls under the fourth category “Against Climate Activism”. 
These cartoons question the validity of climate science and poke fun at the actions of 
environmentalists and left-wing politicians.
The last two categories collect cartoons that do not fit into the other categories. 
The “Context Specific” category collects cartoons that may have widely different argu-
ments, but relate to very specific and at times short-lived contexts. An example of 
this is the Papal Encyclical on Climate Change from 2015, which spawned numer-
ous cartoons at the time. Other examples are cartoons about specific events at UN 
Climate Summits. While the themes and arguments put forth differ, all of the car-
toons in this category illustrate how editorial cartoons may use particular contexts as 
subject matter. The category “Other”, which contains only five cartoons, is made up of 
outliers that did not fit into any of the other categories. The cartoons in this category 
do not present as clearly defined arguments compared to the rest of the corpus. The 
following sections will feature analyses of selected examples from these categories 
in order to address how different arguments about climate change appear in satirical 
cartooning.
7.4  Consequences
The climate debate abounds with more or less apocalyptic descriptions of different 
future scenarios (Nielsen, 2017, 87). This too is a theme in many editorial cartoons. 
Common imagery used for this are scorched human remains or images of flooding, 
but the genre also provides more original and ingenious ways of depicting climate 
change catastrophe. An example of this is a 2013 cartoon by Clay Bennett for the Chat-
tanooga Times Free Press, in which Earth is depicted as a round charcoal grill floating 
through space. On one of the wheels of this Earth-grill the words “climate change” 
are where the brand of the producer would normally be (Bennett, 2013). This drawing 
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provides a simple yet effective visual metaphor for climate change, implicitly arguing 
that by not tackling climate change, we are basically cooking ourselves. Visually the 
comic creates a specific lens or framing. The Earth-grill is in focus, vibrant in color as 
well as placed in the center of the image, whereas the moon and the cosmos are muted 
and blurry. There is no question which elements in the cartoon should be attributed 
importance and meaning. Cartoons like Bennett’s do not contain a visualized target 
for satire. Instead, it directs its argument to the audience by means of easily under-
stood hyperbole. In doing so, the cartoon encourages people to contemplate possible 
climate futures (that are perhaps more realistic, but nonetheless frightening).
Another way of achieving such reflections by the audience is to make the conse-
quences of climate change remain implicit. In a cartoon from 2014 (syndicated through 
Tribune Media) Drew Sheneman depicts not climate change itself, but rather one of 
the commonly used symbols of global warming – the penguin. The cartoon presents 
a waddle of penguins standing on an ice floe, one penguin placed above the rest. 
With its one wing raised this penguin proclaims, “The ice is melting. Sea level rise is 
inevitable and the humans refuse to act! Prepare yourselves, the age of the penguin 
begins now” (Sheneman, 2014). Sheneman draws on the association between arctic 
animals, such as penguins and polar bears, and climate change. However, by letting 
the penguins themselves note the inaction of the human race, the cartoon relocates 
the penguins from a role of climate victims to that of future conquerors. The pose of 
the lead penguin (one wing raised and beak held high) mirrors a classic pose often 
associated with revolutionary figures and political firebrands. The cartoon thus draws 
on the incongruity between the typical image of penguins as cute and clumsy animals 
and the anthropomorphized penguins, here espousing an animal uprising – much of 
the humor lies in this playful discrepancy. However, this incongruity may provide a 
point of departure for thinking about or discussing actual human inaction on climate 
change.
Alex Gregory draws a scene in a 2016 cartoon for The New Yorker which employs 
a very different satiric strategy. The drawing contains a father standing on a veranda 
by the sea with his arm around the shoulder of his young son. This image depicts the 
idyllic and generic scene of a “father and son moment”. This generic scene does not 
in itself have any specific connotations to climate change. However, the text at the 
bottom of the cartoon, relaying the father's words, reads “someday, son, all of this will 
be yours – and under water” (Gregory, 2016). By adding this text Gregory transforms 
the scene from an everyday gesture to a social commentary that uses a central trope 
from the overall climate change debate – that of the fate of future generations. The 
image itself is simple and eschews the type of visual hyperbole that is common to edi-
torial cartoons. Combined with the dash in the text, which relays the pause before the 
topic of the cartoon is actually revealed to be climate change, the stylistic simplicity 
makes the implicit argument subtle yet evocative. Indeed, the fact that the punchline 
about climate change is presented as almost an afterthought that somewhat negates 
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the father’s previous statement, provides the kind of satirical incongruity that pres-
ents an implicit argument about climate change and its consequences.
Any genre will exhibit an interrelated play between genre norms and individual 
variations (Auken 2018, 17-18), and this too is true for editorial cartoons. The depic-
tions of consequences of climate change vary greatly, but utilize strategies that are 
common to the genre, such as visual metaphor, incongruent figures, and constructing 
jokes based on interplay between text and image. Another common trait of these car-
toons – as well as this category in general – is the lack of a specified satirical target. 
The cartoons do not feature any named person, brand or political operative. Instead, 
as Lamb explains the humor is directed at larger inaction and in the end toward the 
reader herself (2004, 23). Therefore, the depictions should be seen in light of the 
generic motive of questioning the status quo. By deliberately playing on the absurdity 
of the depicted climate change scenarios, editorial cartoons encourage the reader to 
contemplate both the larger issue and her role in it. Especially cartoons such as those 
by Bennett and Sheneman hint at a specific agency involved in the issue – a grill 
implies a cook and the penguins are mobilizing due to human inaction. Gregory’s 
cartoon, on the other hand, works as a commentary on the inevitability of climate 
change impact. While it does not provide clear hints of agency, its subtle humor indi-
cates that neither should it be read as entirely fatalistic.
The cartoons that focus on future impact often find their material in widely cir-
culated ideas or imagery of climate change in public culture. There is nothing origi-
nal in the metaphor of humans “cooking” the Earth, penguins as mascots for climate 
change, or a scene involving a “father and son moment”. Indeed, these are all part 
of a cultural stock of metaphors, images and plots that are readily available to both 
artists and audiences within a Western cultural context. While such popular imagery 
is common in editorial cartoons, here it becomes central to the depiction. The com-
plexity of climate change means that the issue becomes hard to delineate in a single 
image. Thus, the cartoonist needs common visual tropes in order to reduce this com-
plexity as well as to construct the punchline of the joke. There are a few exceptions to 
this. For instance, Matt Wuerker at Politico used the Trump governments axing of envi-
ronmental regulations in 2017 as a context for satirically depicting the consequences 
of climate change and air pollution (Wuerker, 2017). However, they are few and far 
between. The consequences of climate change are so far-reaching and complex that 
it becomes hard to delineate specific events or persons, when tackling the overall 
issue. In framing the consequences of climate change, editorial cartoons thus tend to 
seek absurdity in the depictions of the scenarios themselves, providing another more 
subtle way of pointing out shared environmental transgressions.
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7.5  Capitalism
Climate change is by nature a systemic issue that is closely tied to the ways in which 
human industrial societies have been organized. This means that the very status 
quo of the social system is one of complicity or at least responsibility in relation to 
the issue, making it ripe for the type of criticism or ridicule that editorial cartoons 
are known for as a genre. Although cartoons in the category “Capitalism” may still 
portray the consequences of climate change, their focus is not on specific scenarios, 
but rather on assigning blame by highlighting the capitalist system and its actors.
In a cartoon from 2011 (syndicated through Hearst Newspapers) David Horsey creates 
an over the top scenery of climate change. The cartoon depicts a large river, which is 
actually a flood, as it is seen submerging roads, a farmhouse, and perplexed livestock. 
In the background, a large tornado looms, connecting to dark skies above. In the fore-
ground, two men of different stature float down-water. The first man is thin and floats 
in a life preserver, while casting a frightened look over his shoulder at the tornado 
that is blowing at his hair and tie. The word “Government” is written on the life pre-
server. The other man is sitting comfortably and smiling in a boat, reading a stack of 
papers, whilst raising a glass of champagne in one hand. On the side of the boat the 
words “Energy Industry” is written. The man symbolizing the government exclaims, 
“Killer tornadoes! Epic floods! Rising Sea Levels! You told me climate change wasn’t 
real!”, to which this the man symbolizing the energy industry replies, “Senator, the 
only thing that is really real: my epic, rising profit margin!” (Horsey, 2011). 
A lot is happening in Horsey’s cartoon. However, the different elements combine 
to construct an argument that not only presents consequences of climate change, but 
also places responsibility for these squarely on industry greed, as well as on industry 
influence over the political system. The claim that the cartoon presents is that the 
energy industry (i.e. the fossil fuel industry) has hoodwinked the American govern-
ment by playing down the consequences of climate change in order to perpetuate a 
business-as-usual approach. The energy industry is thus more concerned with profit 
than with the well-being of the country, whereas the government is hapless and naïve. 
The posture and facial expressions of the two metaphorical figures in the image hint 
at this. That the energy industry portrayed in the comic should actually be read as the 
fossil fuel industry is further indicated by Horsey’s choice of color scheme, which is 
mainly kept in shades of brown and grey. The sky is thus dark and ominous, resem-
bling the smog of smoke stacks as much as mere clouds. The grass is a pale shade of 
golden brown, giving it a wilted hue. Finally, the water on which the men are floating 
is grey-brown, creating associations with pollution. Neither the claim nor its visual 
presentation is subtle. Instead, Horsey’s cartoon brings to mind the many descrip-
tions of editorial cartoons as an attack genre or weaponized satire.
Mike Luckovich likewise skewers the energy industry in a 2006 cartoon for the 
Atlantic Journal Constitution, albeit less explicitly than Horsey. The drawing is in black 
and white, and shows two polar bears treading water with just their necks above the 
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water line. Beneath them fish are swimming, and in the far-off distance a third polar 
bear is looking at them dejectedly, whilst sitting on a chunk of ice. The first (leftmost) 
polar bear shows an affable expression as it says to its companion, “As a spokesman 
for Big Oil, I’m still not convinced that this is related to global warming” (Luckovich, 
2006). The other polar bear does not answer, but simply looks bewildered. Luckovich 
establishes a satirical incongruity in the combination of text and image. The image 
itself shows the polar bear – a prominent figure in climate change discourse – but 
does not present a clear argument or point. Instead, the punchline is provided by 
the speech balloon. The puzzled and exasperated expression of the other polar bear 
connects the two modalities into a punchline about the fervent denial of climate 
change even in the face of overwhelming evidence. It suggests the incongruity of the 
statement with reality, mirroring the type of reaction from readers that the cartoon is 
clearly aiming at. 
An editorial cartoon like this might also fit under the category of “Climate Change 
Deniers”. However, the understanding needed to “get” the joke or argument relies 
on the identification of the polar being a Big Oil spokesperson. This can indirectly 
be read as a point about the average climate denier being able to change, when pre-
sented with overwhelming evidence, whereas agents of capitalism do not have the 
incentive to do this. Thus, Luckovich’s cartoon employs an incongruous depiction of 
already established climate imagery, presenting an indictment of industry interests 
rather than of climate change deniers in general.
A common trait of cartoons in this category is the specific criticism of capitalist 
interests. However, the charges levelled rarely point out specific people, except for a 
few politicians that aid these interests, but instead use metaphorical representations 
of the fossil fuel industry as a unified monolithic entity or actor. This amalgamation 
and embodiment of companies and lobby groups into particular figures is a rhetorical 
strategy often seen in editorial cartoons, as it allows cartoonists to attack a diverse 
group of culprits (or the very system itself) through a single image.
7.6  Ridiculing the Deniers
The cartoons in this category overwhelmingly ridicule those who do not believe in 
manmade climate change. The argument here is often located in the absurdity of the 
politicians’ or everyman’s denial in the face of evidence. The humor thus relies on 
an implicit understanding between the reader and the cartoon. As described earlier, 
editorial cartoons are examples of quotidian rhetoric. They function not to convert 
people, but rather partly shape or perpetuate social, political and cultural attitudes, 
creating common ground with the reader.
In a 2012 cartoon for the Los Angeles Times, David Horsey presents a typical 
theme from this category. A farmer placed by his field of dying corn crops in a desolate 
rural wasteland under orange colored skies. Next to him is an ostrich with its head in 
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the sand. The farmer is portrayed as an example of someone who previously denied 
climate changes, voted republican, but is beginning to realize the facts. Drought has 
killed his crops, and now even people like him have to feel convinced by the reality of 
global warming. The ostrich represents the Republican Party who continues to ignore 
the reality, and even tries to withhold knowledge from the farmer (Horsey, 2012).
The ostrich with its head buried in the ground is an often-used visual trope in 
American editorial cartoons, but it has a different function than the previously men-
tioned animal stand-ins. Whereas the elephant and the donkey have come to rep-
resent the Republican and Democratic parties respectively, the ostrich can portray 
either side as well as specific political figures. Actual ostriches do not bury their heads 
in the ground. However, the concept is publically accepted as a metaphor for denial, 
and can therefore serve as a strategic depiction within the genre. The ostrich is yet 
another example of distortion through incongruity. As a satirical cartoon, Horsey’s 
drawing works out of context exactly because of the absurd representation of an 
ostrich arguing against climate change. However, as opposed to the cartoons in the 
“Consequences” category, cartoons in this category draw more on specific historical, 
political, and material contexts. First and foremost, the reader must agree with the 
artist that climate change is real and denial is ridiculous or even dangerous. However, 
the context of Horsey’s cartoon stretches beyond political orientation, as it actually 
depicts the big American drought of 2012. In addition to its severity, the drought of 
2012 was characterized by a rather slow recognition of the calamity by political actors. 
Notably, the grains flourished in the early heat, but ended up diminished by more 
than 25% in the US in general (Rippey, 2015). Viewing the cartoon in this specific 
context imbues the depicted farmer and his corn with added meanings. In addition, 
the ostrich metaphor becomes a satirical (if still scathing) comment on the initial 
disregard of the drought from politicians and farmers alike. By combining the stock 
metaphor of the ostrich (representing the GOP) and the more context-specific farmer 
at this moment in time, the cartoon ridicules both of them, but also creates common 
political ground between the cartoon and liberal readers.
Horsey’s cartoon is an example of the way in which American editorial cartoons 
often operate on two levels. On one hand, they must be relatable and funny for larger 
uninitiated audience. This becomes more important with the rise of online circulation 
of cartoons. On the other hand, they usually utilize the specific context of the news 
outlet, the current political situation, and specific ecological condition, as is the case 
of these particular cartoons.
The importance of the context of newspaper and political orientation is always at 
play, also in a 2010 cartoon by Clay Bennet from Chattanooga Times Free Press. This 
cartoon utilizes an often-seen caricature of the average person arguing against climate 
change through a limited logic of personal experience as opposed to scientific knowl-
edge. A man pauses while shoveling snow and remarks, “So, if this global warming 
hysteria is true, then what am I shoveling?” Underneath, it says, “don’t answer that” 
(Bennett, 2010). This cartoon is specifically interesting for our analysis in that it 
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only presents itself as ridiculing the climate change denier through the context. The 
written text outside of the frame shows only what is necessary to understand the joke, 
but in the cartoon itself, almost nothing denotes that this is not ridiculing the climate 
activists themselves. If the reader does not know the artist, the news outlet, and their 
political positions, the drawing could be taken as making the opposite argument of 
what is intended.
When examining how much of the joke and its implicit argument is founded in 
prior knowledge, and how much is located in the actual drawing, one need only look 
to the specific features of the man. Depicting the climate change denier with an overtly 
casual stature, a smirky smile, and one eyebrow raised, frames him as a sarcastic and 
annoying figure. This is the eyes of someone being extremely condescending, prompt-
ing readers to view him as an unsympathetic person. The text in the speech balloon 
in itself denotes nothing but a classical argument, put in a slightly sarcastic manner, 
but seen in relation to the man’s eyes, the cartoon reveals where its sympathies lie. By 
letting someone unsympathetic sarcastically deliver an argument, the cartoon turns 
the tables and ridicules exactly this type of argument. This type of ridicule, however, 
only works by eliciting casual agreement and cooperation from the reader in decod-
ing the satirical message.
In the case of the “Ridiculing the Deniers” category, the cartoons of the corpus 
illustrate that editorial cartoons are, indeed, an attack genre, relentlessly exposing 
and making fun of their target. The kind of ridicule put forth here is directed against 
both the arguments of climate change denial and deniers as a group. However, this 
seems to depend on constructing visual jokes that connects to already held beliefs 
in certain readers (to the exclusion of others). In the age of internet, it becomes vital 
to remember that these types of cartoons usually also have a political, historical and 
geographical context that is essential fully understand the argument – and to get the 
joke. 
7.6.1  Against Climate Activism
In many respects, this last category is the same as the above one, but inversely so. 
Here, the argument about the climate change deniers turns against climate change 
activists, left wing politicians, and climate scientists. The first example by Rick McKee 
in The Augusta Chronicle (2015) – a conservative newspaper from Georgia – works 
with the same motifs as other cartoons (from climate change proponents) such as 
the penguin and the melting ice caps. In the cartoon, a penguin is staring at a frozen 
climate activist with a sign that says, “Help stop Antarctica’s shrinking ice” (McKee, 
2015). With his long beard and desperate eyes, the frozen activist is the marked target 
of ridicule, and the irony is guiding the argument – the ice is not really shrinking, 
but quite the opposite. As in the above category, there is a negotiation between the 
general joke and the context specificity. On one hand, the humorous argument lies in 
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the ironic discrepancy of the ridiculous frozen activist and the staring (and thriving) 
penguin. On the other hand, there is a specific scientific context for this ridiculing. 
In November of the same year, NASA published a study, claiming that the Antarctic 
ice sheet is actually growing in size (Viñas, 2015). The study was (and still is) widely 
contested, as climate scientists disagree with its methods as well as its conclusion 
(Howard, 2015). 
Based on McKees representation of the issue in the cartoon, the contestation 
and larger technical debate about the NASA study seem to be of little interest to the 
general reader of The Augusta Chronicle. In the companion article to the cartoon, the 
newspaper never put forward the news as a dispute per se, but rather as further evi-
dence that climate scientists are wrong and that president Obama was jeopardizing 
the American economy with his climate concerns. Even though the presented joke 
of the frozen activist does work by itself to this day, it does require a specific social 
context to have all of its layers of meaning made explicit. 
In addition to ridiculing climate activist, another common argument in this cat-
egory has to do with the (possible) corruptness of climate science. The argument here 
is often that scientists manufacture scientific results in order to get more money. An 
example of this is a cartoon by Branco also from 2015 (syndicated through the conser-
vative media company Liberty alliance), in which Obama (with his eyes closed) pres-
ents a large bag of money to a scientist. The scientist's eyes are replaced with dollar 
signs behind his glasses. On his arm it says, “the 95%” (Branco, 2015). The argument 
is clearly that the majority of scientists are greedy and corrupt, and yet again Obama 
is a fool for giving money to them.
Many of the same points can be made as in the above analysis about how this 
argument functions and is presented. However, one specific questions spring to 
mind, regarding Branco’s cartoon. What does the form and style of the drawing matter 
to the function and the aesthetics of the cartoon? The American editorial cartoon as 
a genre utilizes standardized visual metaphors, underlining arguments through the 
combination of text and image. There is, however, still room left for style and form to 
contribute to the function as well as the general aesthetic of the cartoons, extending 
the cultural stock of images at their disposal. This is also evident in some of the previ-
ously mentioned cartoons in other categories. 
In this particular cartoon, the eyes play an important role again. Obama closes 
his eyes, ignoring reality (i.e. that climate change is a hoax), and the scientist’s eyes 
are pure dollar signs. Which is worse – the greedy scientist or the president giving the 
incentive? The cartoon presents both as corrupt and evil, but the scientist is especially 
interesting to our particular enquiry. The argument of “the 95%” relies on a demo-
cratic idea. If 95% of climate scientists, stemming from widely different disciplines, 
cultures and countries, agree, it by definition becomes hard to accuse the entire group 
of corruption – if nothing else then because of the sheer complexity of backgrounds. 
Branco, in his cartoon, turns the argument upside down by creating a single scientist 
figure as a sort of metonymical replacement for all the climate change proponents. 
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Metonymy is, of course, a classical satirical figure, which is also seen in other cartoon 
representations (for instance of industry actors). However, Branco’s use of the figure 
underpins the argument or indictment against the majority, put forth by the cartoon. 
One person can easily be corrupted, and he can be portrayed as a specific caricature 
with the greedy eyes, bared teeth, and a droopy panting tongue. The text on the sci-
entist’s arm is the only thing telling readers that he actually represents (almost) all 
of climate science as a whole. However, the text also designates the figure as not just 
a representative of climate scientists, but rather as an embodiment of the majority 
that Branco indicts with fraudulent behavior. By using this caricatured metonymical 
figure, the cartoon works around the argumentative problem of refutations and rein-
forces the political positions of both the cartoonist and the reader. 
7.7  Satirical Functions and Climate Change
By now, it should be clear that there is no one way of depicting or arguing about 
climate change. Instead, our corpus and the chosen examples illustrate a plethora of 
ways, in which climate change may be presented. In this chapter, we have distilled 
the overall variety into a series of main categories that collect differing visual repre-
sentations of climate change within an argumentative perspective. It is important to 
note here that context figures as a main element across the different categories. This 
applies both to political and social contexts as well as to the media context (online or 
a physical newspaper), in which the cartoon itself is encountered. In this sense, edi-
torial cartoons as a rhetorical genre differs from more literary forms of cartoons such 
as the comic strip, which relies more on formally aesthetic expressions rather than 
social context. Groensteen, for instance, notes that single image cartoons work not 
through aesthetic narrativization, rhythm, and payoff, but rather through the invoca-
tion of a specific story or outside context (2013, 23). 
Similar divisions between the aesthetic and the rhetorical exist within genre 
theory, as rhetorical genres often seem rooted in function rather than literary or aes-
thetic sensibility (Devitt, 2000, 698; see also Devitt, 2004). Despite the possible con-
textual constraints of editorial cartoons, differences in types of contexts do appear 
in relation to the issue of climate change. Whereas many cartoons relate to specific 
contexts such as new scientific studies or concrete drought conditions, other cartoons 
do not necessarily link their jokes to any specific event.1 Instead, they use the context 
of the overall debate as a point of departure by using already familiar imagery as the 
basis for metaphors or satirical hyperbole. Furthermore, the physical media context 
1  We purposefully chose to forego a separate analysis of the Context-Specific category, as this cat-
egory is too diverse in arguments and contexts to readily present a unified analysis. However, a lot of 
what can be said about this with regard to context has been covered elsewhere.
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of a given cartoon is important, because the political orientation of the newspaper, in 
which it appears, must be taken into account. As political polarization is a condition 
connected to media outlets and circulation, the political orientation of a given news-
paper or online news outlet dictates certain constraints that cannot but influence the 
tone of satirical cartoons and by extension how they represent the tone of the climate 
change debate. In relation to depictions of climate change our analyses illustrate how 
cartoonists attune their representation and style of jokes to their audience, accom-
modating overall social and political attitudes that one may assume is shared among 
the readers of that particular newspaper. Incorporating established attitudes, such 
as dismissals of climate science or suspicions toward the capitalist system, may help 
strengthen the argument of a cartoon as well as play a part in constructing the joke 
itself. For example, it would be easy to shrug at Gregory’s father and son scene from 
The New Yorker, if one did not already believe that climate change is happening.
However, this also reveals the limits of the genre. We have argued earlier that 
editorial cartoons must be viewed as quotidian rhetoric, in part because their material 
impact remains somewhat limited. Editorial cartoons thus come to embody a middle 
position, in which they are closely related to political culture in society, but function 
as a type of everyday rhetoric that contribute to the shaping of attitudes rather than 
sparking direct action. In relation to the climate change debate this certainly seems 
to be the case. The limitation of having a single image to present means that edito-
rial cartoons may be able to critique systemic issues, specific actors or simply human 
inaction, but they cannot provide suggestions for the solutions, ideals or scenarios 
needed to move forward. Looking to the examples from the analyses, it is striking that 
most if not all the cartoons in reality only address people, who already agree with the 
cartoonist on how to perceive the climate crisis. The functional focus is on reinforc-
ing existing worldviews – be they concerned over or skeptical of man-made climate 
change – rather than shaping new ones. While we do not deny that some people may 
be swayed by the argument of a cartoon, our examination of the larger corpus of edi-
torial cartoons on climate change shows a common tendency towards employing 
shared identifications with pre-existing positions. This, in turn, makes sense when 
looking at the high degree of polarization in the American climate change debate. As 
described earlier, the social functions of humor are often governed by implicit social 
humor regimes, dictating who can make fun of whom, and how this can be done. This 
means that polarization in the overall debate becomes a specific constraint that must 
at least partially be acknowledged, when satirizing the climate change issue.
Looking to Amy Devitt’s earlier chapter in this book, the treatment of climate 
change as both an issue and a specific debate by editorial cartoons can be described 
as “generic mindfulness”. Cartoonists choose to use the genre as a means to reflect or 
reinforce desired worldviews or attitudes. However, the focus on reinforcement also 
reflects the quotidian nature of this type of generic rhetoric. Editorial cartoons have 
interventional aspirations, but as a genre, it may be best to view them as motivational 
rather than interventional from an activist perspective. This does not mean that edi-
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torial cartoons are not contributing to the climate change issue. In fact, as Walker 
points out, editorial cartoons become cultural repositories that reflect the different 
positions, arguments, and schisms in the overall debate. While it is possible to ques-
tion the efficacy of editorial cartoons based on their ability to create agency for the 
reader, one must acknowledge their historical function of chronicling the develop-
ments of how society deals with and communicates about climate change as an issue.
Finally, the editorial cartoon genre also represents an important visual addition 
to the cultural repertoire that shapes how climate change is and can be represented. 
Frederick Buell (2010) has argued that even though people face environmental con-
straints as part of everyday life, these have not necessarily become salient for the 
broader public – especially when looking at the climate change debate. Julie Doyle 
(2011) levels a similar critique, and wonders why human beings have featured so little 
in the last two decades of climate change communication compared to graphs, maps, 
animals, and melting glaciers. Questioning the logic of this framing, Doyle argues 
that it has created a distance to the issue for many laypeople (32). However, as pointed 
out in the earlier analyses, editorial cartoons do not simply make use of cultural stock 
imagery of climate change, but rather extends it or turns it on its head. Indeed, this 
operation seems to be prerequisite for how the genre deals with such issues. The sce-
narios found in editorial cartoons gain rhetorical presence by employing absurdity to 
familiar representations, allowing for more accessible and compelling visualizations 
than can readily be achieved by still photography or computer-generated graphs. Fur-
thermore, editorial cartoons largely answer Doyle’s indictment by actually showing 
human beings in depictions of climate change. Although many human figures in the 
corpus are actually functioning amalgams of groups, this does not detract from the 
fact that human beings are conspicuously present in relation to the issue – much 
more so than in other prominent genres. Even the animals featured in editorial car-
toons are mostly anthropomorphized in order to deliver an essentially human reac-
tion or argument.
In a sense, one could argue that a prominent polemical genre, which is often how 
satirical cartoons have been described, is an odd or perhaps even counter-produc-
tive way to address climate change. By its very nature as satire and limited to only a 
single frame, a cartoon will always be unable to address the complexities inherent 
in this vast issue. As our analyses show, this is true for individual editorial cartoons. 
However, when looking beyond single texts and instead to the repeated addressing of 
climate change in the genre, a different pattern emerges. Indeed, the steady stream of 
cartoon depictions of climate change related issues form a mosaic – beyond any one 
cartoon – which summarizes a societal problem and its ensuing debates through a 
range of generic strategies, highlighting different positions, arguments, causalities, 
images and tropes. The image of the larger mosaic only becomes all the more perti-
nent to the climate change debate, when seen in relation to the circulation of editorial 
cartoons into the everyday practices (and thus attitudes) of readers. Scholars of edito-
rial cartoons are quick to emphasize that editorial cartoons are more than just visual 
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gags, and rightly so. On the other hand, perhaps the folly of humankind – the very 
reason for the current climate crisis – at times warrants an unflinchingly critical look 
and a whip of ridicule.
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8  “How to Turn Accumulated Knowledge into 
Action”: Uptake, Public Petitions, and the Climate 
Change Debate
Abstract: This chapter focuses on how the impasse between climate change evidence 
and the public’s acceptance of and action on climate change might be explained by 
an exploration of the concept of uptake in Rhetorical Genre Studies and by an explo-
ration of the public genres that participate in climate change activism. Attention to 
genre uptakes – to the interconnections, interplays, and transactions between genres 
– can enrich an understanding of genres as social actions by focusing attention on the 
factors (material, social, affective, embodied, and technological) that influence the 
mobilization of knowledge and action between and across genres. Focusing on the 
uptake of a particular public genre, the petition, and on the actions/interactions that 
take place between and around the act of petitioning, the chapter provides further 
insight into the forces that shape uptakes of petitions, particularly climate change 
petitions, and that limit and enable social action on climate change. An examination 
of petitions (and their uptakes) as complex sites of transaction can also draw atten-
tion to mobilizations and actions that may happen along the pathway to uptake and 
social action – mobilizations in process that can lead to interventions in the climate 
change debate.
8.1  Introduction
Uptake is first the taking of an object; it is not the causation of a response by an intention. (Fread-
man, 2002, 48)
In November 2017, at the end of what was widely regarded as a year of setbacks in 
US efforts and leadership to address climate change, and twenty-five years after the 
Union of Concerned Scientists issued the “World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity,” 
scientists from around the world published “World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity: 
A Second Notice” (Ripple et al). Appearing in the Viewpoints section of the December 
2017 issue of the journal BioScience and including 15,364 scientist signatories from 
184 countries, the article has since been endorsed by an additional 4,404 scientists on 
the Alliance of World Scientists’ website. The Alliance of World Scientists describes 
itself as 
a new international assembly of scientists, which is independent of both governmental and 
non-governmental organizations and corporations. We submit, that in order to prevent wides-
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pread misery caused by catastrophic damage to the biosphere, humanity must practice more 
environmentally sustainable alternatives to business-as-usual. Our vital importance and role 
comes from scientists’ unique responsibility as stewards of human knowledge and champions 
of evidence-based decision-making. The main goal of the AWS is to be a collective international 
voice of many scientists regarding global climate and environmental trends and how to turn 
accumulated knowledge into action. (Alliance of World Scientists, 2017)
Scientists’ near unanimous agreement about the fundamentals of climate change and 
steps needed to address it have been well-documented, but “how to turn accumulated 
knowledge into action” has been a source of frustration, enough so that world scien-
tists felt the urgent need to issue the “second notice” warning to humanity.
Recalling the 1992 world scientists’ warning that we cut greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and phase out fossil fuels, reduce deforestation, and reverse the trend of 
collapsing biodiversity or face “substantial and irreversible harm” to our biosphere, 
the authors and signatories of the Second Notice warn that since 1992, 
with the exception of stabilizing the stratospheric ozone layer, humanity has failed to make suf-
ficient progress in generally solving these foreseen environmental challenges, and alarmingly, 
most of them are getting far worse (…) Especially troubling is the current trajectory of potentially 
catastrophic climate change due to rising GHGs from burning fossil fuels (Hansen et al. 2013), 
deforestation (Keenan et al. 2015), and agricultural production – particularly from farming rumi-
nants for meat consumption (Ripple et al. 2014). Moreover, we have unleashed a mass extinction 
event, the sixth in roughly 540 million years, wherein many current life forms could be annihila-
ted or at least committed to extinction by the end of this century. (Ripple et al., 2017, 1026)
The authors and signatories conclude that, twenty-five years later, we have not 
heeded the first world scientists’ warning. “Soon,” they write, “it will be too late to 
shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out. We must recog-
nize, in our day-to-day lives and in our governing institutions, that Earth with all its 
life is our only home” (Ripple et al., 2017, 1028).
With so much at stake and what the editors of this volume describe as “the gap 
between the near-unanimous agreement in science about the basics of human made, 
or anthropogenic, climate change (ACC), and the widespread lack of acceptance of 
this agreement in the public sphere”. The Alliance of World Scientists’ question of 
“how to turn accumulated [scientific] knowledge into action” is more urgent than 
ever. To better understand the impasse between overwhelming scientific evidence of 
climate change and urgency/action on the part of citizens and political leaders, we 
will turn to genre and uptake and the role they play in the mobilization of knowledge, 
for as Amy Devitt argues in her contribution to this volume, genres matter for social 
action: “their conventions, norms, actions, systems, and potential invisibility direct 
the debate in sometimes unnoticed and sometimes unintentional ways” (add page 
#). In order to explore the ways genres direct the debate around climate change, we 
will begin by focusing on how the impasse between climate change evidence and 
the public’s acceptance of and action on climate change might be explained by an 
understanding of genre uptakes as complex sites of selection and genre performance 
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and by an exploration of the affective, social, and material factors that shape uptake. 
Understanding how genres and their uptakes direct rhetorical and social actions also 
reveals possibilities for intervening in and redirecting these actions. As a case study, 
we will examine the uptake of a particular public genre, the petition, with a focus 
on the affordances and constraints of petitioning and the relationship between what 
Dylan Dryer (2016) calls the “uptake affordances” of petitions (the opportunities or 
constraints that shape encounters with and uptakes of petitions) and the “uptake 
enactments” (the act of producing a response). As we examine this complicated rela-
tionship between rhetorical action and social change, we will draw on illustrations/
examples of climate change petitions, showing how a number of prior uptake strate-
gies historically connected to petitioning seem to resurface, reemerge, or recur in a 
contemporary context and remain integral to carrying out a petition’s actions. As we 
hope to show, attention to uptake’s complex relationship to genre can help explain 
how other forces intervene in and redirect rhetorical and social action at the same 
time as it draws attention to mobilizations and actions that may not be as apparent. 
Paying attention to the forces that shape genre uptakes can help us examine where 
breakdowns in the climate debate happen and how to intervene. 
In what follows, we begin by defining genre’s relationship to uptake and how 
attention to genre uptake can reveal the often invisble forces directing social action. 
From there, we will demonstrate uptake at work in the genre of the petition, with 
specific reference to climate change. As we hope to show, recognizing the complex 
uptakes surrounding petitioning reveals how genres can be used to intervene in and 
redirect climate change action.
8.2  Genre and Uptake
Since its beginnings, scholarship in Rhetorical Genre Studies (RGS)1 has been inter-
ested in the inter- and intra-generic relations that shape individuals’ genre perfor-
mances – what Anne Freadman (1994, 2002), extending J.L. Austin’s concept of 
uptake in speech act theory, has called genre uptakes. Attention to genre uptakes – 
to the interconnections, translations, and pathways between genres – enriches an 
understanding of genres as social actions at the core of RGS’ definition of genre. 
While genres orient us in relation to recurring situations and provide strategies for 
responding to and acting in situations, and while genres, as Dylan Dryer explains, 
“persist because they frame what they permit as that which is possible” (2008, 506), 
it is only in the uptakes they routinize (but never completely determine) that genres 
are performed – are taken up – as social actions.
1  See the groundbreaking work of Carolyn Miller, Charles Bazerman, Aviva Freedman and Peter Med-
way (1994), Amy Devitt, Catherine Schryer, David Russell, and Carol Berkenkotter.
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In How to Do Things with Words (1962), J.L. Austin briefly mentions the idea of 
uptake as a way to explain how illocutionary force becomes a perlocutionary effect 
– how, that is, an intentional utterance helps to produce an effect under certain con-
ditions. Within Austin’s theory of speech acts, uptake is offered as a fairly straightfor-
ward process, secured by the apprehension (and then translation) of an intended illo-
cutionary act. Freadman expanded and complicated Austin’s causal theory of uptake 
in order to account for the interplays and trans-actions between genres, and, in so 
doing, made uptake a core concept in genre research. As Freadman is careful to note, 
uptake does not depend on causation (as in a job advertisement causes a job applica-
tion) but rather on selection. Uptake, she explains, “selects, defines, or represents 
its object … This is the hidden dimension of the long, ramified, intertextual memory 
of uptake: the object is taken from a set of possibilities” (2002, 48). By shifting our 
attention from causation to selection, Freadman offers uptake as a complex site of 
transaction, one informed by historical, material, political, affective, socio-economic, 
and ideological forces. 
In Freadman’s formulation of the relationship between genre and uptake – a 
relationship that Freadman understands as fundamental to how we use genres and 
how genres operate – genres condition and secure uptakes (Freadman, 2002, 42). 
One of the ways that genres help us perform social actions is by directing rhetorical 
force, moving it in typified directions, at times formalized in what John Swales has 
called “genre chains” (2004), to secure certain uptakes. Sune Auken has described 
this relational interchange, in which the use of one genre in turn acts as an invitation 
or request for another genre, as “in effect taking part in a social perpetuum mobile” 
(2018, 19). In exploring the relationship between Swales’ concept of genre chains and 
Freadman’s concept of uptake, Auken notes how genre chains mobilize uptakes in 
fairly regularized, sequential ways in which each genre is an uptake of the former: “a 
genre chain is a formalized series of uptakes. Genre chains are bound; they move in 
a particular order, and relate to one another in a particular hierarchy” (20). However, 
outside of formalized genre chains (and even in some cases within them), uptakes are 
more dynamic and unpredictable. As Auken observes, “an uptake can easily follow a 
chain, but it can also deviate from, turn, or twist the purpose of the chain. Also, one 
may insert one or more new genres into the process in an attempt to achieve a desired 
purpose” (20).2
This is why, as Freadman demonstrates, uptakes are not simply the consequences 
of genres – the meeting of a genre expectation. Uptakes also depend on dynamic rela-
tions between genres that enable the movement of knowledge and actions across 
2  For more on the stability and variation inherent in the relationship between an utterance and its 
genre, and the role that generic structures play in the interpretation of works of literature, which has 
implications for understanding uptake, see Auken’s “Genre and Interpretation” (2015a) and “Utter-
ance and Function in Genre Studies: A Literary Perspective” (2015b).
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them. In the Prison Notebooks, Antonio Gramsci (1971) writes, “The starting-point of 
critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is ‘knowing thyself’ 
as a product of the historical processes to date, which has deposited in you an infin-
ity of traces, without leaving an inventory” (323). As it pertains to genre research and 
teaching, Gramsci’s critical elaboration points to the hidden dimension of uptake, 
which refers to the historical processes that stabilize relations and pathways between 
genres in ways that condition and secure, but never guarantee, certain effects. For 
example, as noted earlier, within speech act theory uptake refers to how an illocution-
ary act produces a perlocutionary effect – how, for instance, someone saying “it is hot 
in here” results in someone else, under certain conditions, opening a window. A set 
of relations has to exist in order for this uptake (this selection from a set of possibili-
ties) to happen: the speaker’s relation to others in the room; an interpretation of the 
utterance as referring to temperature and not, say, mood; a relationship between the 
location of a window and a person’s ability/authority to open it; etc. Uptake, as such, 
refers both to the effect and the set of relations that produce that effect. As Gramsci’s 
observation makes clear, though, the relations that inform our selection processes 
are often hidden. How to account for these relations when an inventory is not easily 
available is a major challenge uptake poses to the study of genre and its relationship 
to social action. And yet, we contend, critical attention to uptake relations provides 
valuable insight into how genres like the petition can be used to redirect public dis-
course around climate change.
Since first introducing the concept of uptake to genre research, Freadman’s work 
has consistently alerted us to the ways that genre uptakes are complex sites of trans-
action that challenge a view of genre mobilization as located in genre knowledge and 
as being synonymous with human agency and intentionality.3 For instance, in Fread-
man’s early definition of uptake as “the bidirectional relation that holds between” 
genres (Freadman, 2002, 40; emphasis added), the pivotal term holds suggests a 
relational force or interplay that operates between genres. Uptakes, Freadman’s 
definition suggests, are the result not of causation but of relation and selection – a 
set of relations that are held together in ways that make certain selections (and not 
others) possible and that as a result condition and secure certain outcomes (and not 
others). When studying uptake, then, we need to pay attention to the relations drawn, 
managed, and sponsored that enable the selection and taking up of knowledge and 
actions across genres, which enable and limit rhetorical and social movement. When 
Freadman writes that “uptake is first the taking of an object; it is not the causation of 
a response by an intention” (48), then, she refers to the relations between genres that 
uptakes hold and that make possible certain takings. These takings are not caused by 
genre but by the set of relations that hold between them. The seams between genres 
3  See “Uptake” (2002), The Machinery of Talk (2004), “The Trap and Trappings of Genre Theory” 
(2012), and “Where is the subject?” (2014).
that uptakes weave and “hold,” in other words, make movements and translations 
between and across genres possible. Uptake, then, is a vital part of genre knowledge, 
but because it takes place within a complex site of transaction, it also exceeds genre 
knowledge. 
As “the local event of crossing a boundary” (43), uptake draws our attention not 
only to the relations between genres but also to how individuals move and translate 
across genres. It is especially when they occur across intergeneric boundaries, Fread-
man notes, that uptake translations are “least automatic and most open to mistake 
or even to abuse” (44) since they are most subject to relations of power and other 
extra-textual forces, as in the case of translating scientific knowledge about climate 
change into public action. Certain routinized uptakes, especially within bounded 
and regulated institutional contexts, follow well-worn, expected directions and are 
thus habitually and predictably enacted. But when moving across generic fields, as 
is required when scientific knowledge gets translated to public actions, other uptake 
relations come into play and exert force on the relations between scientific knowledge 
and its public uptake, in ways that affect how science is taken up – that is, how sci-
entific knowledge is selected from a set of possibilities. What makes uptakes in this 
case especially interesting is that they compel us to pay attention to the extra-textual 
factors that inform genre performances, including the historical-material conditions 
and dynamics of agency and power that function between, hold together, and shape 
genre performances. As Freadman more recently put it:
No genre can do more than predict the kind of uptake that would make it happy, and no speaker 
or writer can completely secure an uptake. This is partly because no discursive event is a pure 
example of any genre, and partly because of the unpredictable historical complexity of its 
moment and its ongoing action. We cannot […] reflect productively on uptake outside of dis-
cussions of genre, nor is it productive to theorize the action of genres without uptake. Genre is 
destabilized by uptake even as it asserts its power. (2012, 560)
In short, uptake helps us understand how systemic, normalized relations between 
genres coordinate complex forms of social actions – how and why genres get taken 
up in certain ways and not others and what gets done and not done as a result. To 
study uptake, we need to pay attention to the spaces in between genres – the meso 
practices, interplays, transactions, and translations as well as the meta-genres 
(Giltrow, 2002) and intermediary genres (Tachino, 2012; 2016) that mobilize knowl-
edge and action between and across genres. Focusing on these trans spaces, genres, 
and actions draws our attention to the seam-work that holds genres together in order 
for knowledge to move across them: who and what sponsors, sanctions, and manages 
our ability and willingness to engage in genre transaction work, and to the forces that 
make movement across genres possible, including the affordances, systems of valu-
ation, materialities, embodiments, tools, media, technologies, and affective factors 
that authorize, manage, and sponsor the movement of knowledge across contexts 
and domains. Such a view of uptake can help explain why it can be so hard to turn 
155   “How to Turn Accumulated Knowledge into Action”
 Dimensions of Uptake in the Mobilization of Knowledge and Action   156
accumulated scientific knowledge into action, despite the mobilization of that knowl-
edge in various professional, public, and popular media genres. Trying to understand 
how and why accumulated scientific knowledge has not turned into action with the 
urgency it needs to requires us to understand the phenomenon of movement itself, 
especially the entangled relationship between the mobilization of scientific knowl-
edge and the material conditions, affective factors, and socioeconomic values that 
mediate it. Becoming mindful of this movement and its guiding forces, as Devitt, in 
this volume, argues, takes us a step closer towards making genres work for social 
action rather than only as social actions – in particular, making genres of the climate 
change debate work for transformative social action on climate change.
8.3  Dimensions of Uptake in the Mobilization of Knowledge and 
Action
In the previous section, we described how uptakes result from/are made possible 
through configured, normalized, and activated relations between genres – relations 
that shape what comes to matter and how it gets taken up as such. Karen Barad (2007) 
has explored the dynamic relationship between matter and meaning, arguing that 
“mattering is simultaneously a matter of substance and significance” (3). According 
to Barad, how something comes to matter (have substance) is entangled with how it 
is made significant. How an utterance such as “it is hot in here” comes to matter (have 
substance in the form of someone opening a window) depends on the significance 
accorded to it. Uptakes are, in part, how we recognize significance in one genre and 
take it up as substance. In this way, uptakes make genres matter. But this process 
of mattering, as we have described, is subject to forces greater than genre alone, no 
matter if genres seek to secure and condition certain uptakes. For example, in the 
case of the Alliance of World Scientists’ warning to humanity, what would make their 
Second Notice matter is if governmental agencies and the public take up their recom-
mendations. But for these recommendations to become substance, they first need to 
be made significant alongside or in relation to other kinds of significations, which 
exert their gravitational push and pull on how the Second Notice gets taken up.
Scholarly analyses of climate change skepticism have examined the economic, 
cultural, political, cognitive, sociological, and ideological influences on why individ-
uals remain skeptical of climate change (see Dunlap, 2013; Hamilton, 2010; Jacques, 
2006; Thompson, 2003; Whitmarsh, 2011). In their review of literature, Van Rensburg 
and Head (2017) note a prevailing research strand that identifies how “worldviews are 
acting indirectly, as background dispositions that are reinforced by various cognitive 
and psycho-sociological mechanisms” (3) to shape climate change denial. Van Rens-
burg and Head’s textual analysis of a well-known Australian climate change skep-
tic’s opinion pieces reveals, in addition, the discursive patterns and specific terms 
through which climate change skepticism circulates and is perpetuated. “We argue,” 
they conclude, “that examining the specific objections of sceptics is important for 
devising more effective responses. We argue that climate communicators and prac-
titioners should constructively, patiently, and persistently respond to sceptical criti-
cisms, instead of trying to starve sceptics of public exposure by refusing to engage 
them” (8). Such research provides insights into the competing forces that shape and 
limit the uptake of scientific knowledge about climate change, especially in regions 
where individuals perceive environmental regulations as a threat to their livelihoods, 
culture, and economy.4 
The entangled and at times competing forces that shape what comes to matter (to 
be made significant and come to have substance) in the taking up of genres requires 
closer scrutiny if we are to more fully understand how to turn accumulated scientific 
knowledge into action. In his recent chapter “Disambiguating Uptake: Toward a Tacti-
cal Research Agenda on Citizens’ Writing,” Dylan Dryer (2016) begins the process of 
identifying different elements involved in uptake as a phenomenon. Dryer identifies 
five elements in particular: uptake affordances, uptake artifacts, uptake enactments, 
uptake capture, and uptake residue. Uptake affordances refer to the conditions and 
invitations that facilitate an uptake – something that is offered to be taken up (65-68, 
70–71). By paying attention to uptake affordances, researchers are able to focus on “the 
opportunities and constraints in the conventions that precede and shape the uptake 
encounter” (70). Uptake artifacts refer to the texts or objects produced in response to 
other texts, the artifacts that result from an uptake (65, 71). Uptake enactments refer 
to the act of producing an utterance or text in response to uptake affordances – the 
performance or undertaking of an uptake (65, 70, 72, 74). Uptake capture refers to 
the cognitive or affective consequences of uptake, the way “repeated encounters with 
genres have lingering effects on what writers see – or indeed are able to see – as the 
realm of the possible…” (65). Researchers focused on uptake captures examine what 
successive uptakes do to readers and writers, how they become sedimented as dis-
positions. Uptake residue, which for Dryer is closely related to uptake capture, refers 
4  A recent story in ScienceDaily (2017), “Understanding Alternative Reasons for Denying Climate 
Change Could Help Bridge Divide,” profiled sociologist Jacob Lipsman’s research on climate change 
denial which challenges mainstream criticism that climate skeptics are out of touch, ignorant, or 
unwilling to accept scientific facts about climate change. In particular, Lipsman examined “the links 
between attitudes about climate change and local discursive and political processes surrounding 
coastal restoration issues” in two Louisiana parishes adjacent to the mouth of the Mississippi River, a 
region that has lost over 1,800 square miles of land to coastal erosion (ScienceDaily, 2017). As Lipsman 
concludes, “If an individual or a community is resistant to the idea of climate change for economic or 
social reasons, climate advocates will not be able to effectively communicate with these individuals 
about climate change simply by presenting more data […]. By better understanding the processes of 
climate change denial, climate advocates will be better equipped to have an effective dialogue with 
individuals and communities that are skeptical of these ideas” (ScienceDaily, 2017).
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to the accumulation and sedimentation of relations/configurations that accrue over 
time as a result of repeated uptakes and become part of shared, cultural memory (66).
These dimensions of uptake clearly interact: “the more normalized the uptake affor-
dance, the more instantaneous and “natural” the moment of uptake capture; the more 
powerful the uptake artifact, the more habitual the uptake enactment, and the more 
deeply sedimented the uptake residues” (66). This interaction is particularly acute 
within genre chains, as we discussed earlier. Dryer concludes that “we must attend to 
the multifaceted ways uptake unfolds so we can investigate each dimension empiri-
cally and study public participation in ways that do justice to its complexity” (66). 
As we will show in the following case study of petitioning, examining these dimen-
sions of genre uptake can help provide insight into the complex relations and pro-
cesses involved in how accumulated scientific knowledge about climate change can 
be turned into public action.
8.4  Taking up a Public Genre: Petitioning for Climate Change
Following our previous examination of the complex uptake performances that take 
place in-between and around genres, in this section we will focus on the uptake 
of a particular public genre, the petition, and the performances that take place in-
between and around the act of petitioning. Drawing on Dryer’s multiple concepts of 
uptake, this section will examine the various relational forces that shape uptakes of 
petitions, specifically climate change petitions. Dryer notes the significance of study-
ing genre uptake in the public sphere and the role of Rhetorical Genre Studies (RGS) 
in enacting social change:
These studies are of more than theoretical interest: an enormous amount of public and public-
sector writing on these topics will take place in the next decades as sea-level rise forces us to 
triage our coastal cities’ built resources. RGS must help shape the texts that invite citizens to 
contribute meaningful writing and ensure that citizens’ writing is taken up in the most produc-
tive ways. (2016, 64)
By looking outside the academy and beyond traditional academic genres, particularly 
at public genres that work to mobilize diverse publics and to motivate and bring about 
change, we can learn much about the relationship between rhetorical action and social 
change. The public petition, in particular, is a genre whose exigency is social change. 
It functions rhetorically to respond and to motivate response – in the US context, 
“to petition the government for a redress of grievances” (constitutionus.com). Peti-
tions, by mediating between citizens and authorities, operate in the middle spaces, 
and as an intermediary genres of sorts, can help (re)direct, manage, and intervene 
in available uptakes. We noted previously the competing forces at play in uptakes, 
and petitions function as an in-between space where uptakes might be brokered and 
redirected. If uptake offers a vision of genre as relational – a vision of genre in inter-
play with other genres or a vision of genre as movement – then the genre of the peti-
tion, as a tool of mobilization, can provide insight into the material, social, affective, 
and agentive factors that shape uptakes of petitions and that limit and enable social 
action. Importantly, petitions can also draw attention to mobilizations and actions 
that may not yet appear as such – mobilizations in process. By revealing such mobili-
zations in process, uptake can help climate change activists use petitions more effec-
tively to lay groundwork for social action.
The following case study, then, will examine the “uptake profiles” of petitions – 
or “the social motives, relations, values, and assumptions embodied within a genre 
that frame how, why and when to act” (Bawarshi & Reiff, 2010, 77), with the goal of 
continuing to take up the central theme of this edited volume – the “activistic” focus 
on how genres can influence social change. We will begin with a brief description 
of the genre of the petition and its historical evolution before moving on to examine 
more contemporary petitions, including climate change petitions. In addition, we 
will explore the relationship between “uptake affordances” of petitions – or the 
“opportunities or constraints…that precede and shape” encounters with and uptakes 
of petitions (Dryer, 2016, 65) – and “uptake capture” or the affective, cognitive and 
embodied factors that shape the uptake of petitions (65), specifically petitions related 
to environmental activism and climate change. Finally, we will examine how partici-
pating in climate change petitions might both limit and enable “uptake enactments” 
or the act of producing a response to climate change.
8.5  Petitions, Uptake Affordances, and Uptake Captures
Historically, petitions have afforded opportunities for citizens to appeal to established 
authorities and to have a voice in civic matters. Public petitions, since long before the 
Enlightenment, have been rhetorical sites of political participation, playing a signifi-
cant role in revolutionary rebellions against taxes and the Whiskey Rebellion (both of 
which came about due to a lack of response to the glut of petitions) and in reforms due 
to temperance petitioning, antislavery and antiremoval campaigns, or the suffrage 
movement. Historical studies of the petition have examined the impact of petition-
ing on the maintenance of social order in Roman Egypt (Kelly, 2011), on origins of 
democratic culture in early-modern England (Zaret, 2000), and on political participa-
tion in early colonial America (Bailey, 1979; Maier, 1991). Other studies have focused 
specifically on women’s activism and the role of petitioning in 19th-century Native 
American anti-removal and antislavery movements (Portnoy, 2005; Zaeske, 2003); on 
transnational activism and the role of citizen-petitions in the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (Graubart, 2008); or on the role of petitions in the decentralization 
of Chinese authoritarianism (Chen, 2016). Lex Heerma van Voss (2001) has argued 
that “petitions are social history…showing the evolving ways in which individuals 
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and social movements used petitions” (3), and he further reflects on the “global phe-
nomenon” of those in the past who used their right to petition,
 […] from Egyptian building workers in pharaonic times to illiterate Ecuador Indians in 1899; 
from anti-Catholic English women in 1642 to French workers asking for the repeal of the livret 
ouvrier in 1847; from Italian peasants complaining about noble banditry in 1605, to Brazilian 
slaves vindicating their rights against their owner in 1823; from western European early modern 
guild members to German Democratic Republic workers demanding improvement of economic 
efficiency, or voicing consumer demands. (1-2)
The studies featured in van Voss’ edited collection further demonstrate this global 
phenomenon of petitioning, with studies of petition movements in early modern 
central Europe, early modern Italy, 18th-century France, colonial Andhra, and early 
20th-century Republic of Byelorussia and nationalist China, among others.
Despite a number of wide-ranging historical and sociological studies of petitions 
as a force for social action, there have been relatively few studies of the petition from 
a rhetorical or RGS perspective, with the exception of Zaeske’s analysis of how the 
language of women’s antislavery petitions reflects their shifting political identities; 
Thieme’s related study (2006) of uptake and genre in the Canadian suffrage debate 
(which focuses on a number of other social movement genres that move beyond 
petitions); and Reiff’s study (2016) of the material factors (cultural, economic, geo-
graphic, technological) affecting the rhetorical action of the petition. Nonetheless, 
the genre of the petition fits squarely into what Devitt, in this volume, describes as 
a genre that “operate[s] not just as social action but also for social action” (add page 
#), which makes it a meaningful genre for exploring the interaction of rhetorical and 
social action. Through its conventions, the petition affords citizens a pathway to inter-
vening in public matters and functions as a tool for coordinating civic actions. While 
the petition’s textual features have shifted and changed across time, the genre’s con-
ventions include the following salient features or sequence of rhetorical “moves”5:
1) an opening address to an authority;
2) an expression of the grievance;
3) a recommendation for action;
4) a list of signatories.
The list of signatories, in particular, is an affordance that precedes and shapes the 
uptake and “fosters new networks by virtue of the process of gathering signatures” 
(Carpenter, 2003, 1). These conventions, then, work to facilitate uptake as petitions 
make possible opportunities for the disempowered to mobilize support, make their 
5  John Swales (1990) modeled an approach to genre analysis that begins with identifying a genre’s 
typical moves. Our identification of the petition’s typical moves lends itself to a Swalesian move anal-
ysis.
opinions known to those in power, and mediate between critique – bringing forward 
a grievance – and change, or the redress of the injustice.
Uptake affordances of petitions, historically, have been shaped by what Dryer 
(2016) calls “uptake capture” – the dispositional, affective, and embodied influ-
ences on uptake – or what he describes as the “cognitive or affective consequences 
of uptakes” (65). The embodied experiences of petitioners and their affective conse-
quences can be seen most readily in early petitions, where petitioning bodies engaged 
(rather strategically) in rhetorical action under specific physical and spatial condi-
tions. For example, in pre-revolutionary England, in order for citizens to have their 
petitions taken up and acted upon by authorities, they were physically presented to 
rulers, often thrust into their hands. This physical presentation of petitions, chroni-
cled by David Zaret (2000), began as early as the reign of Edward III (1312-1377) when 
“petitioners sought him out when he was hunting in the royal forests or fighting on 
the border” (85). With the popularization of petitioning and “incessant demands from 
rich and poor petitioners,” this trend continued, extending from James I (1556-1625), 
who was stalked in the back stairways of the palace or while on hunts in the royal 
forest by those presenting petitions, to his successor Charles I (1600-1649), who often 
sent two ushers ahead of the king to prevent petitioners from thrusting petitions into 
the king’s hands (85). Later, petitioners in the 17th and 18th century would march their 
petitions to Parliament or walk their petitions to the county court for collection, and 
19th-century female anti-slavery petitioners canvassed, went door to door, gathered 
signatures, and talked to women face to face in sewing circles and literary societ-
ies – affective, interpersonal encounters that had “lingering effects” (Dryer, 2016, 65). 
An historical account of the circulation of local petitions in the antebellum public 
further demonstrates these embodied, dispositional and affective influences on and 
of uptake:
These were your neighbors who sought you out in your home or field or forest, behind your 
counter, at your desk, with your team – in a time more innocent than ours, before such can-
vassing was commonplace and at a time when a petition meant something….The woman who 
approached you with her petition in hand, at Wednesday night prayer meeting, or in your barber-
shop or at your door, would probably be somebody you knew, or somebody who knew somebody 
you knew. (Miller, 1995, 305)
Earlier we referred to Freadman’s definition of uptake as “the bidirectional relation 
that holds between” genres, and the embodied interactions of petitioners, who knew 
and had relationships with petitioners, act as a kind of interpersonal capture – a 
building of and “holding” of relations that make certain uptake selections possible 
or that make genres, in this case the petition, matter. These uptake captures are, in 
an important way, preludes to actions, cultivating dispositions for later actions. For 
example, in 19th century anti-slavery petition movements, signing a petition might 
encourage and coordinate further civic actions or “correspondence networks,” such 
as women joining a female antislavery society, attending antislavery fairs or conven-
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tions, or making a donation to support the cause. Uptake capture, then, can create 
additional uptake affordances or conditions around petitions that invite additional 
uptakes. In the case of climate change, where public discourse (and skepticism) is 
powerfully shaped by economic, cultural, political, cognitive, sociological, and 
ideological influences, the uptake captures made possible through petitioning can 
become an important counterforce that lays the groundwork (affordances) for a dif-
ferent relation to and taking up of the climate change debate. At the same time, it is 
interesting to consider how these uptake affordances – the conditions and invitations 
that facilitate an uptake – and uptake captures, or interpersonal relationships that 
shape uptakes and consequences, can become constraints as we move to more con-
temporary petitions, such as climate change petitions. Mailed petitions or electronic 
petitions are more distanced by time and space and more “disembodied,” with more 
of a reliance on discursive and rhetorical strategies to promote mutuality and con-
nectedness to shape uptakes. The actions that were coordinated by, for example, cor-
respondence networks of women in the 19th century are later coordinated by a network 
of genres that operate as an integrated rhetorical and epistemic site, as seen by the 
following mailed petition to “Save our Environment” (See Figure 1). This petition from 
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) was sent during the George W. Bush 
presidency, and depicts the genre network of petitions containing 1) a letter from 
the president of the organization and a high-profile person (organizations, such as 
NRDC, often include “personal messages” from more high-profile figures like Robert 
F. Kennedy and Robert Redford); 2) a fact sheet or action plan; 3) a petition written on 
the reader’s behalf and addressed to the reader’s congressional representatives or to 
other appropriate audiences; and 4) perhaps most significantly, a contribution card, 
which is often attached to the petition. These intergeneric texts of the petition work 
together to try to “turn accumulated knowledge into action” (Alliance of World Scien-
tists) as they assemble fact sheets on climate change addressed to citizens alongside 
petition cards addressed to political leaders.
The uptake affordances – or “opportunities and constraints in the conventions 
that precede and shape the encounter” (Dryer, 2016, 65) – can easily be detected 
in the NRDC petition. The letter from a high-profile figure, Robert Redford – what 
Bawarshi (2016) has labeled an “uptake sponsor” (56) – does the work of opinion 
formation previously developed through face-to-face discussion and canvassing. In 
place of the more personalized human interaction, more contemporary print petitions 
include written letters and fact sheets, like the ones depicted in Figure 1, or personal 
testimonials that make emotional appeals, such as the appeal from Robert Redford, 
who decries the gutting of the Clean Air Act, deregulations favoring polluting indus-
tries, and the opening of national forests to drilling, logging, and mining: “These 
blatant special interest handouts are a radical departure from the values of environ-
mental protection that most Americans hold dear.” Without the embodied or rela-
tional transactions of face to face canvassing, print petitions must strategically create 
their own uptake captures or “lingering effects” that motivate action and response 
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Fig. 1: National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) Petition.
through the presentation of shocking facts (fact sheets describing the “dynamit[ing 
of] 5,000 acres of the Florida Everglades” or “the flow of raw sewage into America’s 
oceans and waterways”) and personal pleas by the president of the NRDC (“I urge you 
to stand up for your own environmental future by signing the enclosed petitions and 
by lending your support to NRDC”).
If uptake is the “contextualized, strategic performance of genres in moments of 
interaction” (Bawarshi, 2016, 45), then the shift from a small coalition of canvassers 
to large NPOs like the NRDC entails a shift in the tactical dimensions of the symbolic 
interchange as the sequence of uptakes becomes further removed. For example, the 
NRDC delivers this emotional plea to the President on behalf of citizens, with a space 
left for the petitioner to sign: “I am appalled that your administration has escalated 
its attacks on the environment…. I call on you to uphold 30 years of bi-partisan, envi-
ronmental progress by enforcing our environmental laws and preserving our natural 
heritage” – a simulated uptake capture that can then become internalized as one’s 
own position. The NRDC petition demands an active uptake in its action plan, and the 
role of agency here is interesting since citizens are asked to take action to “save our 
environment” by signing the petition and making a contribution so that the sponsor-
ing organization can then take action by “alerting the media, mobilizing Americans, 
or taking courtroom action” (Fact Sheet). But what is the range of transformation per-
mitted by this genre’s “uptake profile” if the actions are taken on behalf of citizens 
by a mediating organization, thus delimiting the relationship between agency and 
action? Unlike early petitioners’ presentation of their petitions, often in person, in 
contemporary petitions organizations express a grievance on the petitioner’s behalf, 
while the petitioner’s role consists of signing the petition and checking the contri-
bution card that will enable the organization to coordinate social actions. While the 
petition might serve to inform recipients of anti-environmental policies and might 
mobilize support for the NRDC and for environmental causes in general, the direct 
interaction between citizens and authorities (particularly authorities with the power 
to affect climate change legislation) is mediated. This mediation reduces one of the 
rhetorical and social advantages petitions afford in redirecting climate change action. 
At the same time, as we see next, such mediation can make possible other uptake 
captures that can powerfully impact the climate change debate.
This mediation of uptakes – and mediation between citizens’ petitions and 
authorities’ responses – becomes even more pronounced as we consider how climate 
change petitions operate on a global scale. Hari M. Osofsky (2007) examines a petition 
filed in 2005 against the US government by US and Canadian Inuit citizens claiming 
that US climate change policy violates their rights as a culture that thrives on “land, 
ice, and snow” (697). The petition was filed with the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and taken up by Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference, in her statement before a UN conference on climate change. Osofsky 
notes what we would recognize as the unique “uptake affordances” of this “intersec-
tional” petition: “It reframes a problem, typically treated as an environmental one 
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through a human rights lens and moves beyond the confines of US law to a supra-
national forum” (676). In so doing, the petition works to shape “uptake capture” – to 
maximize the affective consequences of uptakes – by aligning global climate change 
with human rights and the rights of indigenous peoples. By bringing together climate 
change and human rights, the petition draws into play the various relational forces 
that shape uptakes. The petition also works to facilitate the conditions of uptake by 
mediating between the Inuit petitioners, the US government, and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. 
The uptake affordances of “intersectional,” global petitions and the relational 
forces that shape uptakes have also been affected by technology and digital media, 
as the next section will explore. The rise in online petitions has the potential to facili-
tate circulation of petitions across cultural and geographical boundaries. While such 
mediation reduces the possibility for direct interaction between citizens and authori-
ties, it potentially increases the possibility for intervening in or brokering uptakes and 
intervening in the climate debate.
8.6  The Uptake Affordances and Constraints of Online Petitions
As we trace the historical evolution of the genre of the public petitions and the migra-
tion of petitions to online spaces, it is easy to see the potential affordances of online 
petitions, which have the ability to reach multiple, dispersed audiences and to mobi-
lize broader networks of support across divides of institution, location and language. 
Media studies scholar danah boyd (2010) explains how the affordances of networked 
publics shape interactions and uptakes by making “one-to-many and many-to-many 
interactions far easier” (54) and by enabling people “to connect to one another across 
great distances” and “over extended periods” (53). The affordances of online peti-
tions, then, are their ability to reach multiple, dispersed audiences and to mobilize 
broader networks of support across divides of institution, location and language. 
At the time of this writing, there were multiple climate change petitions circulating 
online, with petitions sponsored by organizations ranging from the NRDC (“Demand 
the President Trump Restore America’s Leadership on Climate Change”), to corporate 
entities, such as Ben and Jerry’s (“If it’s melted, it’s ruined!”). Multiple climate peti-
tions were also created on various sites such as Care2Petitions or thepetitionsite.com 
(“Don’t Drill Off Our Coasts” and “Defend Starving Polar Bears”), Change.org (“Tell 
Trump to #ActonClimate”), and MoveOn.org (“We the People of the US sign on to the 
Paris Agreement”), some of which are sponsored by high-profile individuals, such 
as Bianca Jagger and Human Rights Foundation’s sponsorship of “An Urgent Call to 
World Leaders to Prevent Catastrophic Climate Change” (Moveon.org). Stephen Hale 
(2010) also points to global organizations like Avaaz – meaning “voice” in several 
European, Middle Eastern, and Asian languages – noting that this online interna-
tional campaign “has grown at incredible speed” and demonstrates promise as a 
global movement seeking to break “the impasse between government, business, and 
individuals” (263).
To illustrate the affordances of online petitions – such as scalability – as noted 
by boyd above, the Avaaz petition (“Mega Climate Petition for 100% Clean World”) 
includes links to email, Facebook, and Twitter and boasts over 3.5 million signatures 
worldwide. Moveon.org’s “We the People of the US sign on to the Paris Agreement” – 
to be delivered to the US House and Senate and President Donald Trump – currently 
has 557,064 signatures. But while networked publics enable a greater scalability, this 
greater scalability can also be a constraint as questions of authenticity and credibility 
are raised. An article on “Authenticating Electronic Petitions” in Canada’s online legal 
magazine, Slaw, further defines these constraints by posing the following questions: 
“But are the online petitions too easy because people can sign without much chal-
lenge, or because one can automate the signing and eliminate the people altogether? 
In other words, are they more likely to contain fraudulent signatures, phony names?” 
(Gregory, 2015, para. 6). A new system of e-petitioning used by the city government 
of Wellington, Australia, raises additional issues of the affordances and constraints 
of online petitions. While affording greater citizen engagement (the second most 
popular topic of petitions focused on environmental issues), the e-petition system 
raised questions about how representative of the electorate the e-petition users were 
or “the danger of the e-petition system being hijacked by a small group of political 
activists” (Toland, 2011, 22). The next section will take up this issue of how online 
petitions may call into question issues of authenticity (of both those initiating and 
signing the petition) and other ethical issues.
8.7  Uptake Residues and Online Petition Hoaxes
Dryer defines “uptake residues” as the intergeneric memories and habitual responses 
that maintain institutions and interactions (2016, 66). These routinized responses 
that shape our encounters with and uptakes of genre can be both enabling and lim-
iting. Bawarshi (2016) has examined the way that uptakes, informed by rhetorical 
memory, can pre-condition or over-determine encounters with genres. Drawing on 
what, by now, is a fairly sedimented understanding of our first amendment right to 
petition “to seek redress of grievance,” these routinized uptakes of the petition genre 
have been used to perpetuate misinformation about climate change and to appeal to 
skeptics under the guise of an appeal to authorities by concerned citizens. The peti-
tion “30,000 Scientists Reject Anthropogenic Climate Change” has been in circulation 
since 1998 and was shaped in response to the then Kyoto Protocol. The petition was 
sponsored by a group calling itself the “Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine,” 
led by a climate change skeptic named Arthur Robinson. Robinson is a biochemist, 
conservative activist and four-time Republican congressional candidate in Oregon 
who believes human-driven climate change is a myth. The petition claims that limits 
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on greenhouse gases would have harmful effects and that increases in atmospheric 
carbon dioxide would have beneficial effects (see Figure 2).
Fig. 2: Hoax Climate Change Petition: http://www.petitionproject.org/index.php.
As of this writing, the sponsoring group claims that the petition has been signed by 
31,487 American scientists, although this has never been verified and the veracity 
of the petition and its signers has been challenged by Politifact.com’s “Punditfact,” 
which rated the claim “Pants on Fire” (Greenberg, 2017) and has been debunked by 
Snopes.com, which rated the petition claims “Mostly False” (Kasprak, 2016), noting 
that several non-scientists have signed the petition, several names cannot be verified, 
and several names are of scientists in fields other than climate science. Using accom-
panying documents, such as a paper printed in the same typeface and format as the 
official Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, the petition was also made 
to look official, thus further drawing on uptake residues that reminded readers of 
credible scientific correspondences. The petition was so misleading that the National 
Academy of Science issued the following clarifying statement: “The petition project 
was a deliberate attempt to mislead scientists and to rally them in an attempt to under-
mine support for the Kyoto Protocol. The petition was not based on a review of the 
science of global climate change, nor were its signers experts in the field of climate 
science” (as cited in Monbiot, 2006). While the petition seems to reflect a normal-
ized uptake and a habitual response by signatories (similar to the rhetorical force of 
the “World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity: A Second Notice,” which also includes 
signatories from the scientific community), the uptake residues of the petition, in this 
case, are used to undercut and destabilize scientific evidence. As McCright, Dunlap 
and Xiao (2013) note, “an organized climate change denial movement has mobilized” 
over the past two decades, and it is able to challenge the scientific consensus and 
gains its strength, in part, “by amplifying the views of contrarian scientists and gen-
erating petitions asserting the lack of consensus” (512; see also Smart & Falconer, this 
volume).
While one constraint of petitioning, then, is credibility, especially of online peti-
tions, another constraint is the potential for the petition to reach authorities and to 
be read and acted upon. boyd notes that “an increase in people’s ability to contrib-
ute to publics does not necessarily result in the ability to achieve an audience” – or 
to achieve a response to the petitions. The rhetorical exigency of the petition – of 
seeking redress from the government regarding grievances – is challenged by what a 
Northwestern University Law Review article refers to as “downsizing the right to peti-
tion,” which points out that while we have a constitutional right to petition, there 
is “not an assurance that communications will receive any particular reception or 
achieve any particular result” (Lawson & Seidman, 1999, 2). Richard Hough (2012), 
in his study of the petition systems of the Australian House of Representatives, the 
Canadian House of Commons, the German Bundestag, the Scottish Parliament, the 
UK House of Commons, and the National Assembly for Wales, characterizes the lack 
of response to petitions as “a parliamentary black hole” (480), although he notes 
that the ability of petitions to affect policy change varies from legislature to legisla-
ture. With the move toward governmental systems of e-petitioning, the challenge in 
receiving a response is even greater. For example, the UK House of Commons insti-
tuted a threshold number of signatures required for a government response to citizen 
petitions, with a “100,000-signature threshold making an e-petition eligible for a 
Commons debate” (BBC, 2012). This is the same threshold that was established for the 
White House petition site “We the People” established by the Obama administration 
(https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/); however, “the White House has not responded to 
a petition since Trump took office” (Rosenberg, 2018). Given these affordances and 
constraints of online petitioning and questions about their efficacy, how can peti-
tions be taken up as tools of mobilization by citizens, and how can they be taken up 
by authorities who act on and respond to the petition? The uptake enactment of peti-
tions, or response to uptake affordances, will be examined in the next section. We will 
also examine how, even though petitions might no longer have the rhetorical force 
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they once had, they can still be used to direct the climate change debate in ways that 
might not be in the form of direct action. That is, while we might not see the uptake 
artifact and enactment of petitions, we can still see affordances and captures and 
maybe even residues that are actions in the making.
8.8  Petitions and Uptake Enactments
This section will focus on uptake enactments of climate change petitions – how they 
are taken up as tools of mobilization by citizen petitioners and how they are taken 
up by authorities who act on the petition – and the ways in which public petitions 
are affected by digital networks that influence the circulation of petitions and their 
intervention in civic actions. When comparing historical cases of petitioning rooted 
in the material and physical gathering of petitioners (such as petitions circulated 
in 19th century women’s sewing circles or prerevolutionary petitions hand delivered 
to the king) to more contemporary online petitions (such as emailed petitions from 
an online advocacy group like MoveOn.org), there’s an obvious shift in the tactical 
dimensions of the interchange as the sequence of uptakes becomes further removed 
and increasingly mediated, and there are constraints or limits to political efficacy in 
digital sites. With online petitions, issues are mobilized across routes of production, 
circulation, and reception but stop short of execution of action and social change, 
which is where criticisms of online petitions – as a form of “slactivism” – come in. 
Howard Rheingold has argued that electronic petitions give people “the illusion that 
they’re participating in some meaningful political action” (cited in Regan, 2002, n.p.) 
as they quickly sign a petition but then fail to take further action. Just a brief search 
of online petitions will yield multiple articles with titles such as “Do Online Petitions 
ever Accomplish Anything?” or “Does Change.org really change anything?” In an 
ABC Australia article titled “Online Petitions: Do They Have Any Effect?” a university 
political science lecturer, Dr. Ian Cook, notes, “Just getting a whole bunch of people’s 
signatures and addresses won’t in itself have any effect, you have got to add to it in 
terms of adding some political pressure” (as cited in Wynne, 2016).
A case in point is a recent Move.on petition to sign onto the Paris climate agree-
ment (see Figure 3), which reached over a half million signatures from across the US 
(and from Canada). The petition notes that it is “To be delivered to The United States 
House of Representatives, The United States Senate, and President Donald Trump,” 
and MoveOn.org notes that they will deliver signatures for approved petitions by 
email to governors, Congress, and state legislators. “However,” they say, “we strongly 
recommend that you deliver your petition in person to have the maximum impact and 
ensure that it is seen by your target.” Because the online affordances help mobilize 
knowledge and mobilize support but don’t seem to extend to social action, Move.on 
recommends actions that facilitate uptake enactments, primarily strategies of uptake 
capture or producing consequences through embodied or affective uptakes. At the end 
of the process of organizing an online petition, Move.on suggests that to deliver the 
online petition, you should download it and organize a face to face meeting: “There’s 
often no substitute for sitting down and having a conversation with the person you’re 
trying to persuade with your petition. By organizing a meeting, you can present your 
concerns in greater detail and engage in a back-and-forth discussion about possible 
solutions. And you’ll be 100% sure that they saw the petition!”
Fig.  3: Moveon.org Petition: https://petitions.moveon.org/sign/we-the-people-sign-
onto.
Actions that further facilitate uptake enactments – and that shape the dispositional, 
affective and cognitive consequences of uptake capture – consist of “birddogging 
your target” or approaching your target at a public event or fundraiser (which bears a 
striking resemblance to the previously described embodied techniques of petitioners 
in pre-revolutionary England who physically presented their petitions); “simple drop 
off” of petitions; or “organizing a news conference or rally (which also has historical 
precedence of organized marches or rallies to present thousands of print petitions). 
In addition, Moveon.org notes the role of “uptake artifacts” or another genre or text 
produced in response to other texts. Their site includes “meta-genres” (Giltrow, 2002) 
or genres that provide guidance in how to produce and negotiate genres and genre 
uptakes of petitions – that is, tactics for engaging petition signers or for mediating 
uptakes. These “uptake artifacts” include 1) an email to petition signers to keep them 
updated on the campaign; 2) a phone call to decision makers; 3) letters to the editor; 
and 4) flyering events (handing out flyers to invite people to join your petition cam-
paign). The uptake enactment or response to a petition, then, seems to depend on the 
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uptakes happening in-between and around the genre. These moments of interaction 
don’t just mobilize petitions but also create affordances for uptake capture, for “lin-
gering effects” that may lead to uptake enactment. Such proto and interstitial actions 
can play an occluded but powerful role in directing (and redirecting) climate change 
action.
8.9  Uptake Enactments: Mobilizing Uptakes, Localizing Uptakes
How, then, might climate change petitions work to mobilize action on climate change? 
Political scientist Daniel Carpenter has argued that the rhetorical force of petitions 
lies not in the response from authorities – the redress of grievances – but in their net-
working potential, noting that the list of signatories is “a rich political resource” and 
that in addition to identifying individuals sympathetic to its declaration, the petition 
and list of signatories “locate individuals in a social structure” (2003, 1). As Carpenter 
and others have argued, it is worth considering whether the most important readers 
of a petition are not its recipients but its signatories. The most important function of 
a petition may not be that it reaches its designated audience but that, in the process, 
it helps to build discursive networks of affiliation and exchange among political orga-
nizers – that it plays a role in coordinating uptakes and coordinating actions that lead 
to uptake enactments.
The creator of thePetitionsite.com, Randy Paynter, would agree, and in response 
to charges that online petitions are a form of slactivism, he argues that “Internet peti-
tions are effectively a ‘gateway drug’ to more civic engagement” (2010, n.p.). Signing 
a public petition is a public announcement of citizens’ support for a cause, “so simple 
actions that demonstrate that we care about, say the environment, lead to future 
actions to support the environment (through donations, voting, purchases, discus-
sions with friends, etc.).” Paynter describes the myriad and multi-directional uptakes 
of petitions: “Sometimes petitions are major factors in a big decision, sometimes 
they’re the triggers that alert international media to hot stories, sometimes they 
simply raise general awareness of an issue, act as catalysts for fundraising, or compel 
other power brokers to get involved” (2010, n.p.). Climate change petitions, then, 
might act as the “gateway drug” to more transformative action on climate change.
As part of this mobilization process, participants in local publics, such as academics, 
might also play a role in mobilizing action on issues like climate change that affect 
a larger public. While academics might not consider themselves “power brokers” by 
any means, Audrey Williams June (2017), in an article in The Chronicle of Higher Edu-
cation, weighs in on the political efficacy (or uptake enactment) of petitions, noting 
that while petition use has become more prevalent among faculty who “have sounded 
off on issues like climate change, academic freedom, and the rights of transgender 
people…. It’s not clear whether petitions signed by academics have more heft than 
others or if they have much of an effect at all. Recent efforts suggest that those that 
apply directly to academe seem to be more successful than those that opine on things 
far from campus” (n.p.). The article goes on to examine petitions that received a sizable 
number of signatures and their outcomes (or uptake enactments), and it’s clear that 
more localized efforts – for example, to change the name of Yale University’s Calhoun 
College (named after an advocate of slavery) or to reinstate two faculty members who 
had been fired from Mount St. Mary’s University – were more successful in producing 
a response than more dispersed, national efforts (for example, a petition to intervene 
and stop Jeff Sessions from being confirmed as Attorney General).
The importance of localized efforts also seems to be driving recent climate change 
activism and petition drives, with a series of petitions by Moveon.org to “Urge your 
Governor to Support the Paris Climate Agreement” (See Figure 4). The main petition 
site notes that, in response to Trump pulling out of the Paris Climate Agreement, 
“governors from California, New York, and Washington launched the US Climate Alli-
ance, a coalition committed to the carbon reduction efforts called for under the Paris 
Agreement. So far, 14 states and Puerto Rico have joined the US Climate Alliance. 
Now, MoveOn members across the country are petitioning their states to join them.” 
Individuals are asked to click on the map to join a petition drive in their state, with 
the petition gathering signatures of residents of the state and sending the petition 
to the state governor, thus making the uptake less dispersed and less distant and 
perhaps strengthening the possibility of uptake enactment and mobilizing a response 
to climate change.
Fig.  4: Moveon.org: https://front.moveon.org/urge-your-governor-to-support-the-
paris-climate-agreement/#.WlvssktG1E5.
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8.10  Conclusion
Recognizing the urgency to act – and noting that “humanity is not taking the urgent 
steps needed to safeguard our imperiled biosphere” (Ripple et al., 2017, 1026) – the 
authors and signatories of the Second Notice warning to humanity indicate how this 
urgency might translate to action:
As most political leaders respond to pressure, scientists, media influencers, and lay citizens 
must insist that their governments take immediate action as a moral imperative to current and 
future generations of human and other life. With a groundswell of organized grassroots efforts, 
dogged opposition can be overcome and political leaders compelled to do the right thing. (Ripple 
et al., 2017, 1026)
The authors describe the role citizens must play in motivating their governments to 
take action through grassroots efforts, efforts that petitions and other genres can 
help to mobilize. But as our chapter’s analysis has hopefully illustrated, the mobi-
lization of scientific knowledge into action requires not just genre work but uptake 
work. It requires paying attention to the pathways drawn and relations held between 
genres that make movements and translations of knowledge across genres possible. 
By focusing on the seams that hold between genres, we can both better understand 
what makes certain uptake selections (and not others) possible and more effectively 
intervene in, broker, and sponsor these uptake selections. 
Historically, petitions have been uniquely positioned to generate and mobilize a 
groundswell of grassroots efforts, yet our examination of petitions (and their uptakes) 
as complex sites of transaction also draws attention to the mobilizations and actions 
that may happen along the pathway to uptake and social action – what we described 
as mobilizations in process. That is, petitions can help us trace what Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987) call “directions in motion” (21) as the act of petitioning, signing peti-
tions, and distributing them can intervene in, direct, and re-direct uptakes. As we 
hope our chapter has demonstrated, recognizing the complex uptakes surround-
ing petitioning reveals how genres can be used to intervene in and redirect climate 
change action.
As Devitt (this volume) argues, “genres work for social action rather than only as 
social actions when people act through them deliberately, consciously, and toward 
desired ends. Genres always already are social actions … But critical awareness of 
those social actions can transform everyday social actions that get things done in 
the world into powerful actions with social and political purpose, actions meant to 
alter the world in meaningful and even structural ways” (add page #). As we seek to 
understand how public genres, like petitions, act in the world – and to understand 
how public petitions might lead to greater awareness and action on climate change – 
it is helpful then to examine not only uptake enactment (the result of genre action) 
but also the social, affective, and material interactions that happen around and in 
between genres and that limit or enable genre action. A better understanding of the 
complexity of uptakes – and their complex scene of agency – can help us understand 
that taking up the affordances of a petition by circulating or signing a petition on 
climate change is not enough and is just a step – or one uptake pathway – in facilitat-
ing action through uptake artifacts (follow-up emails, phone calls to leaders, letters 
to the editor, flyering events) or uptake capture (organizing face to face delivery, bird-
dogging the target of the petition, organizing a rally or march to present a petition). 
We might also consider how localized or place-based uptakes might be more effective 
in bringing about change in climate debates and action, as we consider a vision of 
genre as [social] movement – “interrelationships drawing together configurations of 
conventions into (perceived) recurrence in particular places and times” (Dryer, 2016, 
61). If a petition is a tool of mobilization, then it can mobilize climate change action in 
multiple and different directions, from raising awareness of issues, to helping organi-
zations fundraise, to drawing media attention, to drawing the attention of the author-
ities it seeks to persuade. Understanding these multiple uptake pathways and uptake 
enactments can help us construct uptake-enactment strategies that can “turn accu-
mulated knowledge into action” and can lead to genres for social action and change.
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9  Rogue Rhetorical Actors: Scientists and the Social 
Action of Tweeting
Abstract: This chapter provides a case study of scientists on Twitter as a way to 
examine how well-intentioned and rhetorically-reasonable responses to a rhetorical 
situation can be confused by multiple intersecting, constantly unfolding, and often 
conflating rhetorical situations, genre users, and genres. The case explores conversa-
tions that erupted after several federal science-related agencies in the United States 
received a gag order. Resisting such silencing, several “rogue” or “alternative govern-
ment” accounts appeared on Twitter, and those accounts began sharing information 
about climate change. More broadly, these accounts entered a political debate, taking 
a position on the perceived political moment. We also uncover challenges to how we 
theorize about genre as we move from well-established genres of science communica-
tion to public or vernacular genres. Genre theory can help us understand how what 
appear to be reasonable rhetorical strategies may in fact serve to undermine one’s 
argument. In the case of tweeting scientists, we suggest that scientists deploy typified 
responses to share science or defend science, but the rhetorical situation that oppo-
nents respond to is one designed to generate uncertainty in science, in the authorities 
or experts that report science to us, and in the very institutions that support their 
research. 
9.1  Introduction
Rhetorical genre theory provides an important tool for understanding the possibili-
ties for rhetorical response and, thus, social action (Miller, 1984). Often rhetorical 
genre theorists chart how genres shape particular responses to a rhetorical situa-
tion, describing not only form and rhetorical conditions for a genre’s use, but also 
the norms and values that genres embody. Understanding the norms and values that 
genres mark is important because they provide insight into the motivation of genre 
users. Commonly genre theorists examine those genres that are relatively stabilized 
(Schryer, 1993) and that are embedded in professional communities. When studying 
well-stabilized, professional genres, understanding the norms and values of a genre 
can tell us something of the broader community of genre users. For example, when we 
investigate genres of science, we can learn something about the norms of science as 
a profession and the values that scientists hold, such as objectivity in research by the 
way that scientific research articles are crafted (Bazerman, 1988). Recently, however, 
genre theorists have also turned their attention to what Miller (2017) has called “ver-
nacular genres,” those that take place in public discourse (see, leading these efforts, 
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Reiff & Barwarshi, 2016). Such work is an important area for genre scholarship, and 
pushes further how we characterize genre knowledge, interpretation, and use. Some-
where between those professional and vernacular genres, there are genres that operate 
in both spheres of discourse simultaneously, and this is particularly true in the case of 
scientific discourse in new media environments (Kelly & Miller, 2016). In this chapter, 
we investigate one example of where professional spheres of discourse meet public 
spheres of discourse online. Specifically, we look to climate change discourse on the 
microblogging platform Twitter. Climate change has become a highly politicized issue 
(see PEW, 2016a), and while the science has largely agreed upon its cause, the public 
debate about anthropogenic climate change continues. Scientists continue to weigh 
in on the public debate, trying to clear up misconceptions or explain the science, 
but the debate remains fraught. Choosing a specific site to explore how these dis-
courses are enacted is important because, across a variety of media, we are certain to 
find different forms of public debate about climate change. For example, some public 
debates may centre on whether or not anthropogenic climate change is occurring at 
all, whereas others may focus on what needs to be done in response to the pending 
consequences of climate change. Other public debates might even engage with scien-
tific discourse about climate change. 
Our case in this chapter, too, involves a situation where scientists, publics, and 
policy makers engage in conversation about climate change. The case explores a 
particular thread of the conversation that erupted after several federal agencies in 
the United States received a gag order. Resisting such silencing, several “rogue” or 
“alternative government” accounts appeared on Twitter,1 and those accounts began 
sharing information about climate change. More broadly, these accounts entered a 
political debate, taking a position on the perceived political moment.2 
But the story that follows, from the activities of scientists to the public debates 
and media coverage that came after, reveal a complicated landscape for communica-
tion of climate change research. Online debate about climate change would be too 
simple a description of what is occurring. Debates about climate change suggest more 
interplay between what Smart (2016) has usefully characterized as discourse coali-
tions of Advocates and Skeptics. Smart defines a discourse coalition as “a cluster of 
social actors – individuals, organizations, institutions – who, within the context of 
1  Although Facebook retains the largest share of online users (68% as of January 2018), some 24% 
of global online users are on Twitter, with 21% of online American users on the site, and among the 
American sample, users are younger, educated, and the platform is also popular among those with 
high incomes (PEW, 2016b, 2017, 2018). 
2  Mellon and Prosser’s (2017) study of British online users found that social media users’ demo-
graphics tend to signal certain characteristics of their political leanings, notably they are more liberal, 
more politically aware, although less active insomuch as they are less likely to vote than their offline 
counterparts. Most significantly, what we know about social media users is that they depart from the 
broader public in terms of political engagement (Mellon & Prosser, 2017, 3).
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a major social debate, are attracted to a common set of arguments” (Smart, 2016, 4). 
Importantly, a particular discourse coalition is defined by its opposition in an effort 
to achieve “discursive hegemony” (4). No doubt, these discourse coalitions remain 
active and engaged (see Smart & Falconer, this volume), but climate change is also 
metonymic to a broader social debate. The climate change debate is a partisan issue 
in the United States and in many other countries, and the lines drawn are not par-
ticularly attendant to climate sciences – that is, its epistemological grounding, or, 
even, its axiological commitments – but instead focus on climate science as a locus of 
tension between partisan norms and values. Disentangling the debates that scientists 
are having from partisan political debates is important because they mark different 
rhetorical situations. Because the rhetorical situations to which these parties respond 
are different, the genres they use to respond to these situations necessarily differ, too. 
As Smart (2016) argues, the discourse coalitions in the texts surrounding the climate 
change debate appear to offer incommensurate views of climate change knowledge 
and science (14). 
What we are suggesting is that this is due, in part, to the seemingly similar genres 
and genre sets that each coalition invokes to respond to markedly different rhetorical 
situations. Moreover, we suggest it is not always clear when there are multiple rhetori-
cal situations and multiple typified responses because they may appear similar while 
serving different social actions. Although scientists are fighting back against false 
claims about the science of climate change on Twitter, showing that they are indeed 
rhetorically savvy in new media environments, they also appear to rely too deeply on 
a sincere belief about the commitment to authenticity of deliberation in this space. 
Where the genres deployed by scientists on Twitter to fight back were designed to 
establish the preeminence of science over partisan politics, an inversion occurred, 
and the genre activities now function as a tool of partisan resistance, with science 
subsumed into the political melee. 
In brief, we examine this case of scientists on Twitter as a way to examine how 
seemingly well-intentioned and rhetorically-reasonable responses to a rhetorical situ-
ation can be confused by multiple intersecting, constantly unfolding, and often con-
flating rhetorical situations, genre users, and genres. Along the way, we also uncover 
some challenges to how we theorize about genre as we move from well-established 
genres of science communication to public or vernacular genres. Genre theory can 
help us understand how what appear to be reasonable rhetorical strategies may in 
fact serve to undermine one’s argument. In the case of tweeting scientists, we suggest 
that scientists deploy typified responses to share science or defend science, but the 
rhetorical situation that opponents respond to is one designed to generate uncer-
tainty in science, in the authorities or experts that report science to us, and in the 
very institutions that support their research. Our genres for communicating research, 
including climate change research, must then better attend to the complexity of the 
discourse spaces we are entering by returning to that old question of the rhetorical 
situation – or situations.
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9.2  Genre, New Media, and Muddled Arguments
Rhetorical genre scholars have been studying new media forms and their effect on 
genres for several decades now. Consider Yates and Orlikowski’s (1992) important 
contribution theorizing genres of organizational communication, integrating genre 
into organizational communication studies as a concept to assist in understanding 
structuration processes (see, on structuration theory, Giddens, 1984). Although they 
acknowledge the role of new media forms, it is useful to remember that, still, genres 
are “enacted through rules” and that the “ways in which these genre rules influence 
the generation of specific communication is central to an understanding of genre as 
enacted within communities” (Yates & Orlikowski, 1992, 392). Those rules include 
social and professional norms, as well as being “standardized by being embedded 
in a medium” (392). All of this is reasonably well ordered, and we can see how it is 
distinct from vernacular spheres and new media forms. Reiff and Bawarshi’s (2016) 
call to attend to public genres is an important contribution to genre studies, urging 
genre scholars to look beyond professional discourse spheres to the rich vernacular 
spheres of discourse that many of us inhabit every day. As new media environments 
unfolding online create opportunities for new forms of engagement, particularly 
across different spheres of discourse, it becomes increasingly important to attend to 
how vernacular genres operate differently than professional genres. Genre theorists 
have indeed begun to investigate the manner in which new media in our complex 
web-based ecologies might shape genres or genre (e.g., Andersen & van Leeuwen, 
2017; Caple & Knox, 2017; Lewis, 2016; Miller & Shepherd, 2004, 2009; Pflugfelder, 
2017; Sherlock, 2009; Smart, 2016; Wickman, 2016; Zappavigna & Zhao, 2017; see also 
two volumes: Giltrow & Stein, 2009; Miller & Kelly, 2017). 
What is illustrative in efforts to map emerging genres in new media environments 
is both the rapid evolution of those genres as well as how the genre users put the new 
media affordances and typifications to work for their particular purposes. Further, 
these new media environments encompass both professional discourses as well as 
vernacular discourses. In the latter case, digital, web-based new media provide an 
important case for investigation because these spaces reconfigure social interactions. 
As Andersen (2016) explains, “we, as members of the public, audiences, citizens, 
private persons, searchers, or users are confronted with structured collections of 
items in a more direct way than we may be used to because one means of communica-
tion employed by society’s social and cultural institutions is digital networked media 
and their affordances” (n.p.). Rapid interplay of uptakes across discourse communi-
ties creates interesting problems for how we theorize web-based new media genres 
as well as how we enact them for social action, following Devitt’s call in this volume.
But we wish to raise here the question of how to explore genres for social action 
(following Devitt) in discourses and media spaces where heterogeneous audiences 
and complex information environments shape and are shaped by rapidly evolving 
technologies and norms. Put simply, how does one assess the situation to which 
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they intend to respond when the situation itself is changing, along with most of the 
other variables in the constellation that forms a genre? Although genre theorists have 
attended to these questions, we wish to add another layer in our analysis, which is 
how to respond if the conditions of discourse are not clear or entirely honest. To better 
explain what we mean, we turn to rhetorical scholar Leah Ceccarelli’s (2011) recent 
work on manufactured scientific controversies, which has important implications for 
how we theorize communication of climate change research (see, also, Oreskes, 2010; 
Supran & Oreskes, 2017). Chiefly, Ceccarelli’s study of several cases where “scientific 
debate” was intentionally manufactured for political ends, intentionally misleading 
broader publics about the state of consensus among scientists about current research. 
“A scientific controversy is ‘manufactured’ in the public sphere,” Ceccarelli explains, 
“when an arguer announces that there is an ongoing scientific debate in the tech-
nical sphere about a matter for which there is actually an overwhelming scientific 
consensus” (196). Continuing, she writes, “manufactured scientific controversy can 
be seen as a special type of ‘public scientific controversy’ in which ‘strategically dis-
torted communication’ works to corrode the democratic process” (196) and, we might 
add, the scientific process of knowledge making and shared understanding. Climate 
change is among the cases she explores, recounting Frank Luntz’s 2002 memo in 
the United States that helped change strategies around climate change discourse to 
sow dissent. In that memo, Luntz put it quite simply: “Voters believe that there is no 
consensus about global warming within the scientific community. Should the public 
come to believe that the scientific issues are settled, their views about global warming 
will change accordingly” (qtd. in Burkeman, 2003). The takeaway is that because of 
strategic efforts what was once a technical debate among experts was moved into 
an open, public debate, where all citizens have a stake and a voice, and, it follows, 
a framing of any attempt to argue with the public’s right to engage in the debate as 
“elitist and antidemocratic” (Ceccarelli, 2011, 208). 
Manufactured scientific controversies have important implications for how we 
understand the communication of research as it moves across the spectrum of genres 
from professional or expert genres to public or non-expert genres. Smart’s (2016) work 
on discourse coalitions in climate change research blogs explores a debate that has 
been designed to result in, as he found, necessarily incommensurate beliefs about 
the research because the discourse coalitions are in fact arguing for broader claims 
than the particular research findings themselves. Thus, some arguments are about 
scientific epistemology and others forward axiological claims. 
Indeed, moving the debate to new genres allows for the debate itself to be moved. 
In the pages of research articles, scientists debate with a set of norms and conventions 
rooted in their particular disciplinary homes and in scientific discourse in general. In 
these pages, debates are not large-scale ideological issues but, rather, specific aspects 
of a scientific problem. Meta-studies or review articles reporting on consensus of 
these papers, too, adhere to the norms of disciplines, including how the findings are 
assessed and how they contribute toward a common understanding for the particular 
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scientific community. Such work represents a complex assessment of data specific 
to particular scientific questions. Consensus among scientists that climate change is 
indeed happening and has anthropogenic causes comes from immersion in one’s own 
field, reviewing the evidence and arguments within a scientific framework, and from 
broader engagement in the multidisciplinary climate research community (Oreskes, 
2004). Genres used in the internal communication of climate research among scien-
tists necessarily serve different functions and purposes than more public genres. Spe-
cifically, the professional genres used to communicate climate science among climate 
researchers are designed for assessing, understanding, and vetting research. 
Public genres serve different purposes, and, further, afford the possibility of refor-
mulating the argument. Fahnestock’s (1986) Accommodating Science makes this point 
well, detailing how arguments in public genres may take a different form to address 
the interest and needs of the audience. For example, a research article will have a 
specific argument crafted for a disciplinary conversation, but as that research moves 
into more public, non-expert domains, the argument might move from an appeal to 
producing disciplinary knowledge to an appeal to the wonder of the research itself. 
Normally, we might see this kind of reformulation as an important step toward con-
necting with a different audience which, presumably, has their own interests and 
should indeed be accommodated by thoughtful communicators attempting to share 
complex knowledge with broader publics. However, after Ceccarelli’s work on man-
ufactured controversies, it is not difficult to see how this movement across genres 
affords a moment where research can be intentionally distorted. For example, this 
movement across genres often requires change in how an argument is made or even 
a change in the argument itself, as Fahnestock’s examples of accommodated science 
demonstrate. Indeed, such a movement could even divert the argument from epis-
temological claims about research findings to axiological claims only superficially 
related to the science. Even minor changes to an argument, such as emphasizing the 
funding support for a research study, can shift the framing of the argument from a 
question of science to questions about, for instance, financial influence. Practically, 
the consequences of such genre movement are highly significant to how we commu-
nicate climate change research. 
Determining when these changes to argument have occurred is challenging 
because we bring to bear our own understandings of genre and frames of reference 
to assess and interpret the rhetorical situation we are encountering. Genre studies 
acknowledge that genres play a regulative function, shaping how we understand text 
in context, and that regulative function affects how we interpret a situation. Auken 
(2015) examines the too often overlooked aspects of genre interpretation, includ-
ing genres’ regulative function, which he notes is fragile, saying that “regulations 
imposed by genre can be broken at a moment’s notice or made the subject of manipu-
lation or interpretation” (159). One outcome of this “break” is that a new genre may 
“move into … an entirely different genre” (159). Auken’s account explains the central 
role of expectations in recognizing genres, from rather simple to more complex cases. 
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We wish to focus on those moments when interpretation of genre, and the commonly 
tacit assessments made, fail as genre users move and are moved into a new genre 
space. To illustrate our argument, we now turn to recent efforts to communicate about 
climate change research online using the social media platform Twitter. 
9.3  AltGov Twitter and Resistance Genre Work
It was shortly after the inauguration of the 45th President of the United States that the 
climate change page on WhiteHouse.gov was removed, and days later the US Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency was instructed to remove their page on climate change 
(Davenport, 2017). Then, following the 45th POTUS’s claim that his audience was the 
largest on record, The National Parks Service tweeted comparative photos of the 44th 
and 45th POTUS’ inauguration audiences. During this time, much concern and debate 
surrounding the new administration’s plans for science-focused agencies and science 
funding circulated. Web pages related to climate change were taken down, and con-
cerned scientists wondered what the meaning of these actions might be. Soon after a 
gag order was applied to numerous US agencies that operate under the Department of 
Interior (Revesz, 2017). Amidst concerns about silencing the National Parks Services, 
an unlikely source, began tweeting climate change facts. South Dakota’s Badlands 
National Park used their Twitter presence (@BadlandsNPS) as a site of protest with 
a series of messages sharing facts about anthropogenic climate change: “‘The pre-
industrial concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere was 280 parts per million 
(ppm). As of December 2016, 404.93 ppm’,” “Today, the amount of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere is higher than at any time in the last 650,000 years. #climate,” 
“Flipside of the atmosphere; ocean acidity has increased 30% since the Industrial 
Revolution. ‘Ocean Acidification’ #climate #carboncycle,” and “Burning one gallon 
of gasoline puts nearly 20lbs of carbon dioxide into our atmosphere. #climate” (qtd. 
in Reilly, 2017). 
Characterizing typical tweets from @BadlandsNPS helps illustrate the signifi-
cance of these four tweets to our argument here. Although we wish to provide some 
description of the common content and form of tweets, we do not want to make claims 
about their genre status. Indeed, not making such claims is central to our argument. 
Because the content and form of tweets evolves rather quickly we might find proto-
genres of science communication – or “genre candidates” (Gregersen, 2015) – but more 
important than a system of classification is acknowledging that there is some genre 
activity occurring. Put another way, although it may be difficult, as Miller and Shep-
herd (2009) found, to trace the rapid evolution of online genres of communication as 
they seem to “speciate,” we can acknowledge genre-ing activities that help audiences 
understand and navigate the information they encounter in web-based media envi-
ronments. Reviewing tweets from @BadlandsNPS over a year (January 2017 – January 
2018), many posts feature photographs of the geography or photographs of wildlife, 
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with an accompanying textual description or quotation. Occasional archival photos 
or photos of visitors are included, notes about events or changes to operating hours, 
or facts about wildlife (e.g., the species of ferrets living in the area) or geography and 
habitat (e.g., sod tables or the biological soil crust), or quotations without accompany-
ing photos, and there are also the occasional retweets (sharing messages that others 
originally posted). Climate change facts may appear to be a rather significant depar-
ture from the normal patterns of activity from @BadlandsNPS, although notably, in 
early January 2017, a number of tweets were made about climate change facts, using 
the hashtag #Climate. It was the series of tweets described above, posted on January 
24th, 2017, that generated attention due to the gag order – it was a kairotic moment for 
climate change fact tweets (King, 2017). Soon after the tweets were posted, they were 
deleted, the press reported a statement from the National Park Service that a former 
employee unauthorized to use the account had shared these messages (Diaz, 2017). 
Emerging from these tweets and the surrounding media attention, so-called 
AltGov Twitter accounts began to appear, such as @AltNatParkSer, and their authors 
claimed either to be involved with government agencies or more broadly as sympa-
thizers with the cause. What seemed to be the cause? Political resistance to a new 
administration may seem the obvious social action these accounts hoped to achieve, 
but we argue many are positioned specifically as a defense of science, and quickly 
adopted the conventional form of the @BadlandsNPS account. However, @Bad-
landsNPS’s use of climate change facts in response to a political exigence shifts the 
meaning of “the facts” insofar as they become (further) politically charged. What 
appears to be genred activity of simply reporting scientific information, then, has a 
rather different valence. 
To understand more broadly how downstream accounts were influenced by the 
@BadlandsNPS’s tweets, examining additional Twitter feeds provides further evi-
dence. Since it is difficult to know who is behind a Twitter account, and indeed if they 
are a scientist, expert, or some other individual with the credibility to speak on some 
matter, the fact-checking website Snopes has worked to verify some of the Twitter 
accounts that emerged following the @BadlandsNPS’s tweets. Notably, what they 
are able to verify is that the individual, or some of the individuals maintaining the 
accounts “has a legitimate connection to what they’re posting about” (Binkowski, 
2017). Table 1 provides an overview of the accounts verified by Snopes, and on their 
website, an up-to-date spreadsheet is available. 
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Tab. 1: Snopes List of Verified Accounts
@ActualEPAFacts @alt_kellyanne_ @BadHombreNPS @DeepStateRogue
@Alt_4nTrade @Alt_Labor @knot4sharing @AltScalesOfJust
@AltArmedForces @alt_labor_me @RogueEPAStaff @altEPAR9
@alt_BaldEagle @alt_lawyer @NastyWomenofNPS @altDoD_







Some accounts in this list tweet about climate change, including @AltArmedForces, 
which, during a cold spell in early 2018, tweeted, “The same people saying climate 
change is a myth because it is cold outside this week must also believe there is no 
drought anywhere in the world because it rained at their house today. #Climat-
eChange” (@AltArmedForces, 2018). Singular data points, anecdotes from personal 
experience, and generalization based on these experiences is critiqued in this tweet 
as a reminder that scientific work is based on objective, data-driven evidence. The 
tweet critiques those opposing climate change research findings on the basis of per-
sonal opinion, and the formulation of the tweet reveals how the shift from empirical 
evidence to personal experience aids in the politicization of climate science.
Accounts identifying with science-focused agencies, such as the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, provide further illustrative cases. Consider @ActualEPAFacts, 
which has a short biography with the following text: “#AltGov: When the “elected” 
government lets you down, turn to us. We’ve got your back America” (@ActualEPA-
Facts, 2018). @ActualEPAFacts employs suggestive scare quotes and attempts to 
align themselves with the disenfranchised, further supported by their current Twitter 
banner, which reads “A Blue Congress Will Impeach” (blue is a colour aligned with 
the US Democratic party). Indeed, the account tweets a range of political messages, 
for example, the following selection of tweets:
@ActualEPAFacts 2 Jan 2018 More Trump tweeting about his great big “nuclear button” should 
be the HARD LINE for every American that cares about this country. Trump is a danger to us all. 
#Impeach45
@ActualEPAFacts 19 Dec 2017 More The United States of America is now in the hands of crimi-
nals. 2018 is our last chance to save this country…
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@ActualEPAFacts 9 Nov 2017 More One year ago today we woke up to headlines we thought we’d 
never see. We’ve come a long way since then. We CAN make a difference. One year from now we 
will be celebrating a blue House and Senate.
These tweets have very little relation to the EPA in particular and certainly concern 
the broader current political situation. Although there are some tweets about climate 
change:
@ActualEPAFacts 26 Jan 2017 Climate change is the greatest global threat to coral reef ecosys-
tems. Check out @noaaocean’s graphic for more info. #climatechange [omitted a graphic]
As well, interestingly, a specific claim that science is not a partisan political issue:
@ActualEPAFacts 20 Feb 2017 More “Science is not Democratic or Republican, progressive or 
conservative. Science is science.” Wise words from @SenSanders #sciencenotsilence
And a rather ominous message about the significance of science in our lives:
@ActualEPAFacts 25 Jan 2017 “WHEN THE VOICES OF SCIENTISTS ARE NOT HEARD, THERE IS 
A PRICE TO PAY.” [quotation marks and capitalization original]
Political messaging is clear even in the name of some “alt gov” Twitter accounts, such 
as the “@BadHombreNPS” account. The 45th POTUS used the phrase “bad hombres” 
and the overt racism of the term in political discourse made its way into the naming 
of an AltGov Twitter account, one also signaling solidarity with the National Parks 
Service (NPS). Their Twitter biography further clarifies their vantage: “Unofficial feed 
of Badlands NP. Protecting rugged scenery, fossil beds, 244,000 acres of mixed-grass 
prairie & wildlife from two-bit cheetoh-hued despots” (@BadHombreNPS, 2018). 
Among the AltGov accounts, @AltYelloNatPark frames itself directly, as both 
scientists and activists, writing they are: “An unofficial group of employees scien-
tists and activists, in and around Yellowstone national park. We will try and keep 
you informed, when others can’t”.3 Tweets include mention of the so-called “flat 
earth” movement, current political events, tweets about conservation, and the value 
of national parks. Others recognize exactly the political melee they are enmeshed 
within, including @altHouseScience, “Run by PhD-holding, peer-review loving, non-
gov’t members of #TheResistance. Providing science commentary. DM to get involved. 
Not the official @HouseScience”, who commented “Science is not above the fray of 
politics” (@altHouseScience, 2017). 
Although it may appear that tweeting scientific facts or information is a genred 
activity online, what we have suggested here is that the configuration of media, public 
audiences, partisan political narratives in the public discourse sphere, and the norms 
3  https://twitter.com/AltYelloNatPark. 
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and values of scientific discourse communities function in such a way that what may 
have once been a genre of science communication has shifted into a partisan political 
typification. Tweets about climate change may sometimes serve to inform, but they 
now also, in their uptake by rogue Twitter accounts, respond to a rhetorical situation 
markedly different. Rather than communicating with a public that is unaware of these 
facts or who may simply be interested in the science, these rogue Twitter accounts 
are responding to a rhetorical situation defined by partisan politics at the highest 
national level in the United States. 
Rising temperatures, ocean acidification, and a laundry list of other scientific 
facts provide the basis for scientists’ understanding that climate change is happen-
ing and that humans play a significant role in that phenomenon. There is a prac-
tical problem with the approach to disseminating pure, apolitical information: the 
moment this information moves into broader public discourses, it participates in 
those already-established norms and conventions. Scientists cannot, any more than 
any other group, create a discourse sphere with broad, public audiences that will 
simply play by the rules of discourse in scientific professions, even if public audi-
ences wanted to play by those rules. 
9.4  Final Remarks
Genre theory helps us interrogate the ways in which the movement of genred tweets 
sharing climate change facts give way to more overtly politicized climate change 
arguments, a kind of speciation of scientific tweets communicating climate change 
research and science more broadly. For supporters, politicized tweets about science 
seem to function, ironically, to suggest that science will not bow to partisan politi-
cal concerns. Science has the facts and scientists will share those facts, directly and 
without the kinds of manipulations partisan political discourses engage. Although 
this is a noble aspiration, it is unfortunately a naive understanding of the discourse 
sphere scientists are entering. 
What is at stake for researchers communicating about climate change is the very 
message they hope to deliver. Twitter reveals how the rapid adoption of new media 
forms for communication of complex research can be challenging and can even be 
co-opted by those with adversarial positions. Genre theory can help us explore and 
explain the challenges in new media forms by identifying where norms, conventions, 
and expectations in different discourse communities appear to be incommensurable 
– and, importantly, where they are influential.
Devitt (this volume) explores the different forms of genre work we might conduct 
when deploying genres for social action. One form of generic resistance she illus-
trates is taken from scientific spheres of discourse. “Scientists,” she writes, “report 
their results in scientific articles rather than news reports not only because that’s 
the norm but because the genre fits their values and worldview,” and as such they 
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may not choose to participate in more popular forms of writing (Devitt, this volume). 
The challenge for scientists is that when they “venture into other genres to reach a 
broader audience, they can meet both their own and readers’ resistance” (Devitt, this 
volume). Importantly, we do not wish to suggest that engagement in public and/or 
online spheres of discourse are problematic. Rather, we wish to underscore, to echo 
Devitt once more, “Genre matters.” Genre awareness matters crucially in rapidly 
evolving online spheres of discourse, where genres routinely evolve into new forms or 
may take on hybrid forms, because with this increasing complexity in the genres we 
navigate, there are greater opportunities for a rhetorical misstep. For scientists com-
municating about climate change, the stakes are high. Thus, it is vital that we con-
tinue the conversation about emerging rhetorical situations in online environments 
with scientists and researchers using web-based genres for social actions. After all, 
this case reminds us – in contrast to @ActualEPAFacts’ argument – science is never 
simply science, particularly when it engages actively with general publics in social 
media spaces. Instead, as @altHouseScience writes, “Science is not above the fray of 
politics.”
References
@ActualEPAFacts (2017, January 25). “WHEN THE VOICES OF SCIENTISTS ARE NOT HEARD, THERE 
IS A PRICE TO PAY.” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/actualepafacts/
status/824443506894708736.
@ActualEPAFacts (2017, January 26). “Climate change is the greatest global threat to coral reef 
ecosystems. Check out @noaaocean’s graphic for more info. #climatechange” [Twitter Post]. 
Retrieved from https://twitter.com/ActualEPAFacts/status/824665179778641920.
@ActualEPAFacts (2017, February 20). “Science is not Democratic or Republican, progressive or 
conservative. Science is science.” Wise words from @SenSanders #sciencenotsilence” [Twitter 
Post]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/actualepafacts/status/833804675258396673.
@ActualEPAFacts (2017, November 9). “One year ago today we woke up to headlines we thought 
we’d never see. We’ve come a long way since then. We CAN make a difference. One year from 
now we will be celebrating a blue House and Senate.” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from https://
twitter.com/ActualEPAFacts/status/928630487253471232.
@ActualEPAFacts (2017, December 19). “The United States of America is now in the hands of 
criminals. 2018 is our last chance to save this country...” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from https://
twitter.com/ActualEPAFacts/status/943321341419192320.
@ActualEPAFacts (2018). Biography. [Twitter Account]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/
actualepafacts.
@ActualEPAFacts (2018, January 2). “Trump tweeting about his great big “nuclear button” should 
be the HARD LINE for every American that cares about this country. Trump is a danger to 
us all. #Impeach45.” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/ActualEPAFacts/
status/948411487097360384.
@AltArmedForces (2018, January 3). “The same people saying climate change is a myth because it 
is cold outside this week must also believe there is no drought anywhere in the world because 
it rained at their house today. #ClimateChange” [Twitter Post]. Retrieved from https://twitter.
com/AltArmedForces/status/948595409651404801.
191   Rogue Rhetorical Actors: Scientists and the Social Action of Tweeting
@altHouseScience (2017, January 9). “Science is not above the fray of politics.” [Twitter Post]. 
Retrieved from https://twitter.com/altHouseScience/status/950398808265056256.
@AltYelloNatPark (2018). Biography. [Twitter Account]. Retrieved 2019, March 7, from https://twitter.
com/altyellonatpark?lang=en.
@BadHombreNPS (2018). Biography. [Twitter Account]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/
badhombrenps?lang=en.
Andersen, J. (2016). Genre, the organization of knowledge and everyday life. In Proceedings of the 
Ninth International Conference on Conceptions of Library and Information Science, Uppsala, 
Sweden, June 27–29, 2016 Information Research, 22(1) paper colis1647. Retrieved from 
http://InformationR.net/ir/22-1/colis/colis1647.html (Archived by WebCite® at http://www.
webcitation.org/6oJgtXunh).
Andersen, T.H., & van Leeuwen, T.J. (2017). Genre crash: The case of online shopping. Discourse, 
Context & Media, 20, 191–203. doi:10.1016/j.dcm.2017.06.007.
Auken, S. (2015). Genre and interpretation. In S. Auken, P.S. Lauridsen, & A.J. Rasmussen (Eds.), 
Genre and … (154–183). Copenhagen: Ekbátana (Copenhagen Studies in Genre; vol. 2).
Bazerman, C. (1988). Shaping written knowledge. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
Binkowski, B. (2017, April 24). Twitter’s alts and rogues. Snopes.com. Retrieved from https://www.
snopes.com/2017/06/01/alts-and-rogues/.
Burkeman, O. (2003, March 4). Memo exposes Bush’s new green strategy. The Guardian. Retrieved 
from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2003/mar/04/usnews.climatechange.
Caple, H., & Knox, J.S. (2017). Genre (less) and purpose (less): Online news galleries. Discourse, 
Context & Media, 20, 204–217.
Ceccarelli, L. (2011). Manufactured scientific controversy: Science, rhetoric, and public debate. 
Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 14(2), 195–228. doi:10.1353/rap.2010.0222.
Davenport, C. (2017, January 20). With Trump in charge, climate change references purged from 
website. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/20/us/politics/
trump-white-house-website.html.
Diaz, D. (2017, January 24). Badlands National Park deletes tweets on climate change. CNN. 
Retrieved from www.cnn.com/2017/01/24/politics/badlands-tweets-climate-change/index.
html.
Fahnestock, J. (1986). Accommodating science: The rhetorical life of scientific facts. Written 
Communication, 3(3), 275–296. 
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Giltrow, J., & Stein, D. (Eds.). (2009). Genres in the Internet: Issues in the theory of genre. 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Gregersen, F. (2015). Genre and everyday conversation. In S. Auken, P.S. Lauridsen, & A.J. 
Rasmussen (Eds.), Genre and … (56–98). Copenhagen: Ekbátana (Copenhagen Studies in 
Genre; vol. 2).
Kelly [now Mehlenbacher], A.R., & Miller, C.R. (2016). Intersections: Scientific and parascientific 
communication on the Internet. In A.G. Gross & J. Buehl (Eds.), Science and the Internet: 
Communicating knowledge in a digital age (221–245). Amityville, NY: Baywood Press. 
doi:10.2190/SCIC11.
King, L. (2017, January 24). EPA ‘pause’ on public communications fuels wider alarm about openness. 
USA Today. Retrieved from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/24/
epa-pause-public-communications-fuels-wider-alarm-openness/97009206/.
Lewis, J. (2016). Content management systems, Bittorrent trackers, and large-scale rhetorical 
genres: Analyzing collective activity in participatory digital spaces. Journal of Technical Writing 
and Communication, 46(1), 4–26. doi:10.1177/0047281615600634.
 References   192
Mellon, J., & Prosser, C. (2017). Twitter and Facebook are not representative of the general 
population: Political attitudes and demographics of British social media users. Research & 
Politics, 4(3). doi:2053168017720008.
Miller, C.R. (1984). Genre as social action. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 70(2), 151–167.
Miller, C.R. (2017). Where do genres come from? In C.R. Miller & A.R. Kelly [now Mehlenbacher] 
(Eds.), Emerging genres in new media environments (1–34). London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-40295-6_1.
Miller, C.R., & Kelly [now Mehlenbacher], A.R. (Eds.). (2017). Emerging genres in new media 
environments. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Miller, C.R., & Shepherd, D. (2004). Blogging as social action: A genre analysis of the weblog. In 
L. Gurak et al. (Eds.), Into the blogosophere: Rhetoric, community, and culture of weblogs. 
University of Minnesota Libraries. 
Miller, C.R., & Shepherd, D. (2009). Questions for genre theory from the blogosphere. In J. Giltrow & 
D. Stein (Eds.), Genres in the Internet: Issues in the theory of genre (263–290). Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Oreskes, N. (2004). The scientific consensus on climate change. Science, 306(5702), 1686. 
doi:10.1126/science.1103618.
Oreskes, N. (2010). Merchants of doubt. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
PEW Research Center (2016a, October 4). The politics of climate. Pew Research Center. Retrieved 
from http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/04/the-politics-of-climate/.
PEW Research Center (2016b, November 11). Social media update 2016. Pew Research Center. 
Retrieved from http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update-2016/
PEW Research Center (2017). Social media fact sheet. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from http://
www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/.
PEW Research Center (2018, March 1). Social media use in 2018. PEW Research Center. Retrieved 
from http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-use-in-2018/.
Pflugfelder, E.H. (2017). Reddit’s ‘’Explain Like I’m Five’’: Technical descriptions in the wild. 
Technical Communication Quarterly, 26(1), 25–41.
Reiff, M.J., & Bawarshi, A. (Eds.). (2016). Genre and the performance of publics. Logan: Utah State 
University Press.
Reilly, K. (2017, January 24).A rogue national park is tweeting out climate change facts in defiance 
of Donald Trump. Time Magazine. Retrieved from www.time.com/4645927/badlands-national-
park-climate-change-tweets/.
Revesz, R. (2017, January 27). Donald Trump personally called the national park service director 
about those Inauguration photos. Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.
co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-national-park-service-michael-reynolds-inaugu-
ration-crowd-size-photos-proof-a7548601.html.
Schryer, C.F. (1993). Records as genre. Written Communication, 10(2), 200–234.
Sherlock, L. (2009). Genre, activity, and collaborative work and play in World of Warcraft: Places and 
problems of open systems in online gaming. Journal of Business and Technical Communication, 
23(3), 263–293.
Smart, G. (2016). Discourse coalitions, science blogs, and the public debate over global climate 
change. In M. Reiff & A. Bawarshi (Eds.), Genre and the performance of publics (157–177). 
Logan: Utah State University Press. doi:10.7330/9781607324430.c008.
Supran, G., & Oreskes, N. (2017). Assessing ExxonMobil’s climate change communications 
(1977–2014). Environmental Research Letters, 12, 1–18. doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aa815f.
Yates, J., & Orlikowski, W.J. (1992). Genres of organizational communication: A structurational 
approach to studying communication and media. Academy of Management Review, 17(2), 
299–326.
Wickman, C. (2016). ‘’Learning to share your science“: The scientific notebook textual object 
and dynamic rhetorical space. In A.G. Gross & J. Buehl (Eds.), Science and the Internet: 
Communicating knowledge in a digital age (11–32). Amityville, NY: Baywood Press.
Zappavigna, M., & Zhao, S. (2017). Selfies in ‘mommyblogging’: An emerging visual genre. 
Discourse, Context & Media, 20, 239–247. doi:10.1016/j.dcm.2017.05.005. 
193   Rogue Rhetorical Actors: Scientists and the Social Action of Tweeting
Sune Auken
10  Genre, Anthropogenic Climate Change, 
and the Need to Smell your Body Odor. 
A Personal Postscript
As I am writing this in late August 2019, the Amazon is burning, there has been a dra-
matic melt-off from the Greenland glaciers over the summer, Iceland has held a burial 
for one of its Jökuls, lost to anthropogenic climate change, and a petite Swedish teen-
ager, catapulted into climate debate stardom for her school strike for the climate, is 
crossing the Atlantic in a solar driven sailboat; while middle-aged pundits pontificate 
at her lack of school attendance – or whatever other point they can find to criticize 
her, or the attention her presence in the climate debate has raised. In at least once 
instance, this rose to the level of a public death threat – with no visible consequences 
for the threatener, secure in his privilege, except for a smallish media hassle (Busby, 
2019). They may break her, though she seems remarkably sturdy, but her central argu-
ment they shall never break.
None of these things could be predicted with any certainty when the chapters in 
this volume were first submitted to the editors in January 2018, but it is easily predict-
able that new extreme weather events connected to anthropogenic climate change 
will occur at an increasing rate. It is equally predictable that as the effects of climate 
change become more dramatic, so will the calls to action, and with them new genres 
will arise, and old genres will be deployed or repurposed to get the message across; 
like the burial of the Jökul mentioned above. The counter reaction is just as predict-
able. Even the most basic statements of the science involved will be obfuscated, and 
misdirection, disinformation, and attempts to dismay will be generously applied at 
every stage of the process. 
It is known, because it has been so for decades; and information that was not 
only alarming but also fully actionable decades ago, has not been allowed to make 
an impact strong enough to fundamentally alter the situation. Change that is obvious 
and necessary has been fought tooth and nail every step of the way.
In the process, it has become clear that ACC is not just a challenge for the sciences. 
There is of course still much to be done, and even more, possibly, for the technical sci-
ences as tech-based countermeasures will become increasingly necessary. However, 
the greatest conundrum may prove to be in the humanities and the social sciences. 
How is it even possible that highly exigent information for which overwhelming evi-
dence exists does not make an immediate and strong impact on ideologies, policies, 
and life practices across the globe? Why is it still not made an overwhelming priority 
in the transport sector to lessen air travel? Why is meat production still heavily sub-
sidized in many places? Why have fossil fuels not been downscaled dramatically at 
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least a decade ago? And why, oh why, are we now so desperately short on time when 
we knew of the problem well-nigh half a lifetime ago?
Our perception of the world is inevitably ideological. We cannot avoid it. The 
world, as it appear to us, is never just the world, it is always the world as it appear 
to us, and we are, for better or worse, never neutral observers. We always have an 
agenda, we always have values, and we always have interests. Nothing we do and 
nothing we say can change that.
For me as researcher whose professional topic is genre, the question of implied 
ideology is always close at hand. Our ideology is naturalized to us as we grow up and 
move through the education system. It is naturalized through the values represented 
in our upbringing, through our professional and private interactions, and through our 
language. All of these things are deeply enmeshed with genre. Being habitual, genre 
are “just the way we do things around here” (Schryer, 2002, 76). They may acquire an 
“illusion of normalcy” (Paré, 2002, 61) that might even lead to a “cultural reproduc-
tion of ignorance” (Segal, 2007, 4). As Kidd says: “Ideology is like B.O. […] you never 
smell your own” (2013, 553; see also Paré, 2002, 60). From a genre perspective, if there 
is one thing the debate over ACC demonstrates, it is the inertia inherent in genre use. 
Patterns of understanding and interpretation once established seem to carry on even 
when they have long outlived their usefulness.
However, we are not without agency; we are not bound by fate to be victims of 
genre; in fact, uses of genre invariably have a genre user who, even in the most casual 
cases, is not an automaton. As reflective beings, we have the option to educate our-
selves and to think critically about our implied values, even when these values are 
embedded in genres that are deeply habitual to us. We may never be fully independent 
or fully at a distance, but we can criticize genres through other genres, and language 
use through language use. In fact, genre provides us with many different means when 
we try to change some aspect of the world for the better, as Amy Devitt demonstrates 
in her chapter in this volume. Moreover, the kind of critical genre awareness, Devitt 
and others have argued for, may be one form of the “inoculation” against disinforma-
tion that Cook, Lewandowski, & Ecker (2017) argue is possible. By exposing people 
to the manifold ways genre can be used to disinform and manipulate in a controlled 
manner, you may teach them to recognize not only how they are made the objects of 
disinformation. From the point of view of genre pedagogy, this would also be a step 
towards teaching them how they themselves can tailor their use of genre to fit better 
purposes.
The chapters in the present volume can be taken as an attempt to establish the 
background knowledge needed for a broader awareness surrounding genre use in the 
debate over ACC. They demonstrate how genre is – among other things – a discur-
sive battle ground in which actors maneuver to achieve their social purposes; not 
just on personal or organizational level, but even in large-scale attempts to influence 
the direction of society. The chapters move from minuscule genres like the tweet or 
the editorial cartoon to genres charged with doing the heavy lifting of societal action 
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like the petition or the congressional hearing. On each level, the genres appear as 
flexible and versatile cultural categories structuring human understanding and com-
munication, but also as invitations to action, as individual actors take them up and 
maneuver to use them for their own purposes. The structuring that genre adds to our 
understanding may appear to be set in stone and steel, but proves to be malleable, 
as it adapts, or is made to adapt, to the shifting purposes of individual genre users. 
This is clearly the case with some of the manipulations described, the use of the con-
gressional hearing system to suppress political recognition of the reality or severity 
of ACC, or the manipulative uptakes of climate science in denialist discourse com-
munities preparing the ground for a broad swath of disinformation concerning ACC 
– uptakes, where knowledge and evidence is deliberately transformed into doubt and 
denial. However, it is also – and equally – the case, when humor is deployed to carry a 
message that horror has failed to get across, and which the usual news channels have 
not represented with sufficient clarity, or when scientists take to Twitter when their 
official communication channels are closed off by political decisions. In each of these 
cases, there is a complex interplay between established genre norms, and the uptakes 
of individual actors. Moreover, in all these cases the implied understandings and the 
implied ideology of the genres involved are in play. Sometimes this leads to conflict, 
when the control of the stasis in a congressional committee, which has its own legit-
imization and its own purposes, is used to block knowledge from actually getting 
through to the committee conclusions; or when the scientific drift towards stating fact 
meet the fast-paced exchanges in tweets. However, sometimes they align in surprising 
way, as when the aforementioned respect for facts in the genres of science, finds an 
unlikely ally in news satire’s carnevalesque joy in mocking those disconnected from 
basic, observable reality.
Given that genres are well-nigh omnipresent in human communication and 
understanding, and also the central role genres play there, as evidenced not only by 
the chapters in the present volume, but also by a wide swath of previous research, it 
is fair to say that the chapters in the present volume, are only a starting point. They 
demonstrate how an understanding of the genres involved allows us to shed a new 
light on the way genre is used, and sometimes abused, in the debate over ACC. This 
is worth noticing not just because our failure to recognize manipulations through 
genre have led to widespread disinformation – and the slow pace of positive action to 
address ACC on a societal level – but also, and in a sense more importantly – because 
it points to the way genres can be used to create action and to move a debate forward. 
In the postscript to a previous anthology on genre research, Ashley Rose Mehlen-
bacher remarked: 
Attending to conversations across disciplines and national contexts will become increasingly 
important as genre continues its unabated tour of our scholarly homes. Understanding genre 
studies is then to understand an interdisciplinary conversation that propels this idea of genre 
toward a complicated and likely contested idea of human communication in all its linguistic, 
social and cognitive capacities. (Mehlenbacher (then Kelly), 2017, 293)
The studies in the present volume continue the unabated tour into a context that 
clearly moves across disciplines and national contexts, but at the same time it takes 
it to new places on the intersection of research and politics and, by consequence, to 
the point where knowledge and societal action overlap. A major part of the potential, 
genre research has at this intersection springs from its systematic interest in genres as 
carriers and enablers of knowledge, action, and ideology. Because these genre struc-
turations are always there, sometimes very much under the radar, but also always 
malleable and subject to the control of individual actors, an understanding of the 
roles genres play can help us see the patterns, that are sometimes deployed against 
us, sometimes work on us without our knowledge, and can sometimes be harnessed 
for positive action. This might, in turn, help us react more appropriately when ideo-
logically charged think tanks deploy their divisionary uptakes to scientific evidence. 
We might even be able to see through the shtick when middle-aged pundits choose 
to fill the airwaves with divisionary op-eds, tweets or statements to direct the public 
attention away from the message of a teen girl deploying a well-known genre, the 
strike, in a surprising and surprisingly effective attempt to change the public debate 
over anthropogenic climate change.
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